Donald Trump may spend the remainder of his presidency indulging his narcissism to an extraordinary degree, exercising his constitutional powers to their fullest extent. Such behaviour would be entirely consistent with his temperament. It would, however, find little favour among Republicans already looking ahead to the next presidential election and the congressional contests that will accompany it. Meanwhile, for the next two years, the Democrats will wield legislative authority that will allow them to exert pressure on Trump and obstruct bills aligned with his domestic or foreign policies. This includes measures attached to federal budget legislation, which may become the subject of obstruction, prolonged delays and arduous negotiations.
Against this backdrop, Syrians have arguably benefited from Trump’s presidency through the removal of sanctions imposed on their country. Some of these measures, such as the legislation known as the Caesar Act, were linked to Bashar al‑Assad’s crimes, while the earliest American sanctions date back to the late 1970s. There is a widespread perception that the lifting of sanctions was driven by Trump’s personal wishes. He has, moreover, praised Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa on numerous occasions. His repeated assertions that he was the one who placed Sharaa in office bear the familiar stamp of Trumpian self‑congratulation, yet they are also widely interpreted as a form of political sponsorship.
Given these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the American election results should be viewed with unease in Damascus. Even if Trump’s policy toward Syria remains unchanged for now, his particular approach will almost certainly disappear when his presidency ends in two years. Trump is an exception among American presidents in the extent to which he personalises relations with foreign leaders. That exception is unlikely to be repeated, even if his successor in the White House is another Republican.
Indeed, once this personal dimension is stripped away, relations between Washington and Damascus shrink to the barest essentials. They have never developed, for example, to the point where Trump has shown meaningful concern for the economic hardships of a devastated country in urgent need of recovery projects.
Should the Democrats eventually regain the White House, they are unlikely to reverse course entirely in their dealings with Sharaa. It is worth recalling that Assad’s overthrow occurred in the final weeks of Joe Biden’s Democratic administration. A transformation of such magnitude in Syria at that moment must surely have had the assent of both Biden and Trump, who was then president‑elect. Nor are the Democrats likely to revoke the advantages Damascus secured during Trump’s presidency, for the simple reason that the most significant benefit the Syrian authorities have enjoyed has been the White House’s political embrace. The next president is unlikely to extend that embrace in quite the same fashion.
One challenge that may confront the authorities in Damascus is the Democrats’ particular sensitivity to minority rights. A more formidable obstacle, however, may arise from their bureaucratic approach and their insistence on the primacy of institutions, in marked contrast to Trump’s highly personalised exercise of power. The need to negotiate with American institutions would expose the institutional capabilities of the Syrian authorities to close scrutiny. Their faltering record thus far offers little reassurance about how they might fare in any difficult negotiations ahead.
A development affecting Syrians beyond those currently in power could arise from a broader shift in American foreign policy, with Washington becoming less concerned with the Middle East as a whole. Such a shift has advocates in both American parties and may gain further momentum if a new government takes office in Tel Aviv under a leader less eager to wage war and prolong it.
A waning American interest in the region, Syria included, would offer little comfort to either the authorities in Damascus or their opponents. Experience has repeatedly shown that American neglect can prove every bit as damaging as American involvement, particularly when international and regional actors interpret Washington’s signals and adjust their conduct accordingly.
Indeed, a measure of frustration has recently surfaced among some Syrian officials over the international community’s apparent indifference to rebuilding their country. Their complaints, however, have seldom been accompanied by serious attempts to understand why the world has turned away from Syria. There are, of course, other crises commanding international attention, many of them more immediately combustible. There is also the question of confidence in Syria’s circumstances, a confidence that depends on realities on the ground and cannot be secured through diplomatic meetings alone.
There is, moreover, the simple fact that countries everywhere are preoccupied with their own affairs. Syria must therefore recognise the limits of external assistance and resist the temptation to rely on foreign support at the expense of its own people and resources.
For decades, the picture has remained much the same: anxious or hopeful eyes fixed on the results of American or Israeli elections, watching from countries where no elections are held at all. There is nothing paradoxical in this. The coexistence of these opposites follows naturally from the prevailing political order.
The only apparent escape lies in the contagion of elections spreading to peoples long denied them. Societies that elect their own rulers possess greater confidence in themselves and have less reason to fear the electoral choices of others or invest their hopes in them.
Until that contagion brings deliverance, the worst scenario remains entirely possible: Syria may find itself abandoned to its own devices, only to discover that those very devices are another source of its suffering.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
