By Mohamed Abdirizak, the former minister of foreign affairs of Somalia

Why the next phase of state-building requires a renewed political consensus

A diplomat recently asked me a question that has remained with me ever since. “Will Somalia ever be a united country again?”

It was not the question itself that stayed with me. Diplomats ask difficult questions for a living. What struck me was that an experienced observer of Somalia’s long journey would now ask such a fundamental question about the country’s future.

Twenty years ago, the question was very different. The international community and Somali leaders were asking whether the Somali state could be rebuilt after more than a decade of collapse. Could Somalis establish national institutions? Could they reconcile former adversaries? Could they agree on a constitutional framework? Could they defeat violent extremism and restore the authority of the state?

Those questions produced the political settlement that emerged in 2004. The issue is no longer whether the Somali state can be rebuilt. It is whether the political settlement that made reconstruction possible can continue to sustain a country that has changed profoundly over the last two decades.

This is not an argument that the post-2004 settlement has failed. On the contrary, it achieved what many believed impossible. It restored Somalia’s international legitimacy, re-established national institutions, created a framework for federal governance, and gave the country an opportunity to emerge from one of the longest periods of state collapse in modern history.

No political settlement is permanent. They are designed for the circumstances in which they are negotiated. As countries change, political settlements must change with them. I believe Somalia has reached that moment.

A Different Somalia

The Somalia of 2026 is not the Somalia of 2004. The country is younger, more urban, more connected to the outside world, and more strategically important than at any time since the collapse of the state in 1991.

According to current demographic estimates, Somalia’s median age is approximately 16.6 years. Most Somalis have no memory of civil war or of the painstaking negotiations that shaped the post-transition political order. They inherited its institutions but not the circumstances that produced them.

The regional environment has also changed dramatically. The Red Sea has become one of the world’s most strategically contested waterways. Competition among regional and global powers has intensified. Security challenges in the Horn of Africa are increasingly intertwined with developments in the Gulf, the Suez Canal, and the wider Middle East.

At the same time, international priorities are shifting. The willingness of external partners to provide open-ended political, financial and security support can no longer be taken for granted. Yet much of Somalia’s political debate remains anchored in the assumptions of twenty years ago.

This disconnect between the Somalia of today and the political settlement of 2004 deserves far greater attention than it has received.

The Achievement of 2004

It is important to begin by acknowledging what the post-2004 political settlement accomplished. Those of us who were involved in Somalia’s state-building efforts understood that there was no perfect solution. Federalism, power-sharing arrangements, and transitional institutions were not adopted because everyone agreed on every detail. They were adopted because they represented the most practical means of rebuilding trust after years of conflict and restoring a functioning Somali state.

The settlement that emerged from the peace process was, above all, a political compromise. It accommodated competing interests, created space for reconciliation, and gradually rebuilt national institutions. Without that compromise, Somalia would not have returned to international diplomacy, developed permanent federal institutions, or begun the long process of constitutional reconstruction.

Its achievements deserve recognition. But it is equally important to recognize its limitations. The settlement was designed to end a period of state collapse. It was not intended to become the final blueprint for governing Somalia indefinitely. Peace agreements create opportunities. They do not eliminate the need for political renewal. Twenty years later, many of the country’s most fundamental constitutional and political questions remain unresolved.

The Federal Compact Under Pressure

The strength of any federal system ultimately depends less on constitutional text than on political confidence. Federal governments and constituent states will disagree. That is the nature of every federation. What matters is whether those disagreements are resolved through institutions that all sides regard as legitimate.

Recent political developments suggest that this confidence has weakened. Political disputes surrounding leadership transitions in Southwest State and Galmudug, the commencement of the Hirshabelle electoral process, continuing disagreements with Puntland and Jubaland, and broader disputes over constitutional amendments and electoral reforms are often discussed as separate issues. In reality, they are symptoms of a larger challenge.

For the first time since the federal system was established, several pillars of Somalia’s political settlement appear to be under strain simultaneously. The constitutional review remains contested. Relations between the Federal Government and some Federal Member States have deteriorated. There is no national consensus on the electoral framework. Trust among key political stakeholders has declined.

 Individually, each of these problems is manageable.Taken together, they point to something more significant: a gradual weakening of the political compact that has held Somalia together since 2004. That should concern all Somalis.

Constitutional Politics Cannot Replace Constitutional Consensus

Perhaps no issue better illustrates Somalia’s current predicament than the unfinished constitution.
The constitutional review process was intended to complete Somalia’s transition from conflict management to constitutional governance. Instead, constitutional questions have increasingly become the principal arena of political contestation.

Disagreements over the division of powers, electoral arrangements, the relationship between the Federal Government and the Federal Member States, and the procedures for constitutional amendment continue to generate political uncertainty.

Constitutions are meant to provide the rules within which politics takes place. They should not themselves become the principal object of political conflict. No constitutional order can command lasting legitimacy if significant political actors believe that fundamental rules are being determined without broad national consensus.

For Somalia, completing the constitution is no longer simply a legal exercise. It is an essential step toward rebuilding political trust.

A Changing Strategic Environment

While Somalia has struggled to resolve its internal political questions, its strategic importance has increased considerably.

The Horn of Africa has become central to global maritime security. Instability in the Red Sea has elevated Somalia’s strategic importance and intensified competition among regional and international powers. Somalia’s long coastline and location at the gateway to the Red Sea present significant opportunities—but also significant responsibilities.

Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, the United States, the European Union and others all have legitimate interests in Somalia and the wider Horn of Africa.

That should not surprise anyone. Every nation pursues its own strategic interests. The challenge for Somalia is not how to avoid international competition. It is how to ensure that external partnerships reinforce Somali sovereignty rather than substitute for Somali political consensus.

Strong states manage geopolitical competition. Weak states become arenas in which others compete.Somalia cannot afford the latter.

International Patience Is Not Unlimited

For more than three decades, Somalia has benefited from extraordinary international support. The United Nations, the African Union, bilateral partners and international financial institutions have invested enormous political, financial and diplomatic resources in supporting Somalia’s recovery.

Many Somalis understandably came to assume that this level of engagement would continue indefinitely.Recent developments suggest otherwise.

The decision by the United States to oppose further United Nations logistical and operational support for the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) beyond the current mandate ending on 31 December 2026 is significant not simply because of its financial implications. It signals a broader reassessment of long-standing international approaches to Somalia’s security and state-building.

Whether driven by changing global priorities, competing crises or frustration with Somalia’s prolonged political deadlock, the message is difficult to ignore. International partnerships will remain important. But no external partner can indefinitely substitute for Somali political agreement.

Ultimately, the future of the Somali state will be determined not in foreign capitals, but by the ability of Somalis themselves to reach durable political consensus.

Leadership in a More Competitive World

Throughout my career in public service, I have consistently believed that Somalia’s unity is both a historical responsibility and a strategic necessity. That conviction has not changed. Neither has another lesson I have learned through years of diplomacy and public service.

International partners can support peace. They can finance development. They can assist security institutions. They cannot create political legitimacy. Only Somalis can do that.

The coming years will require a different kind of leadership—leadership capable of engaging confidently with multiple international partners while remaining firmly anchored in a national vision that transcends personalities, electoral cycles and political rivalries.

The true measure of leadership is not the number of international partnerships a country attracts. It is whether those partnerships strengthen national institutions and advance the long-term interests of the state.

The Generation Waiting for Tomorrow

Perhaps the greatest challenge facing Somalia receives the least attention. Somalia is one of the youngest countries in the world. The median age is just over sixteen years. Most young Somalis have no personal memory of state collapse, the Arta Conference, the Mbagathi peace process, or the difficult negotiations that produced the federal system. They have inherited the institutions that emerged from those efforts, but they did not participate in creating them.

Their aspirations are understandably different. They are concerned with education, employment, entrepreneurship, technology, and the opportunities that will allow them to build productive lives. They want accountable institutions, economic opportunity, and a country that competes successfully in the region and the wider world.

Yet much of Somalia’s political discourse remains consumed by the unfinished business of yesterday. The generation that rebuilt the Somali state after collapse was understandably preoccupied with restoring peace and preventing renewed conflict. That was its historic responsibility. The responsibility of this generation is different. It must transform a successful peace settlement into a durable constitutional democracy.

No political settlement can remain legitimate indefinitely if it does not evolve with the society it serves. Institutions that once inspired confidence can gradually lose public support if they fail to respond to changing realities. Political renewal is therefore not a rejection of the past. It is the means by which the achievements of the past are preserved.

Renewing Somalia’s Political Settlement

If Somalia’s greatest challenge is no longer rebuilding the state but strengthening it, then our national conversation must also change.

For much of the last two decades, political debate has revolved around the mechanics of governance: power-sharing formulas, constitutional provisions, electoral systems, institutional mandates, and the allocation of authority between different levels of government.

These debates are important. But they are not the destination. They are the instruments through which we pursue a larger objective.

That objective is to build a Somali state that enjoys the confidence of its citizens, commands the respect of its neighbors, protects its sovereignty, and creates opportunities for future generations.That requires a renewed political settlement.

By renewal, I do not mean abandoning the achievements of 2004 or beginning another prolonged transitional process. Somalia has already spent too many years in transition. Nor do I suggest that every institution created over the past two decades should be reconsidered. The opposite is true.

The achievements of the post-2004 settlement should be preserved. But they must now be strengthened by a broader national consensus capable of addressing the constitutional, political, and strategic realities of today.

A renewed political settlement should pursue several objectives. It should restore trust between the Federal Government and the Federal Member States.  It should complete the Provisional Constitution through broad national consensus.  It should establish an electoral framework accepted across the political spectrum.

Equally important, it must strengthen institutions rather than personalities.  It should also reaffirm federalism while clarifying constitutional responsibilities of federal and state institutions.

Finally, it must prepare Somalia for a generation whose aspirations extend well beyond conflict management. And it should enable Somalia to engage confidently with regional and international partners while preserving its strategic independence and national sovereignty.

None of these objectives is beyond Somalia’s reach. Indeed, they are more achievable today than they were twenty years ago. Somalia today has functioning national institutions, experienced political leaders, an increasingly capable professional class, and international partners that continue to support Somali-led solutions. The problem is no longer a lack of capacity. It is the absence of sustained political consensus.

A Moment That Requires Leadership

Every generation inherits its own national task. Nations experience periods of reconstruction, periods of consolidation, and moments when existing political arrangements must adapt to changing circumstances. Somalia has arrived at such a moment.

The question before us is not whether the post-2004 settlement was successful. History has already answered that. Without it, Somalia would not have re-established national institutions, regained international recognition, or begun rebuilding after state collapse.

The more important question is whether we now possess the wisdom to build upon those achievements rather than assume they can indefinitely sustain themselves.

Political settlements survive because people continue to believe in them. When that confidence weakens, institutions weaken with it. Renewing political consensus is therefore not optional. It is essential.

Having worked on Somalia’s peace process, constitutional development, democratization, and diplomacy over many years, I have learned one lesson above all others: no international partner, however committed, can substitute for Somali political leadership.

Conclusion

This brings me back to the diplomat’s question. “Will Somalia ever be a united country again?”
My answer is yes.

But unity cannot rest on sentiment alone. It must be sustained by institutions that command confidence, constitutional arrangements that enjoy broad legitimacy, and political leadership capable of placing the national interest above immediate political advantage.

The generation that gathered in 2004 accomplished something remarkable. It rescued the Somali state from collapse and created the political foundations upon which today’s Somalia stands.

Our responsibility is equally historic.Our task is to ensure that those foundations are strong enough to support the next chapter of Somalia’s state-building.

When future generations look back on this period, they may identify three defining moments.The first established the Somali Republic in 1960. The second rebuilt the Somali state after collapse through the political settlement that emerged in 2004. The third has yet to be written.

Whether it becomes the moment when Somalia renewed its political compact and completed its democratic transition—or the moment when political division allowed the gains of the past two decades to erode—depends on the choices we make today.

Mohamed Abdirizak
The former minister of foreign affairs of Somalia