Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk (center) with European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen
A study by Michael Thoma aims to show how a coordinated network of official statements, state media coverage, and pro-government investigative platforms is said to have helped portray the 2026 Hungarian elections as a geopolitical battle over Russian influence, using methods that are reportedly strikingly similar to the EU’s Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI).
The article, which originally appeared on Ansage, examines Polish activities related to the Hungarian parliamentary elections of April 12, 2026, using the analytical framework outlined in the third report by the European External Action Service (EEAS) on threats from foreign information manipulation and interference, published in March 2025.
The EEAS model divides the architecture of a FIMI analysis into four functional levels: The first level consists of official state channels, followed by the level of state-controlled media. The third level is formed by state-affiliated channels, and finally, the fourth level consists of state-linked channels.
This level—the most widespread and least visible—enables the mass dissemination of narratives while ensuring the highest degree of credible deniability,”
the analysis states.
According to Michael Thoma, the Polish side systematically disseminated a narrative linking Viktor Orbán to the Russian state, with the aim of undermining his electoral prospects. These measures were not random, isolated events, but rather formed a coherent information construct that could be broken down into the four levels of the FIMI architecture.
Official State channels
As the study notes, the most important official Polish actor in the campaign was Prime Minister Donald Tusk.
The first significant episode occurred in February 2026, when Tusk held a bilateral meeting with the leader of the Hungarian opposition, Péter Magyar, on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference. The next phase began on March 22, 2026, after The Washington Post reported on the alleged actions of Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó, who was said to have passed information from EU Council meetings to Russia. Tusk reacted immediately and sharply; not only was the wording of his response striking, but so was the speed of his reaction. According to a number of analysts, the Polish intelligence service itself may have been the original source of the leak on which The Washington Post relied.
Further escalation followed the release of audio recordings of conversations between Szijjártó and Sergei Lavrov by a consortium led by VSquare after March 31, 2026. Tusk’s reaction, in which he highlighted the Orbán government’s political dependence on Russia, made it clear that the new report was not presented as material requiring further examination, but rather as “confirmation” that reinforced the campaign’s central message—the Orbán government’s dependence on Moscow—the analysis concludes.
On April 13, after the election had taken place, Tusk delivered his political verdict during an official visit to South Korea: “First Warsaw, then Bucharest, Chișinău, and now Budapest. I am glad that this part of Europe is showing that we are not doomed to corrupt and authoritarian rule.”
According to the analysis, this statement places the Hungarian election result within the regional context of a “liberal wave,” with Poland acting not as an observer but as one of the centers generating political momentum.
State-controlled media
According to the journalist, the second tier of Poland’s information activities was represented by state-controlled media, primarily TVP World—the English-language international service of Polish television. In March and April 2026, this broadcaster is said to have systematically promoted the anti-Orbán narrative, taking into account the role of Russian intelligence.
As examples, a report published on March 10 was cited, in which Orbán’s ties to Russia were portrayed as a new “geopolitical variable” in the election campaign. On March 15, the service reported on the election’s progress within a characteristic framework: “Orbán is trailing in the polls, despite alleged support from the Russian intelligence service.” On April 12, election day, the broadcaster published the article “How Russia Spread Disinformation in Hungary Before the Election.”
According to the journalist, TVP World’s approach was relatively simple but effective.
The broadcaster used a format of expert commentary featuring Hungarian and European analysts, thereby creating the appearance of a neutral discussion.
At the same time, the editorial framework remained unchanged: Orbán is a pro-Russian figure who poses a threat to European security.
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Via ansage.org; Featured image: newsroom.consilium.europa.eu
