Abdülhamit Bilici, Washington, D.C.

Ongoing joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran, launched on February 28, leading to the killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, have fueled debate over whether the Islamic Republic could face regime change and what a post-Khamenei political order might look like.

But Dr. Mehdi Noorbaksh, an Iranian political analyst and professor of international affairs and business at Harrisburg University of Science and Technology in Pennsylvania, says expectations of a rapid collapse of the Iranian regime are unrealistic.

Speaking on the final episode of the “Timeline” program on YouTube, Noorbaksh claimed that comparisons with the so-called “Venezuela model” — the idea that removing a country’s top leader could trigger the rapid collapse of the ruling system — do not apply to Iran.

Dr. Mehdi Noorbaksh (Photo: Harrisburg University)

The term gained renewed attention after the January 2026 US intervention in Venezuela that resulted in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro. Some analysts have drawn parallels with the killing of Khamenei, suggesting that a similar leadership “decapitation” could weaken Iran’s ruling system.

Noorbaksh, however, says Iran’s political structure, unified military command and strong nationalist sentiment make such a scenario unlikely.

Below are key excerpts from the interview.

How do you see the US–Israeli attack on Iran? Will it lead to regime change, as some people expect?

No, I do not believe it will. Those who think the Iranian political system is simple are making a serious mistake. The system is complex and layered. For regime change in any country, you normally need “boots on the ground.” When leadership is decapitated or the military is targeted, someone must control the territory and dismantle the remaining structures of power. That is not happening in Iran.

The military remains unified and the leadership structure itself is complex. The Iranian regime has always valued the system more than any individual leader. It is an ideological government, and as long as that ideology continues to be carried by other leaders, the system can survive the loss of one person.

Of course, the death of Khamenei will bring change. Many people were already waiting for the post-Khamenei era. In some ways, the situation is comparable to China after Mao [Chinese communist revolutionary who founded the People’s Republic of China in 1949], where major political change could only occur after Mao’s death.

In Iran, we may now see a different political environment. I was speaking today with people connected to the government, and there are already rumors that some political prisoners might be released. Figures such as Mir-Hossein Mousavi [a former prime minister and opposition figure] are being discussed.

There is also growing discussion in Iranian society about a possible referendum on the country’s future political system.

So the regime may not collapse, but Iranian politics after Khamenei could change significantly.

So the so-called “Venezuela model” would not work in Iran?

Exactly. In Venezuela, the idea was to isolate Nicolás Maduro, decapitate the leadership and encourage the military to defect.

In Iran, that strategy cannot work. The military is highly unified. And it has two major components: the regular army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. For the first time in recent years, these two forces have cooperated closely in defending the country.

They have demonstrated significant capabilities. I am not saying they could defeat the United States or Israel, but they have shown they can defend themselves to a certain degree.

A recent poll in the United States suggested that only about one in four Americans believes the strike on Iran was a good idea. From your perspective, what percentage of Iranians think this attack was a good idea?

There are monarchists who support Reza Pahlavi [an Iranian opposition figure and the eldest son of Iran’s last shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi], and some of them welcomed the attack. Pahlavi has close relations with [Israeli Prime Minister] Benjamin Netanyahu, and some of his supporters encouraged military intervention. But overall, the situation is very different inside Iran.

Civilian casualties including children have created enormous anger. Many people now see the attack as an attempt to create chaos in the hope that the population will rise up against the government. That strategy is deeply flawed. Iranian nationalism is very strong, and many people, even those who oppose the regime, do not support foreign military intervention.

Some members of the Iranian diaspora were seen celebrating while bombs were falling on Iran. How do you respond to that?

I prefer not to judge individuals, but personally I find it shameful. Celebrating while children are dying is something I cannot support.

President Donald Trump promised to end wars and promoted an “America First” approach. Also, the Venezuela model will not work in Iran. Under those conditions, why would he choose this path?

Several explanations have been suggested. One argument is that Trump believed Iran had plotted to assassinate him. Another explanation, mentioned by [Secretary of State] Marco Rubio is that the United States joined the war to prevent Israel from acting alone. But Netanyahu himself suggested in an interview that Trump had already decided early in his second term that Iran would be attacked.

The key point is that Iran was not a major threat at this moment. Many of its regional proxies had already been weakened.

Look at the region: Syria has moved away from Iranian influence. Hezbollah has lost power. Hamas has been severely weakened. So the claim that Iran was an immediate threat is difficult to justify.

How do you expect Iranian society to react to these attacks? Will nationalism grow stronger, or will opposition to the regime intensify?

I believe nationalism will become stronger. But this is not far-right nationalism. Iranian nationalism is rooted in a patriotic tradition associated with Mohammad Mossadegh, who was the Iranian prime minister in the 1950s and nationalized Iran’s oil industry to defend the country’s sovereignty.

This form of nationalism is inclusive. It embraces minorities, Azeris, Kurds, Baluchis and others, as equal citizens. When a country is attacked from outside, even critics of the government often unite to defend the nation.

If a military intervention is not a solution, what would be the best path toward a transition in Iran?

First, political prisoners must be released. That would be the most important signal that change is beginning.

Second, society must be allowed to participate freely in political life.

Eventually, Iran should hold a referendum on the nature of its political system, perhaps within a few years. Many activists envision a government that separates religion from the state while still respecting religious traditions.

A democratic Iran would respect pluralism, human rights and secular governance.

One final question: Is there a risk that the Revolutionary Guards could take full control and create an even more radical system?

There is always a risk. But Iranian society is very resilient. Look at the women’s protests against mandatory hijab just a few years ago. Despite repression, people continue to demand change.

Iran experienced a constitutional revolution as early as 1905, and for more than a century Iranians have pushed for democracy.

I believe that eventually the country will move beyond both monarchy and clerical authoritarianism.

I am hopeful, not idealistically hopeful, but informed by what I see happening in Iranian society.