Enab Baladi – Mohammad Kakhi

Syria joined the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in September 2013 under Russian- and US-led pressure on the deposed Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, after he used chemical weapons in an attack on the Ghouta of Damascus (on the eastern outskirts of Damascus) that asphyxiated 1,144 people, including 1,119 civilians and 25 opposition fighters.

Despite Syria’s accession to the OPCW, the organisation’s Fact-Finding Mission documented 74 instances of potential chemical-weapons use in 2014, just one year after Damascus joined.

According to a report by the Syrian Network for Human Rights, the former Syrian government carried out no fewer than 222 chemical attacks in Syria between 2012 and 2021.

Openness from Damascus

Following the fall of the former regime, OPCW Director-General Fernando Arias met in Damascus on 8 February with a high-level technical delegation, Syria’s Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani, and Syria’s interim-period president Ahmed al-Sharaa.
The OPCW said at the time the meetings were long, productive, and highly open, with an in-depth exchange of information that would form the basis for concrete outcomes and break an impasse that had lasted more than 11 years.

On 9 October, Syria’s Foreign Ministry welcomed a decision on the “accelerated destruction of any remaining chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.” The decision also amended the title of the Syria chemical dossier on the Executive Council’s agenda to: “Elimination of any remnants of the chemical weapons programme of the Assad era.”

Thaer Hijazi, a human-rights activist who has documented a large number of chemical-weapons uses in Syria and co-founded the Civil Network for Rights and Development, told Enab Baladi this signals that the new Syrian state has no connection to the legacy left by the deposed Assad regime. He described the change as symbolically meaningful and positive in shedding that legacy.

The decision instructs OPCW inspection teams to continue investigating and collecting evidence on chemical-weapons use, with the resulting material to support national accountability tracks, departing from past practice in which findings were shared primarily with UN bodies.

In June, the OPCW deployed the first team from its Office of Special Missions (OSM) to Syria with tasks that include visiting declared or suspected sites linked to chemical-weapons activities, collecting evidence and documents, and taking samples for analysis at designated laboratories, among others.

An Israeli strike on Syria’s General Staff building in Damascus on 16 July prevented the deployment of a second team from the OPCW Technical Secretariat.

The Secretariat is currently planning upcoming inspections at the Barzeh facility (northern Damascus) and at Jamraya (Rif Dimashq, northwest of Damascus), both affiliated with the Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC).

A positive step toward sanctions relief

On 26 April, Syria’s Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani sent a letter to the United States responding to a list of conditions for a possible partial sanctions easing, stating that Damascus had met most of them. Among Washington’s eight conditions was the destruction of any remaining Syrian chemical-weapons stockpiles, according to Reuters.

The four-page document detailed measures Syria has taken to address chemical-weapons stocks, including strengthening liaison with the OPCW.

On 5 March, the foreign minister addressed the OPCW Executive Council’s 108th session, affirming the Syrian government’s commitment to dismantling any remnants of the chemical-weapons programme developed under the former regime, ensuring justice for victims, and establishing firm international norms to prevent any recurrence of chemical-weapons use.

Vittorio Maresca di Seracapriola, lead sanctions analyst at the Karam Shaar Consulting Center, told Enab Baladi that the 1991 Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act had, in essence, restricted US foreign assistance, US government-backed credit, exports of national-security-sensitive goods and technology, and US bank lending to the Syrian government.
He added that President Donald Trump lifted these restrictions on the grounds that Syria had undergone what the administration described as a fundamental change in government policy and leadership. In that sense, the move was designed to acknowledge and encourage changes in Syrian government behaviour related to non-proliferation norms, particularly given its past use of such weapons, according to di Seracapriola.

Caesar conditions

Di Seracapriola noted that some sanctions on Syria reference chemical weapons generally as a condition for suspension, but it is important to distinguish between general references to chemical weapons and specific requirements to destroy them, as these are different.

For example, Condition “1” for suspending sanctions under the Caesar Act simply states that Syrian airspace is no longer used by the Syrian government or the Russian government to target civilians with incendiary weapons, including barrel bombs, chemical weapons, conventional weapons, as well as air-launched missiles and explosives, he said.

By contrast, Condition “5” under the Caesar Act provides that sanctions may be suspended if the Syrian government takes concrete, verifiable steps to meet its obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. “So the issue is not only about destroying chemical weapons per se; it includes that as part of broader obligations not to develop or use them,” he added.

Continuing accountability

Investigations and legal actions brought by Syrian human-rights organisations in recent years led, in November 2023, to four arrest warrants against figures implicated in crimes against humanity and complicity in war crimes.

The warrants targeted, alongside Bashar al-Assad, his brother Maher, and two brigadier generals: Ghassan Abbas, who directed “Branch 450” of the SSRC, and Bassam al-Hassan, Assad’s strategic affairs adviser and liaison between the Presidential Palace and the SSRC.

Thaer Hijazi believes the OPCW’s technical mechanisms set up to investigate chemical attacks in Syria will bolster any genuine accountability process for those linked to these attacks.
These teams document chemical-weapons uses in Syria, lay the groundwork for legal documentation by interviewing witnesses and survivors, test soil, air, and site samples, analyse launch-point data and possible trajectories, and determine the units, locations, or airbases from which munitions were fired or aircraft took off, he said.
They also identify those responsible for the use, according to Hijazi.

Hijazi added that national committees can also benefit from this body of work, especially given the large number of documented uses. He stressed that domestic judicial efforts must dovetail with international efforts by various bodies so the government can rely on the facts and findings held by these teams to ensure real accountability for individuals directly involved in deploying chemical weapons across Syrian areas over the past years.

Obstacles and difficulties

The former Syrian authorities declared 41 chemical-weapons facilities at 23 sites, including 18 production facilities (with fixed filling lines), 12 storage facilities, eight mobile filling units, and three facilities associated with chemical weapons.

However, information provided by States Parties, locations cited in OPCW decision-making documents, and sites newly disclosed by the current Syrian government indicate there are more than 100 additional locations that may have been involved in activities related to chemical weapons. The OPCW plans to visit all declared, additional, and suspected sites.

In March and April, an inspection team, supported by the current Syrian government, visited four declared sites and five suspected sites, including Barzeh and Jamraya facilities affiliated with the SSRC, which had not been part of previous inspection rounds.

Hijazi said there are many obstacles to the teams’ work, including the years during which the file remained frozen, the former regime’s clandestine practices, and both political and technical stonewalling in Syria toward past investigative missions.
He cautioned that original documents tied to the programme may have been lost or destroyed, whether deliberately by regime remnants or previously by the regime itself, or due to fighting in numerous areas near labs, depots, or military units that stored such weapons for use.

He added that former personnel from the prior era who knew the programme’s secrets are no longer available; many fled the country or are in hiding, and fear of prosecution will deter cooperation.

A major impediment, he said, is the Israeli Air Force’s repeated strikes on sites that once contained evidence of chemical-weapons use; some targets may have included labs for developing or storing the weapons. In November 2024, Israel carried out airstrikes against several Syrian government chemical-weapons facilities in western Syria, according to Israel’s Channel 12.

The OPCW Technical Secretariat has called on States Parties to provide voluntary contributions to fund its Syria activities. The organisation says it needs €16.7 million in 2025, with estimated needs of €15.3 million in 2026 and €14.3 million in 2027, to complete its tasks and implement measures to prevent, among other things, the re-emergence, proliferation, and use of chemical weapons.