Nearly eighteen months after Syria’s liberation and the collapse of the Assad regime, the country still awaits a law to regulate political life and grant legitimacy to the formation of parties. Syrian society emerged from decades of authoritarianism and the devastation of war with its socio-political vitality severely eroded. In the resulting vacuum, traditional communal structures—family, tribe, region, and sect—have surged to the forefront.
Yet these communal ties, despite their deep social roots, cannot serve as the basis for a modern state. They dissolve individual identity, restrict personal intellectual and political choice, and, if left unchecked, will reproduce fragmentation, entrench narrow loyalties, and deepen Syria’s political dysfunction.
The responsibility for organizing political life now rests squarely with the authorities. This is a critical milestone for fortifying the Syrian body politic against networks of patronage, authoritarian reflexes, and corruption. From a professional standpoint, no healthy or balanced political system can emerge without a national opposition operating from within the political structure itself.
From this perspective, enacting a political parties law is an urgent priority—one that cannot be postponed—while larger democratic milestones may unfold gradually. A parties law does not instantly produce democracy; it lays the groundwork for its eventual emergence. New parties require years to articulate coherent visions and build social constituencies. This process can be structured in stages: beginning with municipal elections, progressing to provincial councils, and culminating in parliamentary and presidential contests.
Meanwhile, the first People’s Assembly of the new era is expected to convene in the coming months. Its members, however, will be independent individuals lacking unified programs or political platforms. In practice, any parliament without organized blocs is limited in its effectiveness. Parliament is a sovereign institution tasked with producing legitimacy and maintaining a balance of power among the branches of government. Ideally, parliamentary elections should follow the emergence of political currents and parties—not precede them.
Some may argue that democracy is not an immediate priority compared with urgent needs such as improving living conditions, stabilizing the economy, ensuring security, achieving transitional justice, and facilitating the return of displaced Syrians. This argument has merit and invites deeper debate. Democracy is not a sudden decision but a gradual process shaped through years of interaction, experimentation, and refinement. Even if democracy is not the foremost priority, the groundwork for its eventual realization must be laid now. That responsibility rests with the transitional government. Enacting a parties law is not about instant democratization; it is about training Syrians in political participation and decision-making.
A common objection is that extremist, sectarian, or populist nationalist currents—many of which reject democracy outright—may dominate the scene if political pluralism is permitted. This concern is valid, but it only reinforces the need for a rigorous parties law grounded in the protection of sovereignty and national unity. Any party that rejects political and legal equality among citizens, denies Syria as a final homeland, or promotes hate speech against any group should be disqualified from licensing at the outset.
This raises legitimate questions about the role of the current authorities within the emerging partisan landscape. Will President Ahmad al-Sharaa or other influential figures establish their own parties? Will the President remain neutral? Will figures associated with the authorities be permitted to form competing parties? And will the political field remain level for all participants?
These questions coincide with an urgent need to insulate the military, security services, and judiciary from partisan conflict. This is essential to avoid repeating the experiences of the 1950s and 1960s, when political parties infiltrated the military and weaponized it in their struggles for power. The military’s role must be strictly confined to protecting state sovereignty—especially during this transitional phase.
While drafting this article, a friend asked me skeptically, “Do you really expect democracy and political parties like those in Canada or Europe?”—implying that democracy is ill-suited to our societies. I harbor no romantic illusions about the realities of Syrian society or the nature of political systems in our region, including the transitional authority. But I write out of conviction—out of a belief in articulating what is necessary for the country’s future, and in the importance of trying rather than surrendering to the status quo.
Deepening democratic practice may take decades, which is precisely why we must begin early. The alternative is to sweep the crises of tyranny and nepotism under a rug woven with lofty slogans and soft promises, while the underlying ailment continues to fester.
The Syrian individual is, first and foremost, a human being—and what has improved the conditions of other peoples can improve ours as well. The principles of democracy, equal citizenship, the rule of law, and state neutrality toward the beliefs of its citizens are pillars that global experience has shown to be essential for stability and public satisfaction. We are not asking for the impossible. It is enough for Syria to advance steadily—even incrementally—on the Global Democracy Index and the World Freedom Index. We must not capitulate to a bleak, transient reality, nor relinquish the dream of freedom for which Syrians have paid an immeasurable price.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
