By Dayib Sh Ahmed
The Horn of Africa has become ground zero for a new kind of power play one where recognizing breakaway states doubles as Red Sea strategy. Israel’s December recognition of Somaliland, coming as Saudi Arabia expands its own Gulf of Aden presence, marks a shift: Sovereignty itself has become a bargaining chip. Who controls legitimacy increasingly determines who controls the shipping lanes.
And right now, Somalia’s territorial integrity which matters far more than most policymakers realize hangs in the balance. The stakes are global. Thirty percent of container traffic worldwide passes through the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait. When Houthi attacks disrupted shipping last year, insurance costs tripled. Freight rates from Asia to Europe jumped forty percent. This narrow passage carries Gulf oil, Asian exports, European imports. Even brief instability sends shockwaves through global markets. Somalia controls Africa’s longest coastline facing the Arabian Peninsula. When its government weakens or fragments, the entire maritime security architecture suffers. Piracy returns. Smuggling networks expand. Terrorist groups find new footholds. Regional powers start competing for access. We’ve seen this movie before in the late 2000s, when Somali piracy became a global crisis. We’re one political collapse away from a sequel.
The Imperial Gambit
To grasp what Israel just did, you need to understand where Israel comes from. Israel was created under British imperial sponsorship and protected by over seventy years of American power. Today, the British Empire is long gone, and America’s global position is eroding. Into this void, Israel is attempting something unprecedented: transforming itself from a client state into an independent regional power.
In this context, as Professor Graham Allison, Dean of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, described the “Thucydides Trap” as what happens when a rising power challenges an established hegemon. He argued in his 2017 book, Destined for War, about China and America. However, the same dynamic explains Israeli strategy today. Facing, unreliable patrons, Israel is building its own dream empire permanent military control of the Eastern Mediterranean, strategic bases along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, and security reach extending to the Caspian Sea.
In line with this, the Abraham Accords fit this pattern. They’re not primarily about peace with Arab states. Rather, they’re about fragmenting potential opposition, breaking the Islamic world and Africa into smaller, weaker pieces that can’t effectively resist Israeli expansion. Within this strategy, Somaliland is the latest move in this game. And history won’t be kind to those who see it happening and say nothing.
Why Somaliland Recognition Breaks the System
Between 1945 and 2020, nearly 35 secessionist movements emerged worldwide seeking to establish independent states by breaking away from existing UN member countries, entities known in political science as “de facto states,” and international research shows their outcomes generally fall into four categories: forceful reintegration, as in Katanga (DRC), Biafra (Nigeria), and Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka); peaceful reintegration, as in Gagauzia (Moldova); survival without legal recognition, the largest group with 20 entities including Western Sahara; and full statehood, achieved only by Eritrea (1993), East Timor (2002), and South Sudan (2011).
Among the surviving de facto entities, some have been recognized by one or a few countries, but such recognition is bilateral and political in nature and does not constitute international legal statehood, which typically requires a formal agreement with the parent state, broad international acceptance, and UN membership, as in the case of South Sudan’s negotiated settlement with Sudan.
Accordingly, the political recognition reportedly granted by Israel to Somaliland does not amount to legal recognition, since statehood requires UN membership, access to international financial systems, membership in institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, treaty-making capacity, international recognition of passports and official documents, and protection under international law; without these, Somaliland remains a de facto entity and legally part of the Federal Republic of Somalia, comparable to Northern Cyprus, recognized only by Turkey for over 50 years, and Western Sahara, which remains in prolonged legal and political limbo.
However, Israel’s recognition does more than offend diplomatic sensibilities. It legitimizes state fragmentation as a tool of foreign policy. Once this precedent is set, you normalize recognizing breakaway regions for strategic advantage, and you open Pandora’s box. Consider, for example, what this means for Saudi Arabia and Gulf States Red Sea plans. Riyadh has spent years building maritime security frameworks, coordinating with coastal states, and trying to prevent exactly the kind of jurisdictional chaos that recognition creates. Who do you negotiate with when authority is contested? Who enforces maritime law when two governments claim the same waters? Who coordinates counterterrorism when political legitimacy is disputed?
In practice, every recognition chips away at the legal architecture that makes cooperation possible. At the same time, Somalia’s internal struggles make this worse. After decades rebuilding from civil war, the country still grapples with federal disputes and contested authority. Its 2012 constitution defines how power gets shared between Mogadishu and regional states. That framework imperfect as it is, provides, the only basis for political order. By contrast, bypass, it, and you get competing power centers. Legal ambiguity. Institutional collapse. For this reason, For the United States, European Union and Saudi Arabia, this, matters because security partnerships require legitimate counterparts. You can’t run joint counterterrorism operations when you’re not sure who’s actually in charge. You can’t coordinate maritime patrols when coastal authority is disputed. Constitutional order isn’t a nicety it’s operational necessity. Here’s what keeps Gulf strategists up at night, If Somaliland gets recognized after thirty-four years of de facto independence, what about every other breakaway region? What message does this send to separatist movements across the Middle East and Africa, especially this should concern Ethiopia and Kenya most. Both are far more diverse and structurally complex than Somalia—Ethiopia with 12 regional states and over 80 ethnic groups, Kenya with 47 counties and more than 40 communities.
Somalia, by contrast, is largely ethnically homogeneous. If secession is normalized there, what precedent does it set for countries whose stability depends on delicate constitutional and social balances? Legitimizing fragmentation in Somalia sends a dangerous regional signal. It weakens territorial integrity—the foundation of stability in the Horn. For Ethiopia and Kenya, this is a strategic red line, not a distant problem. Indeed, The African Union, Arab League and IGAD all immediately rejected Israel’s move. They understand the danger. Contested borders and fragile states already define this region. Normalize fragmentation, and you’ve lit a fuse. Somalia unified can secure its coastline, coordinate with neighbors, participate in regional security. Somalia fragmented becomes another failed state exporting instability piracy, terrorism, proxy conflicts. We know this because we’ve watched it happen before. The choice isn’t theoretical. It’s a direct calculation about whether Red Sea security gets built on stable governance or jurisdictional chaos.
Where Interests Converge
Strip away the rhetoric, and you find unusual alignment. Somalia wants territorial integrity. Saudi Arabia needs maritime stability. The U.S. and EU want functioning counterterrorism partners and secure trade routes. These interests converge on the same point: a unified Somali state with constitutional legitimacy. But convergence doesn’t automatically produce cooperation.
Somalia needs political coherence credible institutions, respected constitutional processes, effective governance. External partners need discipline sustained engagement, not episodic attention when crises flare. Supporting Somali state consolidation isn’t altruism. It’s cold strategic calculation. For Saudi Arabia, central to every Red Sea initiative, engaging a unified Somalia means dealing with one government, one legal system, one set of commitments. For Washington and Brussels, it means reliable partnerships in a region where reliability is scarce. The alternative fragmented authority, parallel governments, competing claims—makes every security challenge harder and every diplomatic solution more remote.
Getting the Message Right
Political reform needs strategic communication to back it up. Somalia’s case should reach policymakers in Riyadh, Washington and Brussels in language they understand: security requirements, legal frameworks, operational efficiency.
Not grievance politics. Not historical claims. Not emotional appeals.
The argument is simple: Constitutional legitimacy enables cooperation. Territorial integrity prevents chaos. Maritime governance requires clear authority. When Somalia speaks this language through credible diplomatic channels and policy engagement, it gets heard. When it doesn’t, others fill the vacuum usually with narratives that justify exactly the kind of fragmentation recognition that just happened. Strategic communication isn’t spin. It’s statecraft.
Somalia’s choices now ripple far beyond East Africa. At a moment when Red Sea security faces unprecedented pressure Houthi attacks, great power competition, proliferating armed groups the question of Somali unity has become everybody’s problem.
A unified Somalia, governed by constitutional order, can anchor Horn of Africa stability and partner effectively in securing vital maritime corridors. Fragmented Somalia, with competing authorities and disputed legitimacy, imposes costs no one can afford disrupted shipping, expanded terrorism, regional instability, collapsed governance.
Israel’s recognition bet on fragmentation. It wagered that narrow tactical, gains—intelligence access, potential bases, and diplomatic signaling—outweigh the strategic costs of legitimizing state breakup in one of the world’s most volatile regions.
That bet puts everyone else at risk.
For Gulf states, the United States, and Europe, the path forward means reinforcing Somalia’s constitutional framework and integrating the country into Red Sea security cooperation. This is not optional—it is a strategic necessity.
Somali unity must be treated not as a favor to Mogadishu, but as essential infrastructure for regional stability. In the Horn of Africa, fragmentation is not merely Somalia’s problem; it is the match that could burn down everything that has been built.
Dayib Sh. Ahmed
Email: Dayib0658@gmail.com
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Dayib is a writer, political analyst and WardheerNews contributor
