By Mohamed A Yasin

Somalia’s fragile federal system is once again descending into political chaos, mistrust, and institutional paralysis, as disputes over legitimacy, expired mandates, and power consolidation threaten to unravel what remains of the country’s already weakened political order.

At the center of the latest crisis stands the increasingly controversial role of former President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, whose constitutional mandate expired on 15 May 2026, yet who continues to dominate federal politics while attempting to shape the political future of several Federal Member States whose own mandates are also deeply contested.

Across Mogadishu and the regional capitals, one question is now being asked with growing urgency: How can a president whose own constitutional legitimacy has expired continue to interfere in the elections and political survival of regional administrations?

That question is no longer theoretical. It is rapidly becoming the central fault line of Somali politics.

A Federal System Built on Expired Mandates

The immediate political spotlight has fallen in Galmudug on Ahmed Abdi Kariye (Qoorqoor), whose constitutional term as President of Galmudug expired nearly two years ago.

Yet Galmudug is hardly alone. The leadership of Hirshabelle has also remained in office long after the expiration of its legal mandate, following controversial political arrangements brokered under Villa Somalia. Those extensions were engineered by Hassan Sheikh’s administration in order to preserve loyal regional allies and maintain centralized political influence over the federal system.

For years, these arrangements survived largely through political bargaining and international silence. But with former President Hassan Sheikh’s own presidential mandate now expired, the contradictions inside Somalia’s federal structure are exploding into the open.

The very leaders who accepted questionable extensions under Hassan Sheikh are now facing the same legitimacy crisis themselves. And the political system that once protected them is beginning to fracture.

The Collapse of the National Consultative Council

The unraveling did not happen overnight. Many Somali political observers trace the current breakdown back to 2024, when the administrations of Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and South West State agreed to continue operating under political arrangements widely criticized as unconstitutional.

That moment effectively shattered the National Consultative Council (NCC), the once-important platform designed to coordinate relations between the Federal Government and the Federal Member States. The first major rupture came from Ahmed Mohamed Islam Madobe.

Madobe openly rejected attempts to normalize mandate extensions and refused to allow Jubaland’s political future to be dictated from Mogadishu. Instead, he returned to Kismayo and organized a regional election under Jubaland’s own constitutional framework.  Supporters of Jubaland argued that Somalia’s Provisional Federal Constitution grants no authority to the Federal Government to directly manage or control regional state elections.

Puntland had already walked away from the NCC long before the crisis fully erupted. President Said Abdullahi Deni accused Villa Somalia of turning the NCC into a political instrument designed not for consultation, but for centralizing power and subordinating the Federal Member States.

Unlike several other regional leaders, Puntland argued that it retained full constitutional legitimacy and therefore had no need for political validation from Mogadishu.The split was no longer political disagreement. It had become a crisis of constitutional authority itself.

Corruption Allegations and Political Patronage

As the federal system weakened, accusations of corruption and political coercion intensified. Opposition politicians and independent analysts increasingly accused  former President Hassan Sheikh’s administration of using financial leverage, political pressure, and institutional manipulation to maintain control over allied regional leaders.

Among the most explosive allegations were claims that regional administrations supported controversial constitutional amendments and irregular electoral commissions in exchange for political protection and financial incentives. One allegation, repeatedly discussed in Somali political circles, centered around federal budget support intended for Federal Member States.

According to political figures and insiders, three allied regional administrations were each allocated roughly $5 million annually for development and budgetary assistance. Critics alleged that Villa Somalia pressured those administrations to return approximately $1 million each back to federal political networks.

The allegation gained national attention after it was publicly referenced by Abdi Aziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen following the dramatic deterioration of relations between Baidoa and Mogadishu. No independent investigation has formally verified the accusations.

But in Somalia’s deeply polarized political environment, perception itself has become politically devastating. The accusations further eroded trust between the Federal Government and the regions, feeding the growing belief that federalism itself was being transformed into a system of patronage, dependency, and political obedience.

Fear of Being Replaced

Now, many of the same regional leaders who once aligned themselves with Villa Somalia are increasingly gripped by political panic.  Sources close to the administrations of Galmudug and Hirshabelle say both leaderships are urgently seeking new electoral processes that could grant them fresh constitutional legitimacy before the political situation deteriorates further.

Their fear is simple. They believe Villa Somalia may already be preparing alternative candidates to replace them. In Somali political circles, the phrase increasingly used to describe the situation is brutal but revealing: “Used and discarded.”

For years, regional administrations loyal to Mogadishu provided Hassan Sheikh with political support inside the federal system. Now, as the federal presidency itself enters uncertain territory, those same allies fear they are no longer politically useful. And in Somalia’s unforgiving power struggles, usefulness often determines survival.

The South West State Precedent

What happened in South West State has only deepened those fears. When President Laftagareen attempted to pursue an election process that appeared more independent from Villa Somalia, the Federal Government reacted aggressively.  Federal troops were deployed into the region. Mogadishu rapidly consolidated influence over key security and administrative institutions. Senior federal officials – Deputy Prime Minister- assumed leadership and is in charge over strategic decision-making inside the state.

Today, many Somali politicians privately describe South West State as a regional administration operating under heavy federal domination. Critics argue that major decisions regarding security, administration, and governance are no longer controlled from Baidoa itself. Instead, power increasingly flows from Villa Somalia. For regional leaders watching closely, the message was unmistakable: Autonomy has limits. And those limits are enforced politically — and sometimes militarily.

Somalia’s Dangerous Political Drift

Somalia now finds itself entering one of its most dangerous political moments in years. The cooperative framework that once held together the Federal Government and the Federal Member States is collapsing. Political trust has almost entirely evaporated. Federal institutions are losing legitimacy. Regional administrations are drifting apart. Opposition alliances are hardening.

Meanwhile, ordinary Somalis watch the crisis with growing exhaustion and fear. The Somali proverb now circulating widely across political discussions captures the mood perfectly: “When two people unite in injustice, they eventually destroy each other over what is rightfully theirs.”

What began as tactical political alliances built on questionable legitimacy is now turning inward. Former allies are becoming rivals. Shared political arrangements are collapsing under the weight of mistrust, fear, and competing ambitions. And behind the maneuvering lies a far more dangerous reality:

Somalia’s federal system — already fragile after decades of war, fragmentation, terrorism, and foreign intervention — is once again approaching a point where institutional collapse no longer feels impossible.

The fear spreading across the country is no longer simply about elections, mandates, or political rivalries. It is about whether Somalia’s fragile state itself can survive another prolonged constitutional breakdown.

Mohamed A Yasin
Email: moyasin680@gmail.com