Sometimes, when courts issue judgments that challenge long-standing practices by state entities and significantly affect how branches of government operate, it is important for political leaders and the public to do more than discuss or ignore the decision. They should also consider how the ruling points to the need for future law reform. Many legal reforms have come from court decisions that reveal gaps or outdated aspects in existing laws. In these cases, the court’s decision often highlights old constitutional and legislative practices that no longer serve the judiciary and need to be updated.
This was especially clear in the recent judgment by Justice Glasgow in the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, in the case of Bristol and Judicial and Legal Services Commission and Eddy D. Ventose [2026], which has drawn a lot of attention. The reasons for this attention, though, are a separate issue.
Before looking at the outdated laws and possible reforms highlighted by this case, it is important to first understand the arguments and the judgment.
The main question for Justice Glasgow was whether section 5 of the Courts Order, which sets the rules for appointing judges to the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (ECSC), was followed when Justice Ventose was appointed as a Court of Appeal Judge. Section 5 (ii) says that a person cannot be appointed unless they are qualified to “practice as an advocate in such a court, and has so practised for a period of, or periods amounting in aggregate to not less than 15 years”. The case focused on what it means to “practice as an advocate”, “has so practised”, and whether Justice Ventose met the 15-year requirement.
As such, para [5] of the judgment noted that the central issue was indeed whether the appointment by the Commission was made in accordance with the requirements prescribed by the above-mentioned section.
According to the judgment, the Claimant argued that the Commission broke the rules because Justice Ventose had not “so practised” as an advocate for 15 years at the time of his appointment. The Commission disagreed, saying he did meet the requirement. Justice Ventose, as an interested party, also said he met the 15-year requirement, pointing to his advocacy work in Dominica and Barbados, except for the periods when he served as a High Court Judge.
To support Bristol’s case, he argued, using case law, that an “advocate” is someone who mainly represents clients in court or tribunal proceedings. This means having the right to speak before a court, which was traditionally limited to barristers, not solicitors. Even though all attorneys in the Eastern Caribbean can now appear in court, he noted that the Court order still keeps this distinction. He argued that only advocates were qualified for the bench, and that Ventose did not meet this requirement for the full period, as explained in paragraph [11]. He also said that judges should be chosen from attorneys who have practised advocacy for several years and know court procedures and evidence rules. But this raises a deeper question: does simply being an advocate for a certain number of years mean someone is ready to be a judge? Or can these skills be learned even if someone has not practised as an advocate for that long? Does the number of years alone mean someone has the right skills for the job? More on this will be discussed below.
Bristol argued, and the court later agreed, that Ventose did not meet the required 15 years as an advocate when his legal career was closely reviewed. Bristol’s most generous estimate was 14 years and 4 months, which is 8 months short. There was also debate about what counted as advocacy work versus other legal work, and whether Ventose had a valid legal practising certificate from Barbados.
The Commission, on the other hand, argued that Bristol’s definition of an advocate was too narrow. They said the term should include “substantive involvement in the preparation and presentation of a case for court including settling pleadings, drafting written submissions, preparing witnesses and witness statements and other comparable litigation work”. If this broader definition was accepted, much of the legal consultancy work Ventose did could count toward the 15-year requirement. The Commission asked for a modern interpretation of the term that reflects current legal practice, not just the conditions when the law was first written.
According to the Commission, as explained in paragraph [27], the reason for this approach is to “broaden the understanding of the terms advocate, advocacy, to one that is not limited to oral advocacy before the courts and tribunals, recognising that modern legal practice does not invariably require advocates to present oral submissions before the court and advocacy may be undertaken through other preparation of written submissions, doing preparatory work, or written advocacy”. The Commission believed that not taking this broader view would go against the purpose of the law, which is to make sure only those with a minimum level of competence are appointed as Justices of Appeal.
The Commission also said that if this strict interpretation of section 5 was used, every applicant or judge would have to prove they were involved in court cases every year since becoming a lawyer. This would be unrealistic, since lawyers sometimes do not appear in court because cases are settled early or do not go to trial. The Commission believed that Parliament did not mean to exclude years with little or no litigation work for valid reasons. As long as the lawyer was available to serve the public, those years should still count.
Justice Ventose, as an interested party, went even further. He suggested, as stated in paragraph [44], that these powers “should not merely be exercised in respect of those who are advocates of the court and those who are actively engaged in work connected to litigation management in court cases, but that it should also extend to, those who have been engaging in law-related activities, such as carrying out judicial like functions, acting as arbitrator, practicing employment as a lawyer, advising on the application of the law, assisting persons in proceedings for the resolution of issues arising under the law, and acting as a mediator in connection with attempts to resolve issues that are, or if not resolved could be subject of proceedings”.
In this way, as explained in paragraph [45], the policy would keep the court’s established practice and allow exceptional candidates with strong legal qualifications and experience to be considered, even if they have not always appeared as advocates before the court.
In the end, Justice Glasgow began by noting that the established way to interpret Commonwealth Caribbean Constitutions, as set out in Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher [1980] and other cases, is to use a broad and purposive approach. This means seeing the Constitution as a living document that adapts over time.
Sir Denis Byron, in AG v. Grenada Bar Association, offered a balanced view. He said that one should look at Parliament’s intention, based on the main meaning of the words, but also adjust as needed to fit the context of the Constitution. Changing circumstances should help explain the full meaning. However, former Chief Justice Byron also warned that “interpreting the Constitution in this manner does not give the court a licence or liberty to conjure up whatever meaning it wishes to attach to the constitutional provisions”.
The main issue was whether to use the updated, broad approach suggested by Ventose and the Commission, or the more traditional, strict approach supported by Bristol, as noted in paragraph [79]. In the end, Glasgow said the stricter, textual approach was better, “as the drafters of section 5 employed the terms advocate and practice as an advocate in accordance with the meaning these expressions bore in their own understanding at the time the provision was drafted”. So, he agreed with Bristol that a person appointed as a Judge must have the right qualifications and must have actually practised as an advocate.
In this case, an advocate was defined as someone who does courtroom advocacy and has the right to speak before the court, similar to barristers in the UK. Glasgow said, “The framers intended for the bench to be populated with individuals who were specially trained and skilled in the craft of presenting cases before the courts, individuals who, at that time would have been more particularly described as barristers, as distinct from solicitors, or legal academics, and even barristers who though qualified did not engage in the actual conduct of litigation before the courts, with the aim being to ensure that those appointed to the bench possessed substantial practical experience in courtroom advocacy and the conduct of legal proceedings, rather than merely holding the formal qualifications necessary for admission to the practice of law.”
However, he also admitted that “it does not mean as he said that advocacy is solely appearing and arguing claims before the court, as it places an undue weight on oral advocacy, which is only a small part of modern litigation, especially when modern advocacy, entails a lot more than mere appearances, and, limiting it would mean that only who appear before the court to advocate on behalf of clients would have the chilling, effect of restricting the field of eligible applicants to such paltry few as to render the process of appointing judges to the court of appeal unproductive.”
But this did not mean that Justice Ventose met the qualifying criteria, as the Commission could not show any court appearances or assistance in proceedings by him between 2007 and 2010. In the end, the court found that the Commission did not follow the requirements of the Court Order when it appointed Justice Ventose as Judge of the Court of Appeal, and quashed the appointment.
The Real Judgment is for Law Reform
However, the main issue from this judgment is not just the facts of the case, but what the law should be in the future regarding the qualifications for Judges of the Court, and whether these rules fit the changing legal profession.
In my view, the current law does not align with the needs of the profession because it focuses only on the number of years served and assumes that equals future judicial expertise. Just because someone has been an advocate for a certain number of years does not mean they have the qualities needed to be a good judge. Of course, the knee-jerk reaction would be, well, the JLSC is not solely assessing the numerical compilation of years to decide.
That is true, and because the Commission considered other factors without clear legal support, this issue ended up in court. While this shows that the court can be held accountable through legal processes, it does not solve the main problem: the Commission made its decision based on irrelevant factors and mistakes, even though it has a big responsibility and is supposed to judge others for similar actions.
Still, some who are more religiously oriented may argue that this occurred because it was supposed to provide an opportunity for the Commission and the wider judiciary to consider how to broaden the pool of eligible applicants, through a reformed criteria structure, with wider and more nuanced qualifications metrics. As such, one need not take out the numerical compilation if a case can be sustained about the “speciality” of the 15 years as distinct from the quality of advocacy provided within shorter time spans. But, built in the design, of the criteria moving forward should be a more capacious criteria and consideration that takes into account, but not limited to, (I) quality of advocacy provided within the period, (II) contribution to legal academia similar to the University considerations for their own internal promotions for professorship, (III) experts of the law in distinct areas based on local, regional and international established criteria, among other considerations. The Caribbean Court of Justice already uses these kinds of criteria as a model.
These changes should be considered not just to widen the pool of eligible candidates, but also because many lawyers, especially younger ones, are not interested in becoming judges for various reasons. Allowing multiple pathways to the bench could help attract more candidates. We do not want to end up with too few qualified or interested people just because of a rule that exists only out of tradition. Instead of saying “this is the law” without question, we should look at the law’s purpose and whether it achieves fair and reasonable results.
The legal profession has changed a lot, and the idea that someone’s skill is only measured by their advocacy is outdated. While advocacy is important, it is not the only way to show legal ability. People can contribute to the law in other ways and still be valuable judges. These individuals should be encouraged to become judges without extra advocacy requirements that do not help them as judges. In fact, many academics and legal professionals in the region, including Ventose, have made important contributions to the bench even if they did not meet the strict number of years. The real question is not about breaking the law, but whether the law itself needs to be changed for the future.
While the court is considering reforms, it is also important to look at how the Chief Justice is appointed. Right now, this requires unanimous agreement from all Heads of Government of the OECS, which means one Prime Minister could block the process for any reason and slow down the judiciary’s progress. This could weaken the independence of the judiciary by making it too dependent on political leaders. The point is not that the heads of government should have no role, but that the current process allows for delays and personal agendas to get in the way of fairness. To prevent this, it would be wise to review the process and make sure the court can undergo real reform, with support from Caribbean legislatures. The court cannot make laws for itself, but it can influence future changes to its rules and procedures.
In the end, not every court case leads to law reform, but this case does offer a real chance for change, and it should be taken seriously.
