On February 3, the Belarusian state news agency BelTA reported that Belarus, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea or DPRK), Iran, Myanmar, and Russia coauthored a joint statement on launching an “inclusive consultative process” to develop “a Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the XXI Century.” According to the report, a Eurasian Charter has been in discussion since fall 2023, led by Belarus and Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have referenced this plan in June 2024, when he said Russia and North Korea will “build an equal and inseparable security structure in Eurasia.”[1]

As of February 4, North Korean media have not reported on this statement.

North Korea’s participation in this multilateral effort —despite its own media silence— reflects both its deepening relationship with Russia and its growing role as an active player in a Russia-led sphere. This aligns Pyongyang’s official statements in recent years to build a new global order with Russia, as well as its self-perception as a more significant global player. Given this trajectory, messaging at the upcoming Ninth Party Congress, where the country will lay out its foreign policy strategy for the next five years, will likely reinforce rather than reverse this course.

Context

North Korea’s participation in the Eurasian Charter initiative follows more than two years of consistent signaling from Pyongyang that it would partner with Russia to build an alternative global order. The move aligns with Pyongyang’s burgeoning ties to Russia—particularly following Kim Jong Un’s warm reception of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in Pyongyang in July 2023, and the Kim-Putin summit at the Vostochny Cosmodrome two months later—and its gravitation to Belarus and Russia-led multilateral forums since 2024.

• In October 2023, shortly after the Kim-Putin summit, a North Korean vice foreign minister called improved North Korea-Russia relations “the just way for building an independent and peaceful new world and realizing genuine international justice.” Pyongyang has since consistently said, explicitly or implicitly, that it would work with Russia to build a new global order. In October 2025, the North Korean and Russian ruling parties issued an unprecedented joint statement signaling Pyongyang’s closer alignment with Moscow on international issues, including Eurasian security.
• The 2024 DPRK-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership codifies this consensus: “The two sides shall aspire to global strategic stability and establishment of a new fair and equal international order, maintain close mutual communication and strengthen strategic and tactical cooperation.”
• North Korea has simultaneously strengthened ties with Belarus, Moscow’s key ally, since 2024, highlighted by Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui’s October 2025 visit to Minsk. North Korea also participated in BRICS events for the first time in 2024, and Choe attended the Third Minsk International Conference on Eurasian Security in 2025, where the Eurasian Charter was reportedly discussed.

Significance

Pyongyang’s participation in the Eurasian Charter appears tied to its self-perception as a global actor—both reflecting that view and serving as a means to further enhance its international standing. North Korea has increasingly viewed itself as playing a greater global role since deploying troops to support Russia in its war against Ukraine. For example, at a 2025 year-end Party plenary meeting, Kim Jong Un said those soldiers “demonstrated to the world the prestige of our army and state as the ever-victorious army and genuine protector of the international justice.”

Against this backdrop, the Eurasian Charter may mark the beginning of a more internationally assertive North Korea. Kim’s past assessments of the global order suggest this trajectory. In 2021, he noted that “the structure of the international relations has been reduced to the structure of ‘neo-Cold War.’” In 2022, he observed a “change from a unipolar world advocated by the US into a multipolar world.” North Korea’s foreign policy in recent years—evidenced by its efforts to build a “multipolar world” with Russia—reflects these views.

Conclusion

The Eurasian Charter’s impact on global politics remains unclear, as does North Korea’s tangible benefit beyond what it may view as enhanced prestige and the sense of security of being part of Russia’s orbit. Yet North Korea’s understanding of international security dynamics will be important to watch, as it will shape the country’s strategic choices going forward. The upcoming Ninth Party Congress should provide insight into Kim Jong Un’s worldview. Given current trends, the Party Congress will likely be used to justify deepening rather than reversing Pyongyang’s current foreign policy course.