(Source: Korean Central News Agency)
North Korea unveiled “new” missile developments in September and October that were incremental improvements of prior systems rather than dramatically new programs. The new Hwasong-20 (HS-20) solid-propellant road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) does not appear to offer much over the earlier HS-19, which it strongly resembles, although it may be more suitable for a future multiple-warhead payload. The Hwasong-11E mounts a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) on a prior, larger, modified version of the KN-23 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM). If this is successfully developed it would provide only a marginal increase to the existing KN-23 force’s ability to evade alliance missile defenses. The North also displayed a new modular launch vehicle that can carry varying combinations of battlefield bombardment rockets and the existing 110 km-range HS-11D SRBM, improving frontline commanders’ targeting flexibility. And it underscored the continuing importance of land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) to augment ballistic missiles and improve force diversification and survivability.
The lack of truly “new” developments should not be surprising given prior improvements to the large variety of missile systems the North has unveiled since 2019. Pyongyang now possesses updated, mature missile systems across the entire range spectrum, and future improvements are thus much more likely to be incremental. Although one should never rule out surprises, potential future multiple-warhead payloads and missile subs big enough for yet-to-be-tested intercontinental-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) are just about the only big shoes left to drop.
“New” Solid ICBM: Waiting for a Payload?
North Korea progressively rolled out between September 2 and October 10 what it termed the new HS-20 solid-propellant road-mobile ICBM. The “next-generation” missile was first mentioned in a September 2 press report of a “high-thrust solid-fuel engine with the composite carbon fiber material” reportedly ground (static) tested eight times and intended for use in the Hwasong-19 mobile solid ICBM that has been flight-tested once in October 2024, as well as the HS-20.
A ninth static test of the motor, reportedly “the last one in the development process,” occurred on September 8, according to North Korean press. Associated photos showed a first-stage motor of roughly the same diameter but slightly longer than that of the original HS-19, suggesting the HS-20 and the future modified HS-19 using this stage will have more thrust than the original HS-19. North Korea claims the motor will produce about as much thrust as the US 1980s Peacekeeper ICBM’s first stage.
Photos released on October 5 of the “milit ary hardware exhibition Defense Development-2025” in Pyongyang showed what turned out to be the HS-20 missile next to its 11-axle transporter-erector-launcher (TEL or road-mobile launcher) carrying an HS-20 missile canister. Analysts originally identified these as being for the HS-19 given their similarity to that missile system, which also uses an 11-axle TEL. The attribution to HS-20 was confirmed when the same-type TEL and canister participated in the October 10 parade in Pyongyang marking the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea and were identified as being for the HS-20. Compared to the original HS-19, the HS-20 missile appears to have roughly the same dimensions but a more bulbous payload shroud (nose cone) and appears to lack thruster ports on the third stage and payload shroud. The missile canister has a blunter nose cap as well. The main difference in the TEL is the lack of lifting arms to erect the missile canister along the side of the vehicle; these presumably have been relocated underneath the canister.
Implications. The HS-20 does not appear to offer much over the original HS-19, and the North’s suggestion that there will be a future HS-19 version using the same new, possibly longer first stage further reduces the potential advantages of the new missile. It is even unclear whether the HS-20 is really a “new type” at all, or just an HS-19 variant up-named for political/propaganda purposes. Also left unclear is what ICBM or space-launch vehicle will be associated with an even longer, 12-axle TEL chassis pictured in the North Korean press in September 2024; what has now turned out to be the HS-20 was widely expected to go with that longer TEL.
Assuming the new motor does give the HS-20 more boost capability than the original HS-19, the most logical use for that increased capacity remains carrying a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) payload. This is because both the original HS-19 and even the earlier HS-18 solid mobile ICBM already can reach targets throughout the US with single warheads.
The blunter payload shroud on the HS-20 would more easily accommodate the blunter, 1960s-style reentry vehicles (RVs) that North Korea probably deploys on its ICBMs to have sufficient confidence they will survive reentry at operational ranges despite the lack of flight testing to such ranges. While the lack of visible thruster ports on the front end of the HS-20 missile seen on October 5 may suggest it will carry a different, unMIRVed payload from the MIRV-associated HS-19, it may well be that the HS-20 display missile lacked all of the features seen on the live version or that the thrusters are concealed behind blow-out ports not visible in the photos.
Some of the uncertainty about the comparative advantages of the HS-20 should be clarified if or when the missile is flight-tested which, based on the track record of previous newly-revealed North Korean ICBMs could occur within a few months—or not at all. In any case, the key thing that would make the HS-20 (or the HS-19, for that matter) significantly add to the North Korean missile threat would be the deployment of a MIRV payload. And the North has yet to successfully flight-test one, despite a claimed MIRV test in June 2024 that probably failed and the likely presence of a MIRV-associated post-boost vehicle (PBV) on the sole HS-19 flight-test that apparently did not release multiple RVs. MIRVing is a demanding technology, and at least several successful MIRV payload tests over at least a few years are likely needed. Russian could somewhat accelerate the timeline but would not obviate the likely need for at least a few successful MIRV flight tests.
New SRBM Variant: Does its Payload Make Sense?
The early October Defense Development-2025 exhibition a nd October 10 parade also featured a new variant of the KN-23 SRBM family equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV). The variant, designated Hwasong-11E (HS-11E), apparently uses the booster and 5-axle TEL of the larger, heavier-payload version of the KN-23 (designated HS-11C) first flown in March 2021. As with other KN-23 road-mobile variants, the TEL carries two missiles side-by-side. The HGV is shorter than that on the HS-16 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) that was also displayed and paraded in October, and has a different fin configuration. On October 23, North Korean press reported the previous day’s flight-test of “two hypersonic projectiles” to SRBM range (some 390 km based on the press description). The “new,” “important,” and “cutting-edge” weapon system was not identified. The associated photos did not show the missile or its launcher, and showed the impact of what looked more like an HS-11C traditional-style RV than an HGV.
Implications. Although the North Koreans indirectly tried to associate the “projectiles” launched on October 22 with the new HS-11E, the available evidence does not permit confirming that association. Additionally, only the projectile launches were reportedly detected by South Korea, not the HGV payload. The North’s press coverage of the launches is highly suggestive of political propaganda. It remains to be seen whether the HS-11E HGV was flight-tested, and if or when it will be.
Although HGVs offer the prospect of increased maneuverability to further complicate the task of missile defenses, the relatively low altitude, short flight-time, and limited booster energy of an SRBM compared to an IRBM call into question the utility of an SRBM-class HGV. The KN-23 already is capable of flying mostly within the atmosphere and thus of maneuvering unpredictably and pretty extensively. Using it to loft an HGV might allow maneuvers over a larger area, but at SRBM levels of performance the payload would bleed off energy pretty quickly, and thus quickly lose its advantages over a traditional KN-23 payload.
That said, an SRBM HGV would experience much less demanding heat and pressure conditions than an IRBM HGV. Longer-range HGVs have been difficult even for China, Russia, and the US to develop, and there is no clear evidence that any of North Korea’s three IRBM HGV flight tests to date have succeeded. The North might use an SRBM HGV as a test bed or stepping-stone to assist IRBM HGV development, either instead of or in addition to developing a deployable SRBM version outright.
In any event, if Pyongyang intends to deploy the HS-11E as anything other than a propaganda tool, several successful flight-tests likely will be required. And if deployed it would provide only a marginal increase to the existing KN-23 force’s ability to evade alliance missile defenses, although successful deployment might boost the prospects of developing IRBM HGVs that would have more defense-evading utility.
A New Modular Rocket/SRBM Launcher
The October 10 parade also featured a new 3-axle wheeled vehicle carrying what appeared to be two launcher modules. Each module could carry nine launch tubes for probable 240-mm multiple-launch rockets (MRLs), or one of the small solid-propellant Hwasong 11-D SRBMs first launched in April 2022.
Implications. Pyongyang may have adopted the modular launcher concept from the US MLRS and high mobility artillery rocket systems (HiMARS), which also can carry various combinations of MRLs and SRBMs. The new launcher should increase the flexibility of North Korean frontline battlefield commanders to tailor the weapons loadout to the mission by mixing and matching various combinations of the MRL and SRBM launch modules. Although the HS-11D can carry either nuclear or conventional warheads, the very short range of the MRLs (40-60 km) makes it unlikely that HS-11Ds carried on the new launcher would be nuclear-armed. Nukes are likely to stand off further from the front line to improve survivability, taking advantage of the SRBM’s 110 km range. The new launcher underscores the important conventional role of North Korean SRBMs. (The North has displayed upwards of 100 dedicated four-missile launchers for the HS-11D that would be plenty for the nuclear portion of the force.)
But Do Not Forget About Cruise Missiles
The early October weapons exhibition displayed five different probable land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), as well as two anti-ship cruise missiles. The LACMs probably include the previously-flown Hwasal-1, Hwasal-2, and Pulhwasal 3-31, as well as the claimed Hwasal 1 Ra-2 with a “super-large” probably conventional warhead. The identity of the final probable LACM, of the Hwasal type, is unclear. North Korea announced the October 28 launch of “sea-to-surface strategic cruise missiles” of a type “improved for the launch from the ship” that were “fired vertically” and flew for over 7,800 seconds (consistent with a range of about 1,500 km). The accompanying photo showed a Hwasal-type LACM flying vertically, but not the launching vessel. Although the press article referred later to the two new destroyers North Korea has launched, it did not explicitly link them to the launch.
Implications. The display and missile launches underscore the importance of LACMs in augmenting ballistic missiles in North Korean theater strike roles, both conventional and nuclear, as well as the enhancement to force survivability provided by diverse basing options for LACMs on road-mobile launchers (which were included in the October 10 parade), various types of surface ships, and at least one type of submarine.
The Bottom Line: Incremental Changes to a Mature Missile Force
Despite Kim Jong Un’s September 2025 foreshadowing of “many secret weapons,” the October exhibition and parade did not reveal any dramatically new ballistic missiles or LACMs. The “new” HS-20 ICBM appeared to offer little more than the previous HS-19, and the addition of an HGV to the new HS-11E variant of the KN-23 SRBM will likely make a marginal improvement to missile defense penetration assuming it is deployed. This should not be surprising given prior improvements to the large variety of missile systems the North has unveiled since 2019. Pyongyang now possesses updated, mature missile systems across the entire range spectrum, and future improvements are thus much more likely to be incremental—as the North probably continues to increase the overall number of missiles and launchers deployed. Although one should never rule out surprises with the North Koreans, potential future MIRVed payloads and missile submarines big enough for yet-to-be-tested intercontinental-range SLBMs (one of which was seen at the exhibition) are just about the only big shoes left to drop.
