(Source: Korean Central News Agency)
Authors of 38 North’s North Korea Briefing, a quarterly publication on North Korea’s internal dynamics and foreign policy, offer their initial assessments of the First Session of the 15th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), held from March 22–23. At the event, Kim Jong Un was elected as the “president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [DPRK; North Korea]”—his third election to this position after 2016 and 2021. In addition, state leadership bodies and SPA committees were elected; the constitution was revised; and the new five-year national economic development plan and the state budget were discussed. Kim Jong Un also delivered a policy speech on domestic and foreign policy issues, including a brief but harsh segment on South Korea.
State media’s coverage of the latest SPA session, taken alongside the summary report of the recently held Ninth Party Congress, offers more information about North Korea’s policy goals while raising new questions that North Korea watchers will be grappling with—and watching state media for clues—over the next five years.
Staying the Course in a “New” Kim Jong Un Era
Rachel Minyoung Lee, Senior Fellow, 38 North, Stimson Center
If the Ninth Party Congress cemented Kim Jong Un’s “sole absolute power,” the latest SPA session followed up by formalizing the “head of state [kukka suban; 국가수반]” designation for his State Affairs Commission (SAC) chairmanship (rendered in North Korea’s official English as “president of the State Affairs”). North Korea had been referring to Kim by this designation since September 2024, implying that a constitutional change—possibly made at the October 2024 SPA session—had adjusted the description of his title, but this marks the first official equating of the “head of state” designation with his SAC chairmanship. That description now closely mirrors Kim Il Sung’s president title, without Kim Jong Un formally adopting the “DPRK president” title itself.
On the foreign policy front, North Korean media coverage of Kim’s policy speech offered no groundbreaking insights beyond what the Ninth Party Congress report had already provided. For example, it merely noted that Kim “analyzed and appraised the present unpredictably complicated international situation,” without elaboration. Worth noting, however, is that while Kim’s speech devoted less time to the United States than the Party Congress report, his characterization of Washington as “resorting to acts of state-sponsored terrorism and aggression in various parts of the world” went beyond the earlier report’s description of a country that “mercilessly destroys the existing international order.” This escalation almost certainly reflects the US strikes on Iran that followed shortly after the Party meeting.
“New” also emerged as a key theme on diplomacy in Kim’s SPA speech, with Kim calling for adjusting North Korea’s diplomacy in line with its “new” global status. Of particular note is his call for improving and strengthening relations with even traditional partner countries “from a developmental point of view … in line with the requirements of the new era”—a more specific and demanding formulation than the Party Congress report, which simply called for further expanding and strengthening such ties.
One issue of concern is how Kim Jong Un’s speech envisions the balance between national defense and the civilian economy, historically a thorny issue for North Korea. North Korea, including Kim Jong Un, often invokes the argument that strong national defense is indispensable for economic growth when making the case for greater defense investment despite economic hardship. Kim Jong Un’s triumphant address to the parliament went beyond simply making that case, or even persuading the public of its necessity. By pointing to the country’s economic successes over the past five years despite prioritizing national defense—what he called “our style of development strategy,” which is in effect the byungjin policy of parallel nuclear and economic development—the speech amounted to a declaration that North Korea would stay on this path. This is reinforced by Kim’s comment that North Korea needs to “prioritize long-term and strategic benefits over short-term and visible benefits.”
Yet Pyongyang appears to be working to reconcile these priorities. Since August 2023, Kim Jong Un has used the term “the national defense economy” and its variants at munitions factories, mostly in connection with shipbuilding. The exact meaning of this phrase is unclear, but seems to imply an increasing importance of the defense industry’s contributions to the civilian economy. North Korea’s intentional disclosure of the connection between the Second Economic Commission (SEC), which directs the military economy, and the cabinet, which oversees the civilian economy, by listing the “Minister of Shipbuilding of the SEC” on the cabinet member roster, appears to support this.
Power Consolidation, Cabinet Restructuring, and Social Control
Gyeong Seob Oh, Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification
Kim Jong Un was reelected SAC chairman, the top leadership position of the state. He will present new lines and policies while continuing to criticize those of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. In this same vein, North Korea will emphasize Kim Jong Un’s ideas and further bolster his cult of personality to consolidate his absolute power.
North Korea underscored the responsibility and role of the cabinet, as per Cabinet Premier Pak Thae Song’s remarks during the SPA session that socialist economic construction will be carried out under “the guidance and management by the Cabinet-Responsibility System, Cabinet-Centred System.” The cabinet-responsibility system is Kim Jong Un’s strategy to evade accountability for economic construction, meaning he will not bear responsibility for economic outcomes himself but will instead limit his role to holding the cabinet accountable.
Kim Jong Un emphasized the legitimacy of his socialist construction strategy, which centers on strengthening nuclear forces and the country’s self-reliance—both prerequisites for appealing to the population to endure the hardships of persistent UN Security Council sanctions, and for suppressing the discontent of cadres and the people.
A significant change within the cabinet is the transfer of the SEC, which oversees the defense industry, under the cabinet’s jurisdiction. This appears to be an effort to place both the civilian economy and the munitions industry under the cabinet premier’s control. However, it remains uncertain whether the cabinet premier will be able to effectively exercise control over the SEC, which had previously operated with relative independence. Furthermore, as long as Pyongyang maintains its policy of prioritizing the munitions industry, the practice of allocating the cabinet’s limited resources preferentially to that sector will not change.
In his policy speech, Kim Jong Un put forward measures to strengthen control over the population, including reinforcing the lowest administrative units—the dong (neighborhood unit) and inminban (“people’s units”)—and establishing a police force. At the same time, Kim proposed measures to alleviate public discontent with the regime, instructing the dong and inminban to “eliminate such practices as imposing extra economic burdens on the inhabitants and fostering discontent,” and calling on party cadres to combat abuse of power, bureaucratism, and other anti-people practices. These measures are intended to suppress popular unrest and pro-South Korea sentiment fueled by the spread of outside information, as well as discontent stemming from economic hardship under prolonged UN sanctions. North Korea will intensify the detection and punishment of non-socialist behavior, including the influx and spread of outside information.
The above segment was originally drafted in Korean. The initial translation was produced using AI tools and subsequently reviewed word-for-word and refined by a bilingual subject-matter expert to ensure accuracy and readability.
Toward a Systematic Strengthening of Cabinet Authority
Mitsuhiro Mimura, Professor, Economic and Social Research Institute for Northeast Asia, University of Niigata Prefecture
During the latest SPA session, the “Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” was renamed the “Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” Although the text has not been made public, the name change alone signals a shift comparable in magnitude to the 1972 amendment that transformed the 1948 DPRK Constitution into the Socialist Constitution—in effect, the enactment of a “Kim Jong Un Constitution.” Further details will depend on future reporting, but the preamble—previously an obstacle to amendments that would designate South Korea as an enemy state due to its recognition of Kim Il Sung’s and Kim Jong Il’s contributions to reunification—may have been significantly revised. The SPA’s term was likely extended by approximately two years because work incorporating the changes of the Kim Jong Un era into the constitutional text—including the “two hostile states” theory—had been underway.
In his policy speech, Kim reviewed economic performance over the 2021-2025 five-year plan period, noting that “the State investment increased 2.4 times in the major economic sectors, and more than 8 times in the core sectors.” A “report” on the cabinet’s work added further figures: compared to 2020, Juche iron production rose 3.2-fold, nitrogen fertilizer 1.5-fold, non-ferrous metals 1.9-fold, cement 1.4-fold, and seafood 1.9-fold, with electricity generation exceeding the five-year plan target by 6 percent. Looking ahead, Kim set a target of boosting industrial output value 1.5 times during the new five-year plan period, identifying electric power and coal mining as the sectors facing the greatest supply-demand strain. It should be noted that Kim was likely the first top leader in North Korea to explicitly address population growth, stating: “Population growth is an important issue related to the future of the State, and an undertaking to which the government of the Republic should always pay attention and devote much effort.” This suggests North Korea is grappling with a declining birth rate, a trend that likely took root during the Arduous March and, as with China, Japan, and South Korea, one to which policy responses came too late.
The session also elected the State Affairs Commission, the SPA Standing Committee, and cabinet members. Notably, Jo Yong Won replaced Choe Ryong Hae as first vice president of the SAC and chairman of the SPA Standing Committee. On the economic side, former Cabinet Premier Kim Tok Hun was appointed first vice premier, presumably connected to Kim Jong Un’s January 19 speech at the Ryongsong Machine Complex, in which he dismissed Vice Premier Yang Sung Ho and implicitly criticized Kim Tok Hun.
The renaming of the “Minister of Shipbuilding” to “Minister of Shipbuilding at the Second Economy Commission [SEC]” raises two possibilities. First, the SEC, which oversees the military supply sector, may have been transferred to cabinet jurisdiction. If that is the case, First Vice Premier Kim Tok Hun would be a plausible candidate to manage the SEC portfolio given his background as chairman of the Chagang Province People’s Committee and his ties to the military supply sector. Second, given the recent push for naval shipbuilding, the Ministry of Shipbuilding may have been placed under dual cabinet and SEC jurisdiction. The latter explanation is supported by the fact that most of the country’s shipbuilding tonnage serves military purposes.
Also significant is the appointment of the Minister of Public Security as a cabinet member, likely reflecting the transfer of the police system from the military to the civilian sector flagged in Kim’s policy speech. In sum, what unfolded at this SPA session amounts to a systematic strengthening of cabinet authority.
Hardening Anti-US and Anti-South Korea Rhetoric, Making the Case for Continued Nuclear Development
Kibum Han, Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Asan Institute for Policy Studies
In his March 23 speech to the SPA, Kim Jong Un stepped up anti-US rhetoric and continued to emphasize the “struggle against the enemy [taejok tujaeng; 대적투쟁]” toward South Korea, using both to justify the policy of parallel development of nuclear and conventional weapons.
United States: Kim Jong Un justified North Korea’s nuclear development line by arguing that its nuclear arsenal makes it safer than “other regions,” an apparent reference to Iran. He said that although “the United States and its allies are constantly deploying nuclear strategic assets in the region around our country and threatening the security mainstay in the region … security of our State is being maintained on a level higher than that in other regions of the world.” He went on to stress the need for continued advancement of nuclear weapons and missiles, arguing that medium- and long-term security concerns must take priority over immediate economic gains. On the unpredictability of the international situation, Kim argued that the way to “turn unpredictability into predictability is to always worry about the worst situation, rather than seeking comfort, prioritize long-term and strategic benefits over short-term and visible benefits.” He concluded that North Korea’s “final victory” is “guaranteed only by the most powerful strength” and declared that it “will continue to consolidate the national position as a nuclear state into an absolutely irreversible one.”
Notably absent from Kim Jong Un’s speech were the kinds of direct statements toward the United States that had appeared in the Ninth Party Congress report, such as offering conditional dialogue or maintaining “the toughest stand.” Instead, the speech placed greater emphasis on stoking anti-US sentiment domestically by highlighting Washington’s “imperialist” character, claiming, for instance, that it was “resorting to acts of state-sponsored terrorism and aggression in various parts of the world” and thereby “triggered off anti-American sentiments and hatred of the forces aspiring after independence.” This intensified anti-US tone reflects the fact that the main target audience of the speech was domestic, and that Kim sought to persuade the population of the need to maintain the nuclear development line. It also appears to reflect a heightened sense of regime insecurity in the wake of developments in the Middle East.
South Korea: Kim continued to display the hostility toward South Korea he had shown at the Ninth Party Congress, threatening that “we will categorically reject, ignore and treat the ROK with the most explicit words and actions by officially regarding it as the most hostile state, and make it pay the price for its acts of provocation against our Republic without the slightest consideration, hesitation or mercy.”
Kim Jong Un’s renewed call at the SPA—following the Party Congress—for stepping up “the struggle against the enemy” appears to be an attempt to justify both the increased military spending and the deferral of improvements to people’s livelihoods required by the parallel development of nuclear and conventional weapons, including the forward deployment of 600mm multiple rocket launchers and the strengthening of naval operational capabilities.
The above segment was originally drafted in Korean. The initial translation was produced using AI tools and subsequently reviewed word-for-word and refined by a bilingual subject-matter expert to ensure accuracy and readability.
