(Source: Korean Central News Agency)
On September 3, China gave North Korean leader Kim Jong Un a high-profile reception at its military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. This marked the first time in 66 years that a North Korean leader had attended a Chinese military parade at Tiananmen Square. Beijing accorded Kim protocol rank just below Russian leader Vladimir Putin, who was also attending. Kim enjoyed both a private meal and one-on-one discussions with President Xi Jinping, in addition to a formal bilateral summit.
China clearly wants to strengthen ties with North Korea after multiple disruptions in recent years. The COVID-19 pandemic brought bilateral interactions to a standstill. More significantly, the relationship suffered when North Korea signed a new alliance treaty with Russia in June 2024 and deployed troops to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. China’s concern about losing leverage over North Korea as Russia’s influence grows is evident. The prominent reception for Kim Jong Un signals Beijing’s intent to reset bilateral relations and reassert its influence over Pyongyang.
Nevertheless, cracks in the relationship remain visible, even in the official readouts of the visit. The North Korean readout was brief and formulaic, containing only one sentence about the visit’s significance: “it further consolidates the political trust between the two parties and two countries, strengthens strategic coordination, and powerfully demonstrates that the friendly relations forged and tempered through the common struggle of the DPRK and China for the victory of the socialist cause will remain eternal and unbreakable despite all trials and challenges.” This boilerplate language fails to address the relationship’s substance given recent developments.
The Chinese readout was more substantive and pointed. It included the usual emphasis on “traditional friendship” between the countries and pledged to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Notably, however, it introduced a new reference to “common interests.” President Xi stated that “China and North Korea should strengthen strategic coordination in international and regional affairs, in order to safeguard their common interests.” According to the Chinese readout, Kim also pledged to “properly safeguard the common and fundamental interests of both sides” a commitment absent from the North Korean readout.
The appearance of “common interests” is particularly significant when compared to previous summit readouts between the two leaders. During Xi’s last visit to North Korea in June 2019, the Chinese readout emphasized “traditional friendship” and focused almost entirely on Korean Peninsula denuclearization. It made no mention of “common interests” because Beijing did not then consider this an issue.
The addition of this phrase in the 2025 readout suggests China seeks to redefine the relationship in more pragmatic, interest-based terms rather than relying solely on ideological affinity and historical ties. China’s emphasis on “common interests” signals perhaps a warning that Beijing expects Pyongyang to align its policies more closely with China’s strategic objectives, especially given North Korea’s growing ties with Russia or in advance of prospective future talks with the US. Judging from the North Korean readout, Pyongyang may not have received this message or simply chose to ignore it.
