DPRK Embassy in Moscow, Russia. (Source: WikiMedia Commons)
Despite United Nations (UN) sanctions aimed at ending its labor exports, North Korea continues to use overseas labor as a financial pipeline for its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program—the very threat that prompted the sanctions. The sanctions have not only failed to achieve their intended security objectives but have also largely sidelined the human rights situation of these overseas workers, many of whom endure conditions amounting to modern-day slavery. The central weakness of the current sanctions regime lies in its narrow security focus, which overlooks that the systematic denial of workers’ rights is itself the mechanism sustaining the country’s financial pipeline for its WMD program.
To advance security and human rights as mutually reinforcing goals, the international community should consider shifting from a blanket ban to a framework for principled engagement, permitting labor arrangements only under strict safeguards that restore workers’ rights to fair compensation and control over their earnings. In doing so, it would envision the empowerment of workers as a means to disrupt the flow of funds to the North Korean government.
Sanctions Evasion and the Case of Russia
In late 2017, the UN Security Council adopted Resolutions 2375 and 2397 in response to North Korea’s sixth nuclear test and the launch of the Hwasong-15 missile. These resolutions prohibited the issuance of new work authorizations for North Korean nationals and required the repatriation of all existing North Korean workers by December 22, 2019, with the aim of ending North Korea’s overseas labor export program on the grounds that its revenue was being diverted to the country’s WMD program.
However, in the UN Panel of Experts’ final report released in March 2024 before its dissolution upon Russia’s veto of its mandate renewal, it was estimated that 100,000 North Korean workers remain active across 40 countries to generate approximately $500 million per year (excluding revenue from the information technology sector). While some workers secure employment through synthetic identity fraud to deceive employers abroad, many find jobs in foreign markets that collude with North Korean authorities to evade sanctions. Russia stands out as a particularly instructive case for the latter category: it admits North Korean workers on student visas to create an illusion of compliance. As of May 2025, South Korean intelligence has estimated that, despite the blanket ban on North Korean overseas workers issued in 2017, 15,000 North Korean nationals are currently employed in Russia on non-work visas.
In early 2018, Russia began reducing the number of work visas granted to North Koreans—which previously numbered in the tens of thousands—and ceased issuing them altogether by 2020, according to data published by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a telling reversal, however, the number of student visas increased sharply to 3,124 in 2018 and 10,876 in 2019, compared with only 41 in 2017. Moreover, in February 2020—just weeks after the repatriation deadline—Russia enacted Federal Law No. 16-FZ to newly allow foreigners enrolled full-time at state-accredited universities to work without separate permits, thereby legitimizing the misuse of student visas. This domestic codification of a sanctions workaround blurred the boundary between illegality and legality, affording state and private actors a veneer of legality for the continued exploitation of North Korean labor.
Although workers are admitted to Russia under student status, research by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB) reveals that they work full-time—often far beyond internationally accepted limits on working hours—without ever setting foot on the campuses of the universities they are purportedly enrolled in. This reality indicates that student visas largely function as an instrument for evading sanctions on work authorization.
Moreover, a recent NKDB study found that this practice has, in recent years, evolved into a business model involving a network of universities, companies, intermediaries, and local police. Intermediaries such as the Intergovernmental Migration Center (Межгосударственный миграционный центр) connect Russian contractors and universities with North Korean economic consular representatives, charging commissions for brokering agreements. Russian universities, including Far Eastern Federal University and the European Institute Justo, collect inflated tuition fees in exchange for sponsoring student visas and fabricating enrollment records. Police officers also solicit bribes during worksite inspections in exchange for overlooking documents that falsely characterize the full-time employment of North Korean workers as part-time apprenticeships.
Adverse Effect of Sanctions on Workers
The costs of this sanctions evasion scheme are ultimately deducted from workers’ wages, which are already heavily expropriated through mandatory “loyalty remittances” to the North Korean state, coerced contributions to company operating expenses, and outright wage theft by managers. As a result, workers interviewed by NKDB, particularly those in construction, report average monthly earnings of $200—compared to the estimated $2,000 to $3,000 they should have earned for their 80- to 120-hour workweeks.
Meanwhile, North Korean companies that fail to secure university partnerships often resort to “borrowing” student visas from workers employed elsewhere. 20 percent of workers interviewed by NKDB relied on the student visas of others after the expiration of their single-entry visas, which permitted stays of up to 90 days. For most of their time in Russia, they remained in an irregular status and were forced to pay bribes to avoid police crackdowns. Regardless of whether they were issued their own student visas or used those of others, all workers could keep only photocopies of identity documents, as the originals were confiscated by North Korean security officers accompanying them.
The use of North Korean labor abroad has persisted and, in some respects, become even more exploitative, as Russia and other host countries have responded to sanctions with evasion tactics that diminish transparency and international oversight. These developments expose an unintended consequence of the current sanctions regime: the blanket ban on work authorization has driven North Korean labor into increasingly opaque arrangements while sustaining the financial pipeline for WMD development. The response by many other host countries has focused on manipulating workers’ immigration documentation rather than improving their working conditions. Consequently, the underlying security concern—the diversion of labor revenue to WMD development—remains unresolved.
Amid the absence of wage protection mechanisms, remuneration continues to be paid in lump sums to North Korean managers instead of directly to the workers. According to NKDB’s research, in Russia’s construction sector alone, approximately $500 to $800 per worker is remitted to the North Korean government, with higher amounts reported in more profitable industries such as information technology.
The Need to Reassess Current Sanctions
It is imperative to reassess the current sanctions regime and explore more nuanced measures that better balance security objectives with labor and human rights protections. Labor shortages and the demand for inexpensive labor provide strong incentives for private actors to forgo genuine compliance with sanctions in countries where the political will to enforce them is weak. More importantly, the UN and other multilateral bodies have focused disproportionately on terminating the labor export program rather than improving the working conditions of North Korean workers abroad. Consequently, North Korean overseas workers continue to work excessive overtime, to be denied fair compensation, to lack control over their personal finances and identity documents, and to be restricted from leaving assigned worksites and residences. These conditions are perpetuated by the inaction of Russia and other host countries, enabling North Korea to maintain one of the world’s most entrenched systems of transnational repression within their jurisdictions. Taken together, the situation of these workers satisfies all eleven indicators of forced labor identified by the International Labour Organization and, in many instances, rises to the level of servitude and the “crime against humanity” of enslavement.
At the same time, overseas employment remains one of the few avenues through which ordinary North Koreans can glimpse the outside world and secure a better chance at making a living, particularly since the recent fortification of the Sino–North Korean border. After the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, only a few dozen individuals have managed to defect directly from North Korea, compared to the thousands who have reached foreign countries through the labor export program. Moreover, border restrictions have undermined food security by cutting off informal trade routes and reducing economic activity inside North Korea. In the post-pandemic context, the opportunity to work abroad has therefore become increasingly valuable for North Koreans who would otherwise have no realistic prospect of experiencing the broader world or sustaining a livelihood.
A Framework for Principled Engagement
Against this backdrop, the international community should move away from the current blanket ban and instead explore a framework for principled engagement in the employment of North Korean workers. Such a framework would conditionally permit lawful labor arrangements under stringent safeguards, beginning with wage protection mechanisms administered by trusted third parties such as the UN. In particular, it could utilize two mechanisms—escrow accounts and in-kind compensation—to reform the labor export program and thereby reduce the North Korean state’s control over workers’ earnings.
The first mechanism would require firms in host countries procuring North Korean labor to deposit the full value of their contracts into UN-managed escrow accounts. Using traceable instruments such as debit cards, North Korean workers themselves, rather than their managers, would access wages deposited into these escrow accounts. This mechanism would replace the current practice where firms transfer lump sum payments to North Korean managers, who then transfer loyalty remittances and make other arbitrary deductions before redistributing the remainder to the workers. Depositing payments into escrow accounts overseen by a neutral international body would better ensure workers’ direct access to earnings and limit opportunities for wage theft and diversion.
The second mechanism would compensate North Korean workers through in-kind benefits provided by humanitarian agencies. Wages owed to workers would be delivered as tangible goods and services—food, housing, healthcare, utilities, and other basic necessities—distributed by agencies such as the International Organization for Migration operating in host countries. An additional component could include non-monetary remittances to workers’ families in North Korea: rather than sending cash that could be seized by state authorities, workers could direct a portion of their income toward essential goods distributed to their families through monitored humanitarian channels.
The proposed model draws on the logic of Food-for-Work programs implemented across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, which exchange labor for essential goods. Its humanitarian context, however, more closely parallels the Oil-for-Food Program (1995–2003), which permitted Iraq to sell limited quantities of oil under sanctions to secure vital resources for its civilian population. Both frameworks represent humanitarian exceptions within sanctions regimes, channeling funds from prohibited uses toward civilian needs. The Oil-for-Food Program therefore serves as a critical precedent for reconciling security with humanitarian objectives while also revealing the governance risks inherent in such arrangements. To mitigate these risks, the proposed model would expand the role of independent third parties while minimizing that of the North Korean government in operational control. Under UN supervision, neutral entities would oversee labor procurement, financial management, and audits to minimize opportunities for collusion and diversion. To test its practical feasibility, the initiative could begin with a pilot phase in one or two host countries, allowing the UN to address implementation challenges before broader adoption.
The implementation of this model would depend primarily on the willingness of host countries to adopt wage protection mechanisms instead of continuing sanctions evasion. At the same time, it must be accompanied by reforms from the North Korean government. One such reform would be the replacement of the current “loyalty remittance” system with a graduated income tax system, under which contributions are proportional to earnings and collected only after wages are received by workers. North Korea must also verify that revenues from labor exports—namely, equitable tax revenues as proposed—are used for healthcare, education, and social welfare, rather than for weapons development. It should agree to independent audits of labor revenue flows to demonstrate genuine compliance with its international obligations on peace and security.
Conclusion
Admittedly, the transition to a framework of principled engagement would face significant hurdles: administrative complexity, high operational costs, and potential resistance from North Korea and its allies. Yet, these challenges are outweighed by the moral and strategic imperative to reform a system that has failed to safeguard human rights and prevent the financing of weapons development. By building on, rather than replicating, earlier precedents, the proposed framework would mark a shift from measures that punish indiscriminately to those that protect selectively—targeting the state while shielding the people. Over time, such an approach could demonstrate that the international community can design solutions that balance peace, security, and human rights.
