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North Korea’s once-thriving markets are experiencing a transformation as the government intensifies control measures. Notably, over the past four years, there have been declining merchant activity and market closures stemming from deliberate enforcement actions involving plainclothes inspectors, permit checks, and seizure of unlicensed goods and foreign materials.

The crackdown represents a multifaceted strategy to restrict external information flow, eliminate unofficial merchants in favor of state-registered operators, and reassert comprehensive surveillance over people’s daily lives. Rather than isolated administrative measures, these market controls signal the regime’s broader effort to reclaim political authority over spaces that had evolved into relatively autonomous social and economic hubs. This choice of restrictive control reveals the regime’s prioritization of political control over economic efficiency, marking a shift away from the pragmatic tolerance that had previously allowed markets to flourish as survival mechanisms for ordinary citizens.

North Korea’s Market Crackdown: Regime Control Over Economic Autonomy

According to a 2022 analysis of North Korea’s official market conditions published by the Korea Institute for National Unification, North Korea operated 414 official markets at that time. Compared to 2016, there were 7 new markets, 8 closures, 45 relocations, 38 expansions, and 18 contractions, showing that the overall market size remained relatively stable. However, recent developments tell a more nuanced story. Merchants have been abandoning street vending operations in large numbers and selling off their shops, including at Chongjin’s Sugam Market, once a major commercial hub. Satellite imagery analysis revealed market closures across multiple regions between 2019 and 2024, including in Wonsan (Kangwon Province), Deokryong Workers’ District (Uiju County, North Pyongan Province), and Haksan District (Unsan County, South Pyongan Province).

This shift suggests a departure from the previous trend of expansion, revealing that while markets appear to maintain their formal structure, government oversight and control have become increasingly stringent. Authorities are particularly focused on bringing informal commerce under official control through street vendor crackdowns, restrictions on what can be sold, and new taxes and fees. The result is that while markets may look similar in size on paper, merchants are finding their business freedom and independence steadily eroded.

While reporting limitations prevent comprehensive analysis of enforcement differences between urban and rural areas, unpublished information obtained by Daily NK from sources inside North Korea indicates that major markets in Pyongyang and provincial capitals are experiencing sustained crackdowns. Reports suggest that the regime plans to continue crackdowns until the Ninth Party Congress and then carry out a comprehensive review and assessment of these measures.

The systematic nature of these enforcement campaigns suggests they stem from deliberate policy decisions rather than economic factors alone. In May, for example, officials conducted a broad inspection in Pyongyang, with plainclothes inspectors from district commerce departments and security forces monitoring markets, according to unpublished information obtained by Daily NK. Business permits were checked and the origins of goods reviewed, leading to the removal of dozens of unlicensed merchants and the seizure of certain items.

North Korea’s market crackdowns extend far beyond simple commercial regulation. Foreign pharmaceuticals, USB drives, movies, and other items containing outside information or culture are permanently banned, while merchants and shop owners face constant surprise inspections from market management offices and security agencies. Enforcement tactics include undercover purchases, searches of bags and cell phones, and CCTV surveillance. Violations lead to goods confiscation, fines, business suspensions (or bans from entering markets), and mandatory “ideological education” sessions. Repeat offenders reportedly risk criminal charges.

This pressure forces merchants to focus on safer daily necessities, and many street vendors simply shut down. Some try workarounds like private warehouse storage or mobile sales, but as the costs of avoiding detection get built into prices, customer demand drops too. The result is that while markets may look intact from the outside, merchants have far less freedom and customers have fewer choices.

Understanding the Current Intensification

Recent efforts by North Korean authorities to increase market control reflect multiple interconnected motivations, representing an escalation from previous periodic enforcement campaigns. The current crackdown’s significance lies in its systematic nature and connection to broader political objectives emphasized since the Eighth Party Congress in 2021, where strengthened party guidance was highlighted. Informal economic activities that had previously operated in gray areas are now being actively brought under formal party control.

Given how these measures have been reportedly carried out, there appear to be three major driving motivations.

First, limiting external information flow. Historically, markets were permitted following the food shortages of the 1990s as a means for people to access necessities, and their presence has grown nationwide. As markets have facilitated the introduction of foreign goods and information, authorities have expressed concerns about potential impacts on state stability. The recent enforcement campaign includes efforts to confiscate items like USB drives and foreign media that may influence public attitudes, thus limiting the spread of such information inside the country.

Second, bringing merchant activities under state control and eliminating unofficial operators. Permit checks and origin investigations by inspectors go beyond maintaining order; they are part of a strategy to ensure only state-registered businesspeople operate. By removing unregistered individuals, authorities seek to secure tax revenue and bring market activities under state control, absorbing the informal economy. This transforms private survival mechanisms into sources of state power.

Third, pursuing regime stability through enhanced surveillance. The North Korean government has consistently linked regime preservation with comprehensive oversight. Recent market crackdowns are not simply administrative actions; rather, they signal the reactivation of extensive surveillance mechanisms that affect people’s everyday activities. The presence of plainclothes inspectors and security personnel within market areas serves as a reminder to citizens that monitoring can occur at any moment, thereby creating a psychological effect potentially greater than the crackdown itself.

These interconnected strategies—market crackdowns for regime consolidation, establishing state-directed economic control, and intensifying public surveillance—represent a comprehensive effort by North Korea’s government to reassert political authority over markets that had become relatively independent social spaces. The regime aims to suppress capitalist influences and eliminate potential threats from autonomous economic networks and non-governmental relationships that emerge from market activity. This represents a preemptive move to prevent any challenge to centralized control that could arise from independent economic activity.

North Koreans Find Workaround Strategies

Although authorities are once again pushing for a restoration of the planned economy, North Koreans keep turning to markets. The reason is straightforward: state-run stores and grain distribution centers simply can’t deliver. State stores carry limited stock or sell poor-quality goods, while grain distribution centers offer stale, moisture-laden grain. Markets, by contrast, provide real choices—Chinese rice, Russian flour, and rice from private farms. Goods purchased in the markets may be pricier than from state stores, but consumers tend to consider the higher quality and more ample supply worth the higher price.

North Koreans have found creative ways to keep their market activities going despite common institutional roadblocks like business permit requirements, market fees, restrictions on what can be sold, and controls over operating hours and locations. Young merchants, who struggle to get business permits because of age restrictions and other requirements, register under other people’s names or set up shop at unofficial stalls. Delivery services using bicycles and motorcycles have expanded recently, and “grasshopper trading”—hushed transactions in market outskirts and back alleys—is booming. Rather than confronting the system head-on, people have responded with flexibility—adapting to the changing conditions and moving fluidly between official and unofficial channels.

The success and sustainability of markets is not just about making ends meet—they have spaces where North Koreans collectively learn self-reliance, adaptability, and survival skills. North Korean authorities keep trying to replace markets by expanding state stores, but North Koreans continued to trust the markets, which out compete on quality, price, variety, and convenience, and enable a certain level of autonomy within an oppressive system.

Policy Implications: Beyond Nuclear Diplomacy

The international community must shift their approach to North Korea by recognizing that markets represent the true economic foundation of North Korean society. Current policy frameworks that focus primarily on high-level diplomatic engagement and sanctions miss the critical reality that ordinary North Koreans have created resilient economic networks that operate independently of state control.

Market trading stability and independence must be guaranteed so that North Korean citizens can become self-reliant rather than dependent on state rations. To achieve this, the international community should develop concrete programs that support market autonomy recovery, including expanded access to foreign currency and the flow of practical technology and information. We must not forget that markets are the foundation for the livelihoods of North Koreans.

While maintaining the sanctions regime against North Korea, we should consider expanding exceptions in areas directly linked to survival rights, such as food, healthcare, and finance. This should go beyond short-term aid to provide structural support that enables North Koreans to develop long-term self-sufficiency. It is time for policies that balance humanitarian concerns with sanctions.

North Korean markets are not simply trading posts—they are social lifelines that sustain North Koreans’ survival. The international community must urge North Korean authorities to transform markets into engines of development rather than targets of oppression. For the “socialist market economy” to be more than empty rhetoric, market autonomy and economic choices must be protected, which would also enhance the sustainability of the North Korean system. There is an imperative to persuade the North Korean regime with this logic.

Meanwhile, future reunification planning must account for the fact that North Korea’s real economy is already largely market-based, building on existing market structures and merchant networks rather than attempting to replace them with imported systems. The survival strategies and community bonds forged through market activities represent valuable social capital that should be preserved and strengthened. Understanding North Korean markets isn’t just about economic policy—it’s about recognizing the agency and resilience of ordinary people who have created sustainable alternatives to failed state-led systems. Effective policy must respect these achievements while working to expand the freedoms and opportunities that markets have already begun to provide.