Guest contributor

James Shwe

What two strategic thinkers reveal about China, the junta, and the resistance

U.N. Special Envoy on Myanmar Julie Bishop’s latest address to the General Assembly, the European Union’s rejection of the junta’s staged election, and shifting Indian strategic commentary all point to the same conclusion: Myanmar’s military rulers remain weaker than they look, and the resistance still holds deeper strategic advantages.

When people discuss Myanmar’s revolution, they usually turn to diplomats, activists, or think tanks. But two older voices—Sun Tzu and Niccolò Machiavelli—still offer a powerful way to read the current moment. 

Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese strategist traditionally linked to The Art of War, likely lived around the 6th century BCE. Machiavelli, a Florentine writer and statesman from Renaissance Italy, lived from 1469 to 1527; “Florentine” simply means he came from Florence, then a wealthy and intensely political city-state.

If these two men looked at Myanmar today—China’s pressure, the junta’s staged legitimacy, the resistance’s staying power, and the battle over the U.N. seat—they would reach a similar conclusion: the junta looks stronger on paper than it is, while the resistance retains deeper strategic advantages.

“The terrain, timing, and moral cause favor the resistance.”

“The prince is hollow, and borrowed power cannot save him forever.”

Sun Tzu’s view

Sun Tzu begins with five essentials in conflict: moral cause, timing, terrain, leadership, and method. By that measure, the junta and Beijing are fighting on bad ground.

The moral cause is plainly not with Min Aung Hlaing. The 2020 election result, the removal of the civilian government, and years of atrocities and mass displacement all sit on the resistance side. 

Timing also favors the side that only has to endure. A regime trying to govern a hostile country is under far more pressure than a movement that only has to survive and expand.

Terrain matters too. Myanmar’s battle zones—from Sagaing Region to Kachin State, from Chin, Karenni and Rakhine states—favor mobile local forces, not a centralized army dependent on air power and fixed positions. 

China’s strategic ambitions, including trade corridors and infrastructure, must cross land where control is disputed and where local actors do not answer to either Naypyidaw or Beijing.

Sun Tzu would also notice that China’s method does not fit the battlefield. Beijing works through documents, projects, pressure, and counterparties. 

But its counterparts are unreliable. The junta is losing legitimacy and control. Ethnic armed organizations have their own interests and cannot simply be ordered into line.

Recent international signals reinforce this point. Julie Bishop told the U.N. General Assembly on June 19 that Aung San Suu Kyi should be released immediately and referred to her as having been re-elected in 2020 prior to the 2021 coup. 

The E.U. has also renewed sanctions and explicitly rejected any election that is neither free nor fair and merely serves to legitimize military rule. 

Sun Tzu would read these not as side issues, but as changes in political terrain. They make it harder for the junta and China to convert coercion into recognition.

He would say the U.N. seat is especially important. It is not just a procedural matter. It is strategic ground. The junta and Beijing need to take that ground if they want to transform paper sovereignty into accepted sovereignty. 

So, it must be defended the way one defends a vital pass: with allies, preparation, and precise timing. A “seat empty” formula would look neutral but would actually hand the resistance’s voice to silence.

Machiavelli’s view

Machiavelli asks a different question: can a ruler who grabs power actually keep it? His answer for Min Aung Hlaing would be brutal.

The junta chief is what Machiavelli would call a failed new prince. He seized power, but he never consolidated it. He did not crush opposition quickly. He did not secure a loyal and effective military. He did not build institutions that could outlast him. 

Instead, he is still trapped in a war years later, relying on Chinese and Russian backing to sustain a regime that cannot command genuine public obedience.

Machiavelli warns repeatedly against relying on the arms of others. A prince who survives on borrowed force is never secure. That warning applies not only to Min Aung Hlaing but also to Beijing. 

China has invested in a client that cannot stand on its own and in local actors whose loyalty is conditional at best.

Machiavelli is also useful on the question of legitimacy. He understood that deception only works if the audience accepts it. The junta’s staged election and “civilian president” maneuver were meant to give a coup constitutional clothing. But the deception has not worked where it matters. 

The E.U. has rejected that path as illegitimate, and Bishop’s remarks underscored that the world still remembers who won the last real election. In Machiavelli’s terms, a failed deception is worse than no deception at all because it exposes weakness and strengthens the opponent’s claim.

He would also pay attention to India. Indian strategic commentary has become more realistic about Myanmar’s shifting balance, with growing recognition that resistance forces now shape the borderlands in ways New Delhi cannot ignore. 

Machiavelli would see this as a warning about coalitions built on mixed interests: they look large from a distance, but they begin to crack under stress.

What both thinkers tell us

Sun Tzu and Machiavelli use different languages, but they meet in the same place. Both would say the junta is weaker than it looks. Both would say China is overreaching through unreliable proxies. Both would say that legitimacy is not decoration; it is a battlefield.

They would also agree on one warning. External conditions may be moving in the resistance’s favor, but internal unity still matters. That is why the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union, or SCEF, is important. 

If the external opening grows while internal fragmentation continues, opportunity can still be lost. If SCEF helps turn scattered strengths into coordinated political direction, the resistance’s strategic advantage becomes much more meaningful.

For DVB readers, the lesson is simple. This is not a story of inevitable junta recovery. It is a story of a hollow regime, an overextended patron, and a resistance that still holds the more important ground—moral, political, and increasingly diplomatic.

James Shwe is a Myanmar democracy advocate and writer based in California. His previous DVB analysis of Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to India appeared on June 3.

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