Guest contributor
Harry Myo Lin
The upcoming Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin, China, is shaping up to be one of the largest gatherings of leaders in recent years.
Heads of state from China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Belarus, Central Asia, and the invited Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states are expected to attend.
Among them will be Myanmar Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, representing Myanmar as an SCO dialogue partner, a status it gained in 2023.
This marks the first time Myanmar’s junta will sit in the room with such a wide constellation of global and regional powers under the SCO framework.
At first glance, this may appear to be a routine diplomatic engagement. In reality, it represents a serious risk for Myanmar’s democratic revolution.
SCO and the “Three Evils”
The SCO was founded in 2001 by China, Russia, and Central Asian states to address regional security threats. Its Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, coordinates intelligence-sharing, training, and cooperation against the so-called “three evils”—terrorism, separatism, and extremism.
While these terms are deliberately broad, in practice, they have been used by authoritarian members to justify domestic crackdowns. In practice, the framework has been applied in different contexts to suppress political dissent, to justify restrictions on minority movements, and to target opposition groups under the same broad categorisation.
It is not difficult to imagine Myanmar’s junta applying the same logic.
By participating in SCO frameworks, the military could seek to label the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) and the broader revolutionary organisations as ‘’separatist or terrorists’’, opening the door to political cover, intelligence exchange, or even quiet technology transfers under the counter-terrorism agenda.
Symbolism and legitimacy
Critically, Myanmar’s status in the SCO does not grant voting rights or full membership. As a dialogue partner, it is invited to specific events from digital economy forums to media and people-to-people dialogues. However, symbolism matters in international politics.
Participation in Tianjin allows the junta to show both domestic and international audiences that it is not isolated, that it sits alongside major powers, and that it has access to multilateral networks beyond the West. This symbolic legitimacy is arguably as important as any material support.
For the revolution, this creates a narrative challenge. Even if Western governments continue to reject the junta’s legitimacy, regional forums like the SCO provide alternative spaces where that legitimacy is quietly reinforced.
The UN vs. regional blocs
There is a deeper lesson here. For years, Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement has rightly emphasised the importance of the National Unity Government (NUG) holding the country’s seat at the United Nations.
That remains crucial. But the reality is that the U.N. has become a forum of rhetoric without enforcement, where Myanmar’s case is stalled by veto politics and geopolitical rivalries.
Meanwhile, regional blocs like the SCO and ASEAN are becoming more decisive in shaping economic opportunities, political cover, and security narratives. The junta understands this, hence its eagerness to engage in Tianjin.
In today’s international order, regional blocs like the SCO are increasingly more influential than the U.N. itself. Retaining Myanmar’s UN seat remains crucial, but in practice, the U.N. often produces more rhetoric than results. Policymakers and advocates need to factor in these shifting dynamics when considering strategies for Myanmar’s future.
What this means for the revolution
For Myanmar’s democracy movement and its allies, the implications are significant. The first step is to watch the SCO closely. It is no longer just a distant forum for Central Asia; Myanmar’s inclusion as a dialogue partner means the organisation now has a symbolic role in shaping narratives and policy that affect the country.
At the same time, the junta is likely to leverage the SCO language on terrorism, separatism, and extremism to brand the PDFs and the broader resistance movement as “separatists or terrorists.”
Countering this framing requires proactive messaging and international advocacy to underline the revolution’s democratic legitimacy and its struggle for human rights.
Another key point is the need to engage regionally, not only at the U.N. While Myanmar’s seat at the U.N. remains vital, advocacy that focuses exclusively on New York or any other Western capital alone is no longer sufficient.
Civil society, diaspora networks, and friendly governments must also find ways to shape conversations in regional arenas such as the SCO and ASEAN.
Finally, it is important to recognise the symbolic battleground of legitimacy. Even if SCO membership does not lead to immediate material support for the junta, the mere act of sitting at the same table as Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi grants it symbolic recognition.
To counter this, the revolution must ensure its own voice, values, and legitimacy are equally present and amplified in international and regional forums.
The SCO Summit in Tianjin is not just another meeting. It highlights how the balance of legitimacy and influence is shifting toward regional platforms.
For Myanmar’s junta, it is an opportunity to normalise its place among powerful neighbours. For Myanmar’s revolution, it is a warning: the struggle for democracy will not only be fought on the ground and in Western capitals, but also in the arenas of regional legitimacy.
The international community, policymakers, and advocates need to pay attention to this shift. Otherwise, while debates continue endlessly in global diplomatic forums, legitimacy may quietly be conferred in regional settings where practical alignments are being shaped.
Harry Myo Lin is a Myanmar expert based in Austria with extensive experience across Myanmar and Asia, specialising in peacebuilding, International Relations, interreligious dialogue, and promoting freedom of religion and belief.
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