The Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) has erred in portraying the proposed relocation of its headquarters as a constitutional violation.
While MEC is unquestionably an independent constitutional body, that independence has a defined purpose and scope. It was never intended to insulate the Commission from routine administrative decisions of government, and interpreting it as such stretches the Constitution beyond its intended meaning.
Constitutional independence exists to safeguard the MEC’s electoral mandate from political interference. It guarantees autonomy in matters such as voter registration, constituency delimitation, vote tabulation, and the declaration of election results.
These are the core functions that must remain free from executive influence. Administrative arrangements such as the physical location of offices do not fall within this protected domain.
Relocating MEC’s headquarters from Lilongwe to Blantyre does not affect the conduct of elections. It does not interfere with decision-making, alter electoral procedures, or compromise the Commission’s authority.
A change in physical location does not amount to a loss of independence. In fact, administrative restructuring can, in some instances, enhance efficiency and service delivery without encroaching upon constitutional mandates.
MEC has relied heavily on Section 76 of the Constitution to justify its position. However, that provision protects the Commission in the exercise of its powers and duties; it does not confer absolute control over logistical or operational matters.
Neither the Constitution nor the Malawi Electoral Commission Act designates Lilongwe as the MEC’s permanent headquarters. The absence of such a provision is significant and weakens the claim of constitutional infringement.
It is also important to examine the nature of the Executive Order at issue. By MEC’s own admission, the directive applies broadly to multiple public institutions.
This context is critical. A policy of general application cannot reasonably be interpreted as a targeted attempt to undermine MEC’s independence. Constitutional violations are not established merely because an independent body is affected by a wider administrative policy.
At the core of MEC’s argument lies a conceptual misunderstanding: the conflation of independence of function with immunity from administrative oversight.
These are fundamentally distinct concepts. Accepting MEC’s reasoning would suggest that matters such as office leasing, utilities, security arrangements, staffing structures, and budgetary controls constitute unconstitutional interference. Such a conclusion is neither practical nor legally sustainable.
Independent commissions were never intended to operate outside the framework of the state. They function within the public administration system, depend on public funding, and are subject to reasonable organisational decisions provided those decisions do not intrude upon their core constitutional responsibilities.
The courts exist to protect constitutional substance, not to obstruct routine government organisation. Judicial intervention is warranted when independence is genuinely threatened, not when ordinary administrative decisions are recast as political encroachment without a firm legal basis.
In short, independence of judgment does not extend to independence of physical location.
MEC’s objection elevates a management issue into a constitutional confrontation where none truly exists.
What we are witnessing is not a genuine constitutional crisis, but a fragile legal argument cloaked in the language of constitutional alarm.
