In a bid that signals renewed U.S. interest in Central Asia, U.S. President Donald Trump on September 7, 2025, held what he described as a “great conversation” with Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.
Earlier in the week, Trump also spoke over the phone with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, with both sides highlighting plans to expand their strategic partnership. Commentators have noted that Trump’s rhetoric and transactional approach to foreign policy in his second term create both challenges and opportunities for sustained U.S. engagement in the region.
“Great Conversation” With Tokayev
As he departed the White House for the U.S. Open men’s final, President Trump told reporters, “We had a great conversation,” though he offered no further details on the substance of the discussion.
On Kazakhstan’s side, President Tokayev had reached out in July, expressing his openness to constructive trade talks following Trump’s imposition of 25% U.S. tariffs on Kazakh goods. In that July letter, Tokayev committed to “developing fair, predictable, and mutually beneficial trade relations.” He also emphasized his readiness for “constructive dialogue aimed at finding a rational solution.”
The exchange reflects the broader importance of the U.S.–Kazakhstan relationship, which extends far beyond tariffs. Since 2017, the two nations have maintained an “enhanced strategic partnership,” covering trade, security, and energy cooperation. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest uranium producer and a leading supplier to U.S. nuclear power plants, while American firms such as Chevron and ExxonMobil are deeply invested in the country’s vast oil fields. Strategically located between Russia, China, and Europe, Kazakhstan offers Washington a critical partner in promoting regional stability and developing alternative trade corridors traditionally reliant on Russian land. By engaging closely with Astana, the U.S. strengthens its foothold in Central Asia while securing vital resources and supporting Kazakhstan’s multi-vector diplomacy.
Strategic Outreach to Uzbekistan
Earlier the same week, Trump and Uzbekistan’s Mirziyoyev agreed to broaden their strategic partnership across economic, security, and cultural domains, the Uzbekistan press office reported. According to the office, Trump praised Uzbekistan’s “irreversible reforms” aimed at modernizing its economy and improving living standards, while Mirziyoyev lauded what he termed the “impressive results of the domestic and foreign policy” of the U.S. administration.
This extension of engagement to Tashkent comes against a backdrop of longstanding U.S. involvement in Uzbekistan, including trade under bilateral agreements since the mid-1990s and cooperation on border control and counter-terrorism programs. In late 2024, shortly before Trump’s second term began, Washington reaffirmed its support for Uzbekistan’s bid to join the World Trade Organization, with U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai announcing the completion of bilateral market-access negotiations. That same year, U.S. officials also underscored opportunities in critical minerals cooperation with Tashkent through the C5+1 diplomatic framework.
Beyond trade and security, Uzbekistan is strategically important as Central Asia’s most populous nation and a key transit hub between China, Russia, and South Asia. Closer U.S.–Uzbek ties complement Washington’s regional engagement with Kazakhstan, creating overlapping partnerships that strengthen American influence, promote economic diversification, and reinforce stability across Central Asia.
Why Now? Geopolitics, Tariffs, and Regional Recalibration
These calls come at a time when U.S. policy towards Central Asia is undergoing an unmistakable shift. In mid-2025, the Trump administration imposed sweeping new tariffs – including a 25% duty on Kazakh goods (excluding key raw materials) – unsettling regional partners and heightening concerns about supply-chain resilience and inflation. The Times of Central Asia has previously reported that Central Asia stands at a “critical crossroads” as disruptions hit regional supply chains and inflationary pressures rise.
Concurrent cuts to aid programs and soft power tools have also reduced Washington’s presence on the ground, with executive orders slashing 83% of USAID programs and massively downsizing U.S.-funded media.
At the April 2025 EU–Central Asia summit in Samarkand, Brussels unveiled a €12 billion (US$13.2 billion) Global Gateway package for infrastructure and green energy. Two months later, the China–Central Asia Summit in Astana produced wide-ranging agreements in energy, agriculture, and education, deepening Beijing’s role. Regional leaders also gathered in Tianjin for the largest Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit to date, where China, Russia, India, and Iran advanced proposals for a development bank and expanded integration. With all five Central Asian presidents in attendance, the SCO projected itself as an alternative to U.S.-led frameworks.
Against this backdrop, Trump’s outreach to Kazakhstan’s Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s Mirziyoyev appears aimed at recalibrating Washington’s influence. Since January 2025, U.S. engagement has leaned heavily on tariffs, law-enforcement cooperation, and migration deals – including the deportation of 131 Uzbek nationals in April – while cutting aid programs to combat child labor in Uzbekistan. These moves signal a pivot from aid-driven diplomacy to transactional leverage. The question now is whether this toolkit can sustain U.S. influence in a region increasingly courted by Europe, China, and Russia.
Implications and outlook
The blend of tariffs, reduced assistance, and selective cooperation has complicated Washington’s regional engagement. For Kazakhstan, sustained dialogue with the U.S. could help ease trade tensions and safeguard critical exports, while for Uzbekistan, American backing for reforms and expanded commerce remains attractive even as aid channels have narrowed. With China and the European Union expanding their economic reach, Central Asian governments are increasingly interested in building deeper trade and investment ties with the United States – not only to reduce reliance on any single power, but also to secure access to technology, capital, and markets that support their long-term development strategies.
The United States stands to benefit from Central Asia’s energy reserves, mineral wealth, and strategic geography, but long-term relevance cannot be secured through tariffs and enforcement tools alone. Washington will need to find common ground with leaders in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and beyond, offering practical avenues for closer economic and security cooperation. If framed around shared interests – from stable energy markets to counterterrorism and diversified trade – such cooperation can sustain U.S. influence while respecting Central Asia’s drive for autonomy in an increasingly multipolar world.
