Regional rivalries and foreign interventions are again destabilizing the region.

The Horn of Africa appears to be drifting back toward a familiar and dangerous pattern. Six decades ago, a cascade of cross-border proxy wars shaped by Cold War rivalries and regional ambitions helped redraw the political landscape of northeast Africa, contributing to state collapse and enduring instability.

Today, many of the same dynamics are resurfacing. National armies are fragmenting, external powers are deepening their security involvement, and emerging technologies, from armed drones to new financial networks, are lowering barriers to intervention.

The result is a regional environment increasingly prone to escalation. The question is no longer whether the Horn might repeat the cycles of destabilization that marked its late twentieth-century history, but whether current conflicts could produce consequences even more far-reaching than those of the past.

The roots of today’s tensions lie in earlier cycles of regional rivalry, from the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia to proxy struggles linking Ethiopia, Sudan, and Eritrea during the Cold War and its aftermath.

Those patterns of mutual destabilization are now re-emerging in new forms, as Sudan’s civil war intersects with Ethiopia’s internal conflicts and external powers expand their influence across the Horn. Dynamics that once fractured states and redrew borders now risk drawing Ethiopia into a similar spiral, with potentially profound consequences for the region.

Ogaden Legacy

One of the earliest and most consequential examples of this dynamic emerged in the rivalry between Ethiopia and Somalia.

Following his seizure of power in a coup d’état in 1969, Somalia’s Siad Barre pursued an elite-driven pan-Somali nationalism that had emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, mobilizing the public around an irredentist campaign to reclaim the Ogaden.

He backed the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), an insurgent movement in eastern Ethiopia committed to the Greater Somalia project, uniting all Somali-inhabited territories under a single state.

Barre escalated the conflict in 1977 by directly invading  Ethiopia in an attempt to annex what is now Ethiopia’s Somali region, producing one of the most significant interstate wars in post-colonial Africa. The conflict killed about 60,000 people and displaced more than half a million.

Beyond the humanitarian and material toll, Barre’s support for the WSLF and later invasion carried lasting consequences for Somalia and the region. After the war, the Marxist regime of Mengistu adopted a policy of destabilizing Somalia by backing opposition groups, contributing significantly to Barre’s downfall in 1991 and to Somalia’s subsequent state collapse.

As Somalia struggled to establish a strong central authority, Ethiopia invaded in 2006 to support the weak transitional government against the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which it viewed as a direct security threat.

Despite decades of international efforts to strengthen Somalia’s central authority, the country has remained a theatre of geopolitical competition and a base for militant groups such as Al-Shabab and an emerging ISIS affiliate.

Proxy Frontiers

A similar pattern of indirect confrontation emerged along Ethiopia’s western frontier.

Although Ethiopia and Sudan maintained cordial relations after Sudan gained independence in 1956, proxy competition began when Sudan supported the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in the early 1960s.

In response, Emperor Haile Selassie supported South Sudanese rebels, a policy that intensified after Ethiopia’s Marxist military regime took power in 1974. As the proxy war expanded, Sudan also backed insurgents seeking to overthrow Ethiopia’s military government, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

Decades of reciprocal proxy warfare reshaped the internal politics of both countries. In Ethiopia, they contributed to the collapse of the military regime in 1991 and the rise of TPLF–dominated coalition government.

They also contributed, along with other factors, to major geopolitical changes, including the creation of two new states: Eritrea, which seceded from Ethiopia in 1993, and South Sudan, which gained independence from Sudan in 2011.

Post–Cold War relations between Ethiopia and Sudan experienced periodic tension. One such episode was the mid-1990s assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, in which Sudan had a role.

Despite occasional skirmishes in the Al-Fashaga borderlands, the two countries largely managed tensions, including through a 2008 agreement to ease tensions and begin border demarcation. This relative stability held until Sudanese forces occupied the fertile territory at the start of the Tigray war in November 2020.

Overall, relations had been relatively peaceful in recent years. Khartoum initially viewed the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam positively before shifting its position and aligning with Egypt after the fall of Omar Hassan al-Bashir.

Ethiopia also played an important role in Sudan’s peace process through IGAD, helping facilitate the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005.

Enduring Rivalry

Eritrea’s independence in the early 1990s introduced a new fault line in the region. Six years after Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia, the two countries fought a devastating war between 1998 and 2000.

Although the conflict formally ended with the Algiers Agreement, both states spent nearly two decades weakening one another through indirect means.

Ethiopia sought to isolate Eritrea internationally while backing opposition groups to its regime, including the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization. Eritrea, for its part, supported Ethiopian armed opposition movements such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and Ginbot 7, all of which maintained offices in Asmara.

When Ethiopia invaded Somalia in 2006, concerns grew that Somalia could become a proxy battleground between Ethiopia and Eritrea, with Ethiopia backing the transitional government and Eritrea supporting the Islamic Courts Union.

The 2018 détente between the two countries dramatically shifted relations, evolving into a military alliance during the Tigray war. Yet only a few years later relations deteriorated again. After Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed renewed calls for Ethiopia to gain access to the sea, tensions began rising between the two states.

The Ethiopian government has accused Eritrea of supporting armed groups inside Ethiopia, including alleged cooperation with the TPLF and Fano, claims Asmara denies. Meanwhile, Addis Ababa has hosted Eritrean opposition groups and reportedly explored mobilizing segments of the Afar population in ways that could affect Eritrea’s control of the port of Assab.

Regional Spillover

Recent developments have raised concerns about the widening regionalization of conflict in the Horn. Reuters recently reported that Ethiopia has secretly established a training facility for Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Following the United Arab Emirates’ decision to leave its military bases in Somalia after Mogadishu terminated defense cooperation with the UAE in January 2026, reports suggest Ethiopia has become an important node in the UAE’s support network for the RSF.

As Sudan’s civil war intensifies, the Blue Nile State, which borders Ethiopia, has become a major battlefield. Sudan has also accused Ethiopia for the first time of allowing its territory to be used to launch drone attacks against Sudanese forces, an allegation that could further escalate tensions.

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) accuse the RSF of launching attacks from areas near the Ethiopian and South Sudanese borders in coordination with opposition groups, including the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North (SPLA-N) led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu.

Reports also indicate that a recent RSF drone strike hit al-Kurmuk near the Ethiopian frontier, illustrating how the conflict is increasingly spilling toward Ethiopia’s borders. The Sudanese government accused Ethiopia of aiding the RSF attack.

Internal Fractures

Ethiopia is currently facing multiple internal conflicts.

In the Amhara region, federal forces have been fighting the Fano insurgency for the past three years. Initially fragmented and lacking centralized command, Fano was widely expected to be contained quickly.

Yet the insurgency has persisted, and several factions recently announced the creation of a unified Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM).

Such consolidation could transform the movement into a more cohesive organization capable of coordinating strategy and potentially expanding cooperation with other armed actors.

Reports also suggest that recent federal troop redeployments from northern Ethiopia have enabled Fano fighters to capture additional towns, extending their reach into local communities.

In Tigray, unresolved issues following the Pretoria Agreement, including the status of western Tigray, refugee resettlement, justice and accountability, and political governance, continue to generate tension.

With shifting alliances among former adversaries, including alleged cooperation between Eritrean forces, elements of Fano, and factions linked to the TPLF, the possibility of renewed conflict remains a serious concern.

In Oromia, the federal government continues to clash with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), though the conflict receives far less international attention. Additionally, reports indicate that federal troop redeployments have created security risks across the country, including in Oromia.

The Somali region has remained relatively calm since the 2018 peace agreement between the federal government and the ONLF. However, grievances over governance, corruption, and self-administration have recently led several Somali political groups to form the Somali People’s Alliance for Self-Determination (SPAS).

While it has not yet become an armed movement, such political consolidation in a historically volatile region could contribute to future instability.

Meanwhile, recurring ethnic violence in Gambela, sometimes linked to instability in neighboring South Sudan, and persistent security crises in Benishangul-Gumuz, where the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is located, pose additional challenges to Ethiopia’s internal stability.

Approaching Precipice

The modern history of the Horn of Africa demonstrates the destructive consequences of regional intervention and proxy warfare. From the Ogaden War to the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict and the collapse of Somalia, attempts by states to weaken their neighbors have repeatedly produced instability that ultimately harms the intervening states themselves.

Today, the region shows signs of drifting back toward the same pattern. Sudan’s civil war is drawing in neighboring actors, while Ethiopia faces multiple internal conflicts that could easily acquire regional dimensions. At the same time, external powers are expanding their influence across the Horn, raising the risk that local disputes could evolve into broader proxy confrontations.

If the past offers any lesson, it is that the pursuit of short-term strategic advantage through intervention often produces long-term insecurity. Unless regional leaders exercise restraint and prioritize cooperative security arrangements, the Horn of Africa may once again find itself trapped in a cycle of conflict history has already shown to be devastating.

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