How Africa’s leading institution turned a peace agreement into a tool of war

When the Pretoria Agreement was signed in November 2022, it was presented as a diplomatic breakthrough that could bring an end to one of the most devastating genocidal wars of the 21st century. Brokered by the African Union (AU), it promised not only a cessation of hostilities but also the restoration of humanitarian access and political stability in Tigray.

More than three years later, much of what was promised has yet to materialize. The main provisions of the agreement remain unimplemented, and the AU has shown little effort to push for their enforcement or to hold parties accountable.

At this point, the problem is no longer whether the agreement ended the fighting, but whether it was ever designed to produce a durable peace.

From the outset, AU’s role as a neutral guarantor was questionable. For most of the war on Tigray, the TPLF refused to accept the AU as a mediator, citing its perceived bias toward the Ethiopian government.

This perception was reinforced by the conduct of its then-Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, whose sympathy for Abiy Ahmed’s military campaign was laid bare when he echoed the Ethiopian government’s portrayal of the war as a “law enforcement operation” to preserve national unity and constitutional order.

The AU also complied with a request from Abiy to remove a Tigrayan staff member serving as a security adviser, dismissing him on grounds of alleged disloyalty.

Nearly a year into the war, the AU’s official social media account published a post mocking the United States for calling on the parties to pursue dialogue. It compared the TPLF to ISIS and the Taliban, echoing the language used by the Ethiopian government to justify its military campaign.

The post was later deleted, and the AU issued an apology, stating that an Ethiopian staff member had published it without authorization. However, the issue went beyond the post itself, revealing an underlying bias within the AU throughout the war.

In 2023, the AU’s Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) terminated its Commission of Inquiry on Tigray, established in May 2021 to investigate mass atrocities committed during the war. The investigation was closed without publishing findings or recommendations, despite nearly two years of work. Its webpage was also removed from the AU’s official site, leaving no public record of its conclusions.

The decision was formally linked to the signing of the peace agreement. But it came after the Ethiopian government had openly criticized the inquiry. An institution that closes its own human rights investigation under such conditions is difficult to regard as a neutral guarantor.

Selective Enforcement

The role of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was also not credible. It was formally included in the agreement’s monitoring mechanism, but it has produced no meaningful public reporting on violations in Tigray. Like the AU, IGAD has treated the Pretoria Agreement more as a framework for managing Tigrayan compliance than as a mechanism for enforcing obligations on both sides.

The impartiality of the lead mediator, Olusegun Obasanjo, was also questioned. During the peace process, he was repeatedly seen travelling alongside Abiy, touring parts of Oromia and appearing publicly at ease with him, at times even photographed holding hands. For many observers, this raised a basic question: how could someone so visibly close to one side be trusted to mediate between both parties?

Despite these concerns, the agreement was signed, and the AU formally assumed the role of guarantor. What followed was selective enforcement. The AU’s monitoring mechanism focused almost entirely on the disarmament of the Tigrayan Defense Forces (TDF), one of the few provisions that the Ethiopian government had prioritized. It failed to produce regular public reporting on ongoing violations.

The AU remained silent despite reports of an ethnic cleansing campaign in Western Tigray, even after the agreement was signed and continuing as late as June 2023.

The TDF handed over heavy weapons under AU supervision in early 2023, fulfilling its obligations under the Pretoria Agreement, while the main territorial and political provisions remain unresolved.

Non-ENDF forces still occupy Tigrayan territories, displaced populations remain unable to return home, and the basic services and administrative structures that were supposed to be restored have not materialized. The TDF disarmed, but the protections meant to accompany that disarmament never came.

Compounding these concerns, the AU Commission last week appointed Obasanjo to support peace and stability efforts in the Horn of Africa, reinforcing perceptions that the institution saw no serious problem with how the agreement had been handled.

External Priorities

The United States and the European Union (EU) also had leverage they could have used to push for meaningful implementation of the agreement, but neither chose to maintain that pressure. The United States’ pressure campaign during the war on Tigray, including threats of sanctions, aid restrictions, and Ethiopia’s removal from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) trade program, helped push Abiy toward negotiations in Pretoria in the first place.

By June 2023, the Biden administration had revoked its designation of Ethiopia as a state responsible for gross human rights violations, reopening the door to development assistance without meaningful conditions tied to implementation of the Pretoria Agreement.

Nothing has changed under the current administration either. In its latest meeting with Ethiopian officials on 11 May 2026, the US State Department spoke about regional security cooperation and commercial ties, but made no public reference to the Pretoria Agreement or its implementation.

In October 2023, barely a year after the Pretoria Agreement was signed, the EU followed suit and pledged 650 million euros in renewed support to Ethiopia without conditioning it on implementation of the agreement. The message was clear to Abiy: the agreement could remain unimplemented without consequence.

Just three months before that pledge, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had met with Abiy at a migration conference in Rome on 23 July 2023. For the EU, maintaining cooperation with Ethiopia on migration appeared to matter more than pushing for full implementation of the Pretoria Agreement.

Human Rights Watch pointed out at the time that EU foreign ministers had largely overlooked the lack of progress on accountability in their plans for future engagement with Ethiopia. The EU had its own priorities then, and judging by its latest statement, it still does. Tigray and the people affected by the war do not appear to be among them.

On 20 April 2026, the EU announced it would resume direct budget support to Ethiopia, unlocking over 140 million euros. The EU said the decision reflected Ethiopia’s progress on economic and governance reforms. The Pretoria Agreement was not mentioned. Tigray was not mentioned.

Ten days later, on 30 April, the EU issued a statement on the situation in Tigray calling for dialogue and de-escalation but attaching no conditions and demanding nothing. Nearly four years on, the language has not changed, and neither has the approach.

Political Breakdown

On 19 April 2026, the TPLF Central Committee announced it would reinstate the legislative council elected by 2.8 million Tigrayans in 2020, accusing the Ethiopian government of failing to implement the agreement.

It cited ENDF’s mobilization, the unilateral extension of the interim administration’s mandate without consultation, the withholding of civil servant salaries, and the continued de facto blockade on Tigray.

On 5 May 2026, the restored council convened in Mekelle and elected Debretsion Gebremichael as President of Tigray.

As the elected government of Tigray, the TPLF endured the occupation and resettlement of Tigrayan territories, the revocation of its legal status, the blocking of medicine and fuel, the withholding of humanitarian aid, and the provocation of renewed war.

Unhindered humanitarian access was one of the core provisions of the Pretoria Agreement. It has never been fully restored.

Residents in Addis Ababa can withdraw up to 50,000 birr per day from their bank accounts, while in Tigray the limit stood at 2,000 birr ($13) as recently as February 2026 and has since fallen to 1,000 birr, when cash is available at all. The banking system has effectively been used as a tool of pressure against Tigrayan civilians. The AU has said nothing about any of it.

The TPLF repeatedly called on the AU, IGAD, and the international community to enforce the agreement. None chose to act.

There is a limit to how long Debretsion’s government, which derives its mandate from the 2020 election, can watch its people stripped of territory, legal standing, and political existence while being asked to trust an unimplemented framework without weakening its own standing.

The AU presented the Pretoria Agreement as evidence that African diplomacy could end one of the continent’s deadliest wars. More than three years later, the people of Tigray are still waiting for that promise to be fulfilled.

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While this commentary contains the author’s opinions, Ethiopia Insight will correct factual errors.

Main photo: Olusegun Obasanjo visited Sof Omar Cave in Bale alongside Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and other government officials. June 2022. Source: social media.

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