Mohammad Tanzimuddin Khan: The first point is that, just as Awami League historically enjoyed close relations with India, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) once had a similarly strong relationship with China. Whenever BNP came to power, it was able to build a high degree of trust and cordial relations with Beijing.
However, that relationship suffered a setback after 2001, particularly in 2004 when the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office was opened in Dhaka. China’s sensitivity regarding Taiwan is greater than almost any other issue, and naturally Beijing did not view this development favourably. As a result, the traditional relationship of trust between BNP and China was significantly weakened.
Later, when a new government came to power after the 2008 election, China no longer felt the same obligation to demonstrate confidence in its relationship with the BNP. This made it much easier for Beijing to shift decisively toward the Awami League.
Even before the official results of the controversial 2018 election were announced, the then Chinese ambassador visited Ganabhaban to congratulate Sheikh Hasina. The same scene was repeated the day after the 2024 election. For China, who holds power or what ideology they represent matters less than ensuring that it maintains good relations with whichever government can best safeguard China’s economic interests.
China now appears to believe that the distance that had developed with the BNP can be repaired and that the changed political circumstances present a new opportunity to rebuild its image and relationship with the party. Likewise, for the BNP, this is a major opportunity to overcome past estrangement and establish renewed engagement with China.
The greatest challenge facing a BNP government is economic. A substantial portion of Bangladesh’s Annual Development Programme (ADP) is allocated to transportation and infrastructure development. At present, there is no larger global source of infrastructure financing than China. Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has supported infrastructure projects around the world while building an extensive network of land and maritime trade routes. Through this network, it is also institutionalising its diplomatic friendships.
If you look at global politics, you can also see major changes underway. The tensions surrounding the Iran conflict and the Strait of Hormuz, followed by efforts at understanding between Iran and the United States, indicate that the United States no longer occupies the same dominant position it once did. America’s economic capacity has also declined considerably.
Ultimately, politics is driven to a large extent by economic interests. The United States’ ability to provide economic assistance is now much more limited than before. For example, USAID has significantly scaled back its operations worldwide. As a result, under today’s global political and economic realities, many countries have become more willing to pursue policies without giving as much weight to US preferences.
Bangladesh finds itself in a similar position. If it can secure its economic interests through cooperation with China while placing somewhat less emphasis on the United States, that is the course it is likely to pursue. The same logic applies from China’s perspective. Moreover, China has regarded Bangladesh as a strategic partner since 2016. Consequently, the interests of both sides have converged in a particularly favorable way at this point in time.
