For decades, Iran has been perceived in Western strategic policy thinking primarily as a Middle Eastern player. Yet Iran borders both Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Hence, any internal turbulence, whether through a managed political transition or chaos and instability, would shape Iran’s foreign policy and spill into neighboring regions. Such developments would recalibrate the balance of power in one of Eurasia’s most fragile and strategically contested regions: the South Caucasus.
After the collapse of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in September 2023, the forced displacement of Armenians and the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers, the South Caucasus began undergoing a slow but profound realignment. Russia’s war in Ukraine also weakened Moscow’s capacity to become the region’s main security guarantor and power broker, paving the way for extra-regional actors.
This shift was further cemented by the Washington Summit in August 2025, and the resumption of the peace talks between Armenian and Azerbaijani officials. From the Summit to the declaration of the Trump Route for Peace & Prosperity, or TRIPP, developments show that the United States and, to a lesser extent, the European Union have replaced Russia’s diplomatic position in the region.
Meanwhile, the ongoing crisis in Iran has expanded Turkey’s influence. Ankara has followed a more cautious course in diplomatic normalization with Yerevan while continuing to deepen its security ties with Baku and facilitating regional connectivity projects within the context of the Turkey-backed Middle Corridor connecting Turkey to Central Asia through the South Caucasus.
In recent years, Iran has acted both as a status-quo power and as a bridge: a regional power wary of territorial changes and the expansion of Turkey’s geopolitical influence, while also serving as a bridge between Yerevan and Baku through economic incentives within the context of north-south connectivity corridors. Whether Iran can maintain these roles amid growing uncertainty will shape the geopolitical future of the South Caucasus.
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This analysis will reflect on three scenarios: a chaotic collapse and internal fragmentation; the continuation of the Iranian state or its replacement by a more hardline nationalist authority; and a transition toward a Western-leaning government. Each scenario is analyzed from the angle of its impact on local and regional actors.
Iran’s political future and Russia’s leverage in the South Caucasus
In his book “The Grand Chessboard,” former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski warned that the most dangerous outcome for the U.S. would be a Russian-Chinese-Iranian alignment across Eurasia that could challenge American hegemony.
From this perspective, regime change in Iran and its replacement with a pro-Western government is the best scenario for the U.S. A Western-oriented Iran would distance itself from Moscow and Beijing while aligning itself with U.S. interests. Such a development would further isolate Russia by hindering Moscow’s ability to circumvent sanctions and by obstructing access to Iran’s Chabahar Port, a critical maritime gateway linking the International North-South Transport Corridor to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Moreover, the loss of military-technical cooperation with Iran could create certain challenges for Russia in its war with Ukraine.
If Iran opens to Western markets and revises its foreign policy, Russia’s role in the South Caucasus will further shrink. Over time, stabilization of oil prices and possible Iranian oil exports to Europe could also challenge Russia’s position as a global energy security player by reducing its oil export profits.
But if Iran collapses and fragments, Russia may find itself in a dilemma. Initially, Moscow would try to exploit the chaos by presenting itself as a stabilizing factor and offering new regional security arrangements. In the long run, however, Turkey, with its security agreements with Azerbaijan, will have the capacity to fill the power vacuum and even win over Yerevan through conditional economic incentives.
If that were to happen, Russia would lose a strategic partner that could have helped contain Turkey’s regional ambitions. Russia would then have two options: to force a new regional system and directly challenge Turkey, or concede further to Ankara and become a junior regional actor until an alternative system emerges in Tehran.
If Iran’s position hardens — either through the continuation of the current administration or due to its replacement with a more hardline group that remains hostile to the West — Russia’s standing in relation to the United States would improve. In the long run, if Washington abandons its commitments in the South Caucasus because of its own domestic politics or lack of interest, Russia and Iran may restructure the regional system to their benefit.
Turkey’s dilemma and opportunity
For now, regardless of the possible outcomes in Iran, Turkey’s position in the South Caucasus continues to consolidate. Ankara has deepened its strategic partnership with Azerbaijan while gradually pursuing normalization with Armenia, extracting political and psychological concessions from Yerevan in the process. Russia’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine has further expanded Turkey’s room for maneuver in the region. The announcement of the TRIPP project represented another — at least partial — diplomatic success for Ankara vis-à-vis Iran. Much, however, will depend on how Tehran engages with Washington over the future of TRIPP and whether the United States supports providing Iran with a corridor to Europe through Armenia. Ultimately, this too will hinge on Iran’s broader political trajectory.
Turkey is playing the long game of corridors in the region. It views the Middle Corridor as a strategic route linking Asia to Europe through the South Caucasus and Central Asia while bypassing Russia and Iran. This corridor also strengthens Turkey’s geopolitical influence, expands the economic integration and regionalization of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and supports Ankara’s ambition to become a regional energy and transit hub.
This strategy is not necessarily ideological. Currently, Turkey’s main objective in Central Asia is geoeconomic. It also lacks the political and economic resources to contain Russia and China in Central Asia, nor are Central Asian states eager to join their “big brother” in an “ideological crusade” against their powerful neighbors.
For that reason, chaos and instability in Iran are not in Turkey’s interests. Ankara lacks the resources and leverage to prevent Iran’s fragmentation or counter non-state actors whose activities could spill over its borders. Moreover, after China, Turkey is Iran’s largest trading partner.
Should Iran descend into internal chaos, Turkey would prioritize risk mitigation, the prevention of the flow of refugees and the rise of Kurdish nationalism in Iran. Ankara is cautious on this issue, which is why it pressured the U.S. when, in early March 2026, outlets like Al Jazeera circulated news that the CIA was working to arm Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in northern Iraq to encourage an incursion into Iranian territory under U.S. air cover, followed by an uprising in the Kurdish-populated territories of northeastern Iran.
Estimates vary on the number of ethnic Kurds living in Iran because official censuses do not track ethnicity. According to Minority Rights Group International, they make up about 10% of Iran’s population, which places their number at approximately 9.3 million. The Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK, the Iranian branch of the PKK) is also active there. Turkey views PJAK’s activities as a security threat.
In addition, millions of Azeris live in northern Iran. Due to the domestic crisis and lack of a centralized authority, Turkey — backed by Azerbaijan — may be forced to act. However, it would be challenging to understand the form this action would take. Would Turkey have the political, military and economic resources to impose a buffer zone along the Iranian border? How then can Ankara mitigate a Sunni-Shia conflict in the region? And how would Iranian Kurds perceive such action? Turkey’s gradual and careful normalization of ties with Yerevan should also be viewed through this lens. In April 2026, a joint Turkish-Armenian committee met in Kars, highlighting the importance of the activation of the Kars-Gyumri railway. Recently, Turkey also lifted restrictions on Armenian goods, paving the way for direct trade. Turkey is taking calculated steps to increase its economic influence in the South Caucasus while preparing for worst-case scenarios in Iran. Of course, such a scenario would create opportunities for Turkey, but overextension would also carry high economic and security risks.
If Iran leans toward the West, Turkey could lose its value in the eyes of the West as a country containing Iran in the Middle East and South Caucasus. Western actors may instead consider cooperating more with Iran, sidelining Ankara. Such a political orientation may push Western companies to invest in Iranian infrastructure, turning the country into a regional transit hub for north-south and west-east connectivity. Such a policy shift would also be encouraged by Gulf states, seeking to normalize relations with Iran, even going further into establishing security ties. This may push Turkey to shift its foreign policy priorities as well and may find a more competitive rival in the South Caucasus. Over the longer term, Turkey could reach out to Iran and together they could contain Russia.
In a scenario where Iran’s current course continues and adopts a more hardline stance toward the United States — or is replaced by a nationalist government — Turkey would likely continue its balanced foreign policy between competition and pragmatism. Ankara would advance its “Turkic World” concept and further institutionalize the OTS with Baku, while simultaneously managing its rivalry with Tehran.
In that scenario, Ankara would continue becoming a regional power that acts as a buffer, while increasing its geo-economic influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia without directly clashing with Moscow and Tehran. Another possibility is that Turkey could even cooperate with Iran, and even Russia, on TRIPP to expand regional influence at the expense of the EU or the U.S.
Armenia: Most exposed with limited maneuvering space
The Iran war has put Armenia in an increasingly fragile and exposed position. Despite the positive atmosphere of the 8th European Political Community Summit held in Yerevan, the visit of high-ranking Western officials and the EU-Armenia joint declaration on May 5, the continuing crisis in Iran and supply chain disruptions will continue to expose Armenia’s economy and maneuvering space in the region.
A potential collapse of the Iranian state, coupled with disruptions to transit infrastructure and a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, would significantly constrain Armenia’s north-south connectivity options and increase its dependence on currently non-operational routes through Turkey.
Such a scenario could also generate severe border instability, as thousands of Iranian refugees might seek refuge in Armenia. More critically, the geopolitical consequences would place Yerevan under heightened pressure regarding corridors and border arrangements from both Azerbaijan and Turkey. Amid uncertainty in Iran, Ankara and Baku would likely gain stronger leverage in negotiations with Armenia. At the same time, Russia could attempt to expand its influence by positioning itself as Armenia’s sole security guarantor against neighboring threats. In this context, Yerevan would find itself facing simultaneous pressure from three directions
If the Iranian state survives and continues its current foreign policy path, it will seek to maintain its bridging foreign policy between Yerevan and Baku. Armenia will benefit and may even find room to continue its balanced foreign policy between Washington and Tehran, while advancing TRIPP and the north-south corridor, thereby diversifying its trade routes.
If Iran instead changes its foreign policy vector toward the West, Yerevan, under the current administration, will also benefit. Iran may negotiate with the U.S. to join TRIPP, and the normalization of diplomatic and economic relations between Washington and Tehran would positively impact Yerevan’s position in the South Caucasus. If ties between Iran and the West are normalized, sanctions would be relieved, and Iran would re-enter global trade and energy markets. Regionally, it will be an important trading partner for Armenia. At the same time, Tehran would likely continue resisting territorial changes near its borders while engaging with the U.S. and EU over TRIPP and the north-south connectivity initiative linking the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea via Armenia and Georgia. Though this may seem an ideal scenario for many Western analysts, the recent war has shown that Iran will continue resisting American and Israeli pressure both politically and militarily.
Taking these scenarios into account, Armenia must navigate its foreign policy with extreme caution. It is no secret that Yerevan has been gradually distancing itself politically from Moscow while strengthening ties with Washington and Brussels, even as U.S. and EU policies are no longer as coordinated as they once were. Armenia’s ruling party seeks to diversify the country’s security partnerships through deeper engagement with the West while preserving strong relations with Iran, which remains a vital strategic partner and an essential counterweight to Turkish influence in the region.
Yet this dual-track foreign policy narrows Yerevan’s room for maneuver, compelling Armenia to adopt a cautious and largely neutral position, as demonstrated during the recent U.S.-Iran conflict. At the same time, Armenia’s dependence on Iranian trade routes and energy supplies is closely tied to the future of TRIPP and the potential unblocking of transport links between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Ultimately, the war has further exposed Armenia’s structural vulnerabilities — namely, its geographic isolation and dependence on external actors.
Any serious instability or collapse in Iran would therefore leave Armenia significantly more exposed by depriving it of its most reliable southern buffer, which Yerevan is not ready for and has no exit strategy.
Azerbaijan: The biggest beneficiary of a weakened Iran
Azerbaijan’s Caliber media has argued that, as Middle Eastern supplies decline, the only alternative land corridor left is the Middle Corridor, which can connect Europe to Asia. In fact, Azerbaijan wants to present itself as a key energy and transit hub for Europe. By doing so, it aims to raise the importance of the Middle Corridor and attract Western attention toward TRIPP.
Baku, unlike Yerevan, benefits from Iran’s weakness and isolation. However, it would be threatened as well if Tehran sinks into chaos. Hence, for Baku, the current crisis in Iran provides both opportunity and challenge. From Baku’s perspective, an uncontrollable Iran would have consequences for the entire region, and radical elements in the IRGC may pose a great threat to Baku’s government. As such, Azerbaijan needs a weak but contained Iran.
Iran is important to Azerbaijan for many reasons. First, around 16 to 20 million Iranian-Azeris live in northern Iran. While they mostly feel integrated into Iranian society, some have nationalist tendencies supported by Baku. Tehran has long viewed Baku with suspicion over potential irredentist ambitions regarding its northern territory. On different occasions, the Azerbaijani state media has referred to the geographical area in northern Iran populated by Azeris as “Southern Azerbaijan.” At the same time, although Iran and Azerbaijan are mostly populated by Shia Muslims, both states have taken different ideological paths when it comes to state-building. Baku has taken a nationalist path, while Tehran is a theocracy, which sometimes gives Tehran leverage over Shia clerics in Azerbaijan. Furthermore, over the past three decades, Iran has acted as a constraint against Turkish-Azerbaijani ambitions to dominate regional corridors. Yet, Tehran continues to supply Baku with energy sources and is the gateway to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. As a result, chaos in Iran is not in Azerbaijan’s interests.
Meanwhile, the emergence of a pro-Western Iran is the best outcome for Baku. Such a transformation in Iran’s foreign policy would reduce ideological hostility, as Tehran would be less reactive to Israeli-Azerbaijani cooperation, though concerned about Turkish-Azerbaijani cooperation. Economically, north-south trade corridors could expand, while energy swaps and transit cooperation would likely intensify. However, this does not mean that Iran would not give a green light to all of Baku’s wishes. Even a pro-Western Iran would still be cautious of Azerbaijan. It may even try to influence more of Azerbaijan’s domestic politics and prevent Baku from becoming a key transit hub that threatens Tehran’s geoeconomic interests in regional corridors. And if the Iranian state prevails or is replaced by hardliners, competition and cautious coordination with Baku will continue, and Iran would be more suspicious of Azerbaijan’s relations with Israel.
By contrast, a scenario involving Iranian state fragmentation and prolonged instability would be the most dangerous for Azerbaijan, despite the superficial strategic opportunities it might present. In the short term, Baku could benefit from a weakened Iran. Turkish-Azerbaijani influence across the region would likely expand, tilting the regional balance of power decisively in favor of the Ankara-Baku axis. Domestically, nationalist and irredentist rhetoric surrounding “Southern Azerbaijan” would probably intensify. Nevertheless, such a scenario would also carry profound strategic risks for Azerbaijan. And if nationalists seize power in Iran, Baku would feel threatened and would further seek Turkey’s help. Meanwhile, Israel’s support for Baku against Tehran would depend on how a nationalist government in Iran would perceive Israel and how stable its relations would be with the U.S.
Conclusion
Iran is not a small actor in Eurasian geopolitics; the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and its resilience against U.S.-Israeli attacks have shown that its policies have an impact not just on regional politics but also global energy markets. In what form Iran emerges from the war and what policies it later pursues will not only shape the balance of power in the Persian Gulf but also the emerging order in the South Caucasus and beyond.
We can conclude with three points:
If a political transition happens in Iran toward a Western-leaning government in the future, this may benefit Armenia as it would widen its strategic autonomy. As for Azerbaijan, Iran would be a competitor, though Baku would economically benefit. Regionally, the balance of power may shift, as the U.S. may cooperate with Iran, and Tehran’s value would increase in the eyes of the West. This would harm Russia’s interests and put Turkey in a challenging position.
Second, a collapse of the Iranian state and domestic chaos would have the most destabilizing outcome as it would trigger a refugee crisis, infrastructural damage and transnational challenges. This would create a power vacuum, and an uncontrolled Iran may pose a threat to neighboring regional actors such as Turkey and Russia. The South Caucasus, already fragile, is ill-prepared to absorb such a systemic shock from its southern neighbor. Armenia would lose a reliable partner, and with strained relations with Moscow, Ankara and Baku would pressure Yerevan for additional political concessions.
Finally, the continuity of the current state or a possible replacement with a hardline faction would preserve a certain predictability in Iran’s foreign policy. Moscow would be the greatest winner as it will retain an important regional partner, Ankara will continue its managed rivalry, and South Caucasian states will try to maneuver to gain from Iran to boost their position in the region, especially in terms of trade and border security.
Thus, any further escalation surrounding Iran or a violent collapse of the state without a managed transition would endanger stability and peace in the South Caucasus. The region sits at the intersection of major geopolitical fault lines. Although Iran may not currently wield the same level of influence in the region as Russia, Turkey or the United States, the future direction of Iranian foreign policy will significantly shape the geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus. The contest over Iran is therefore not solely about the future of the government in Tehran, but also about determining who will control the strategic transit corridors of Eurasia and exert influence in the neighboring regions.
