After a succession of diplomatic breakthroughs that reopened channels with international institutions and economic partners, the Syrian government now confronts a far more intricate challenge: converting foreign outreach and sanctions relief into measurable economic recovery.
Recent political advances have enabled Damascus to restore key international ties and create openings for investment and funding. Yet the ability of state institutions to manage these opportunities remains uncertain, particularly as public economic distress deepens and reconstruction needs continue to expand.
From Political Openings to Economic Tests
Syrian economic researcher Dr. Karam Shaar observed that the government’s success in navigating foreign relations and securing rapid sanctions relief places the responsibility for the next phase squarely on Transitional President Ahmad al‑Sharaa. Diplomatic achievements, he argued, represent only the first step toward sustained recovery.
Writing on Facebook, Shaar noted that the government’s diplomatic campaign produced relatively swift sanctions relief, effectively placing the burden of the upcoming stage on Sharaa. He added that political maneuvering can secure temporary measures, such as funding civil service salaries or procuring natural gas for a limited period, yet the remaining economic obstacles require specialized technical expertise.
His assessment highlights a shift in the nature of the challenges facing Damascus. Political initiatives may ease constraints and restore ties with international bodies, but capturing the benefits of these developments demands actionable economic programs, administrative reform and specialized teams capable of managing complex international cooperation.
Political Gains Require Technical Expertise
Shaar also examined the management of foreign affairs, noting that the centralized approach adopted by Foreign Minister Asaad al‑Sheibani, characterized by top‑down decision‑making within a narrow circle, proved effective during the political phase. He warned, however, that such an approach may lose its effectiveness when the government enters technical negotiations and long‑term institutional follow‑up. Al‑Sheibani’s one‑man method, he said, served its purpose previously, yet its productivity is likely to diminish in the future.
He stressed that opening channels of cooperation politically cannot replace the need for dedicated technical teams within state institutions. These teams must negotiate legal, economic and technical details rather than relying solely on high‑level diplomacy.
The European Agreement: From Understanding to Execution
This institutional gap is evident in recent steps taken by the European Union regarding its economic relations with Damascus. On 11 May 2026, the Council of the European Union decided to end the suspension of certain provisions of the 1977 Cooperation Agreement with Syria, fully reactivating a significant framework for bilateral trade and economic ties after years of partial suspension under the former regime.
Restoring the agreement does not guarantee an immediate return of investment or trade. It requires negotiating implementation mechanisms, preparing a business environment capable of attracting firms and resolving legal and administrative hurdles facing potential investors.
Shaar argued that the real test lies in moving beyond political breakthroughs to possessing the technical capacity to finalize open files. He cited the European track as an example, noting that high‑level political signals prompted the European Union to express openness to renegotiating the agreement. Syria now requires a complete and empowered technical team capable of addressing the finest details and carrying the process to completion.
International Funding: Conditional Capital
This challenge extends to international development finance, which represents a crucial avenue for securing capital needed for reconstruction and basic service restoration. Political approval to establish funding mechanisms does not guarantee the immediate release of unconditioned capital. International financing is typically tied to governance standards, transparency, institutional capacity, expenditure auditing and regular performance reporting.
Addressing Syrian institutional readiness, Shaar questioned how public entities would handle these requirements. He noted that foreign governments may agree to establish a joint fund with the World Bank, yet funding will likely arrive in conditional tranches released upon achieving specific milestones. He raised the question of which technical teams within Syrian institutions, including the Foreign Ministry, will coordinate directly with these international bodies.
These questions gained urgency following the announcement on 18 October 2026 by Syria and the World Bank Group regarding the establishment of a Multi‑Donor Trust Fund for Recovery and Reconstruction, named “START.” The fund aims to provide concessional financing, investment guarantees, technical assistance and institutional capacity building, while directing donor contributions toward priority recovery areas.
Beyond providing financial resources, the fund’s impact will depend on its governance structure, allocation mechanisms and project oversight. Discussions between Syrian officials and World Bank representatives emphasized the need for robust frameworks for transparency and accountability, as well as enhanced institutional capacity to manage projects. Establishing specialized technical teams across government ministries therefore becomes an essential requirement rather than a minor administrative detail.
The $216 Billion Reconstruction Challenge
The urgency of institutional readiness is underscored by the immense scale of national needs. The World Bank estimates Syria’s reconstruction costs at approximately $216 billion, reflecting extensive damage to infrastructure, housing and commercial facilities throughout the conflict. Financial pledges alone will remain insufficient unless paired with institutional capacity capable of translating funds into tangible economic and social projects.
Shaar concluded that the upcoming period demands a structural shift in managing economic affairs by expanding the role of experts and technical specialists within state institutions. These specialists must be granted the authority to participate in decision‑making and project execution, rather than leaving complex files in the hands of a small group of officials. He noted that political acumen delivered quick wins in the preceding period, yet the marathon of sustainable recovery requires empowering technical experts across state bodies.
Ultimately, the Syrian government’s next test extends beyond broadening international relations or securing financial commitments. The central challenge lies in building competent public institutions capable of managing these opportunities, executing structural reforms and ensuring that resources reach the sectors most in need. Diplomatic gains may open the doors to recovery, yet converting those gains into increased production, investment and improved living standards for Syrians depends on what state institutions can achieve on the ground.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
