The research in this article stems from Project Anthracite, a multiyear initiative funded by Global Affairs Canada and managed by RUSI and VERTIC, with support from 38 North, that uses open-source tools to analyze North Korea’s chemical industry, examining the extent to which it can support a chemical weapons program.
Introduction
Project Anthracite is the RUSI project to assess the nature and scale of North Korea’s chemical warfare (CW) capability using open-source capabilities. While a major part of the effort is to study the North Korean chemical industry to determine the potential capability and capacity to support a CW programme, this is unlikely to provide definitive evidence of an active CW capability. An end-to-end approach would be needed to determine this, which is beyond the scope of the current study and unlikely to be fully achieved using publicly available sources only.
One element of this approach is to ascertain the existence and location of dedicated military Battalions (Bns) subordinate to the Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau (NCDB)[1]. Eight Bns are referenced, two of which are reportedly active (the 17th & 18th), with six in reserve (13th, 14th, 15th 16th, 27th and 36th). Multiple reports about the locations and even existence of these Bns are contradictory, historical, and the subject of probable circular reporting. Additionally, the existence of NCDB Bns would not necessarily confirm the existence of an offensive, militarized nuclear or chemical warfare capability, as it could be argued that such formations would have a defensive function to counter an external chemical or biological warfare (CBW) threat.
Some or all of the reported Bns may no longer exist, may never have existed, may have been relocated, or may be hidden from sight (tunnel complexes are prolific in North Korea). Additionally, the North Koreans are extremely surveillance-aware and therefore tend to avoid sensitive activity during known time windows of satellite passes. However, the lack of an external, credible nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) threat to the DPRK indicates that the existence of NCDB Bns could be an indicator of an offensive North Korean CBW capability.
Through a broad search and analysis of commercially and publicly available imagery and other available open-source references, this study sought to identify possible likely locations for the NCDB Bns, prioritizing the 17th & 18th Bns for which there was the most collateral reporting, including defector testimony. Specific attention was applied to identifying anything on imagery that could support a link to CW (e.g. specialist vehicles, reinforced storage areas, additional security, collocated/integrated production or storage facilities).
Several identified sites of interest were analyzed, some of which had some of these features, however only one NCDB Bn (18th) was located, which heavily relied on collateral reporting. The scarcity of reliable open-source collateral and large geographical extent of the search areas, limited access to very high-resolution imagery. The ambitious nature of this study makes this overall a low-confidence assessment of the existence and/or location of NCDB Bns. However, it provides a useful baseline and an example of the challenges and opportunities of open-source intelligence (OSINT) when applied to such a complex and difficult target set.
Background & Context
According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), the North Korean Nuclear and Chemical Defence Bureau (NDCB) is actively involved in the research and development of weapons, and nuclear and chemical defence. It operates at the national level and reportedly is broken down into seven different units: operations, training, materials, technology, reconnaissance, section No. 32 (possibly relating to CW research & development), and mining/underground facility operations. Two additional research institutes (No. 55 and, No. 398) are responsible for: 1) simulating nuclear and chemical contamination and 2) training and operations, and decontamination respectively.
According to NTI, the NDCB has its own department of operations, made up of eight battalions.[2] Two of these were reported as active, the 17th and 18th, with the remaining, 13th,14th, 15th, 16th, 27th, and 36th in reserve. Some of these national assets may be assigned to support a corps, division, or regiment, and provide the Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) with both detection and decontamination capabilities.
According to the US Army, North Korean chemical battalions comprise three chemical companies, each with two chemical reconnaissance platoons and two chemical decontamination platoons. This potential subordination, historical nature of the reporting on unit designations, and the likely routine reorganization and redesignation of military units in general, further challenges the ability to identify and locate CBW related units since they are likely to be dispersed and integrated into other military formations.
Table 1. NCDB Unit Names.
In the absence of additional information, this analysis focused exclusively on attempting to identify the eight NCDB Bns listed above. Each of these Bns were considered in turn to try to identify and locate them on imagery.
NCDB Bn ORBATs and Functions
If there is little in the way of open-source reference material regarding the existence and location of NCDB Bns, there is even less on the potential orders of battle (ORBATs), structures, or task organization for an NCDB Bn.
The NCDB is reported to be responsible for oversight and technical assistance for chemical precursor and agent production, distribution and storage of chemical weapons, and production of defensive equipment in coordination with other military organisations. It also is responsible for NBC defense training within the KPA and response to NBC incidents. At the tactical level, it would therefore be logical for NCDB Bns to have both offensive and defensive responsibilities. This could include the handling and transport of chemical weapons and radiological material, training and doctrinal development for NBC resilience, specialist support to CBW delivery capabilities (e.g., chemical artillery and chemical warheads), and providing an emergency response to accidents and leaks, in addition to protection and decontamination of North Korean forces in the event of conflict.
As in all national militaries, the size of a battalion depends on the type of troops involved, the role of the battalion and the doctrine employed by the nation involved. North Korean military doctrine evolved from the Former Soviet Union in the 1950s-60s, when the Korean People’s Army (KPA) was trained, organized and equipped along Soviet lines. During the Korean War, Chinese influence led to a greater emphasis on irregular warfare, the use of light infantry and human wave tactics. Following the end of the war, juche (self-reliance) and songun (military-first) ideologies reshaped doctrine to prioritize internal resilience, asymmetry, and independence from foreign dependencies.
Deep tunnelling and underground facilities, massed artillery near the demilitarized zone, forward-deployed light mobile infantry forces, and training for guerilla operations behind enemy lines have since been prioritized. KPA ground force battalions are therefore not standardized against other well documented doctrinal models, and likely have, in any case, evolved as the KPA has modernized. Additionally, the highly specialist nature of an NCBD Bn makes it unlikely that it would follow standard organizational norms.
However, this specialization is likely to be reflected in the type of equipment observed within such a unit. Expected signature vehicle types would include CBRN reconnaissance vehicles such as the M1989 (variant of the BTR-60PB), modified UAZ-469 or Kia KM420 and decontamination trucks based on the Zil-130 or Gaz-66, or indigenously produced variants. Signature decontamination vehicles may include Russian TMS-65U and ARK-14KM, although decontamination equipment could also be mounted on a variety of Russian or North Korean chasses. Other vehicles may include command and control vehicles (e.g. Gaz-69 variants), general transport (e.g. Zil-130, Gaz-66 trucks), indigenously-produced variants such as the Sungri-58 (built on a Gaz-51 chassis) and Sungri-4.15 (built on a Gaz-69 chassis), and light engineering support vehicles such as bulldozers and diggers. Although some of these generic vehicle types are potentially identifiable on very high resolution imagery, specific features of individual variants identifying them as NBC-related are too small to be visible. Many of these vehicles are applicable to both nuclear and chemical functions and as such, even if positively identified, would not, on their own, confirm a chemical warfare-related unit. Together, these factors make the task of identifying NCDB Bns on imagery particularly challenging.
A common feature of the battalion is that it is the main tactical formation capable of acting independently. The multiplicity of potential tasks and the sensitive nature of the NCDB Bn role make it feasible that they would be based in discrete, self-contained bases, not necessarily collocated with other KPA units, although this cannot be ruled out. Other potential features are a proximity to CBW-related facilities, including those linked to research and development, chemical weapon production sites, missile units, decontamination training facilities, and CW storage facilities. NCDB units may also be deployed alongside other tactical units for training and exercises, however, they are likely to return to their home bases upon completion of these activities. Finally, the existence of extensive tunnels and underground facilities throughout North Korea means it can’t be ruled out that NCDB Bns are hidden from view.
Potential Locations of NCDB Bns
13th NCDB Bn – Hamhung Vinalon Complex
The 13th NCDB (reserve) Bn has been reported as located at the Hamhung Vinalon Complex. This is assumed to be what is more frequently referred to as the February 8th Vinalon Complex. An approximate 15 kilometer diameter area imagery search centred on the Vinalon complex (39°51′21″N 127°35′07″E) was conducted to identify a potential location for the 13th NCDB Bn (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Overview of possible locations for the 13th NCDB at the Hamhung Vinalon Complex (February 8th Vinalon Complex). Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
The following three areas of interest were located as the only probable military facilities identified in the search area, other than air defense sites:
Area of Interest (AOI) #1 (39°48′57″N 127°35′28″E). This probable military facility is located 3 kilometers southwest of the 8th February Vinalon complex, adjacent to the Number 17 Explosives Factory. The site comprises a HQ/Admin compound with probable barracks, a vehicle depot that may double up as a depot for civilian vehicles servicing the adjacent explosives factory, a separately secured, walled compound that may be a small arms shooting range, and a small probable training area. The training area includes a trench and three possible mock up military vehicles that appear to have been static on all available imagery since early 2015. Imagery quality is unable to identify these vehicles and they may be generic mock ups, but they appear to have a configuration indicating armoured personnel carriers (APCs). However, they are relatively small vehicles (approximately 4 meters in length), which makes them shorter than most APCs, so they could be modified light command vehicles.
This is a small military establishment, and the only identified probable military site within the immediate vicinity of the Vinalon complex, but it could also be associated with the nearby explosives factory. The configuration of the base indicates its primary role is for training. That would be consistent for a reserve Bn, however there is no evidence of military vehicles other than those on the training area, and no other evidence from imagery that this could be the location of a NCDB Bn.
Figure 2. The first probable military facility is located southwest of the February 8th Vinalon Complex, and is the only probable military site in its vicinity. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Area of Interest #2 (39°55’56”N, 127°31’56”E). This military facility is located behind the Institute of Chemistry (Hamhung Branch) that was the subject of a previous report. It comprises a large vehicle storage compound with U-shaped and rectangular sheds, and a second vehicle storage area that may be for vehicle maintenance. Military vehicles are regularly seen in both areas. Although imagery resolution precludes a positive identification of these vehicles, a rough mensuration on all available imagery since 2017 indicates most of them are box bodied vehicles, approximately 4 meters in length and 1.8 meters in width (Figure 4).
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Figure 2. The first probable military facility is located southwest of the February 8th Vinalon Complex, and is the only probable military site in its vicinity. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Figure 3. The second AOI for the 13th NCDB Bn is a U-shaped facility behind the Institute of Chemistry. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Imagery from June 2, 2017, shows nine vehicles of these dimensions, which is consistent with a Bn level formation. There are few military vehicles of these dimensions, apart from the UAZ-469. The UAZ-469 is a common Soviet Union era light utility vehicle, widely exported globally.[3] Numerous variants and local adaptations of this vehicle have been produced, including a CBRN reconnaissance variant (designated the UAZ-469RKh). Modifications for this variant are visibly minor and are comprised of predominantly antennae and tubes, so are undistinguishable on commercial satellite imagery. There are several features about this location that would make it a logical location for an NCDB Bn: its colocation with the Institute of Chemistry (Hamhung Branch) that has been potentially linked to research and development for chemical weapons, and the possible existence of buried and bermed buildings associated with this facility would support this assumption. However, there is nothing on imagery to confirm the nature of the military base, and the presence of air defence sites, communications towers and other potentially sensitive facilities in the area makes it equally likely that the base could be used to support any or all of those.
Area of Interest #3 (39°56’15”N, 127°30’54”E). On the other side of the mountain, and linked by a switchback road to AOI #2, is another military base, comprising three separate areas. Nested in the foothills is an HQ/administrative support compound, with a sports field/parade square and probable barracks.
Directly opposite the main entrance to this compound, on the other side of the main road that leads directly to the 8th February Vinalon Complex, approximately 10 kilometers away, is a vehicle depot. This comprises a large walled compound surrounded by vehicle sheds, with a single entryway. There is an unidentified structure in the compound that appears to be bunded and with two vents, but the quality of available imagery precludes a positive identification. Military vehicles are regularly observed in the compound, (Figure 5) as is a white coach.
The third area is located further east, 0.5 kilometers down an access road from the vehicle depot. It comprises two areas, one an active air defence site and the other a probable air defence support area. The location and layout of this AOI does not rule it out as a candidate for the 13th NCDB Bn, however its proximity to the air defense site suggests that the facility is air defense-related.
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Figure 5. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Figure 6. Across from the main entrance to the AOI #3 compound, a vehicle depot sits. Imagery from March 2025 shows military vehicles parked in the area. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
14th NCDB Bn – Sunchon Vinalon Complex
The 14th NCDB Bn has been associated with the Sunchon Vinalon Complex (also known as 118 Factory and the Sunchon Nitrolime Fertilizer Factory). This is located in the sprawling industrial city of Sunchon, and is the subject of a separate report. It was established in 1985, but by 2009, the original site had reportedly been shut down and was derelict. This could potentially impact the existence or location of the 14th NCDB Bn, and available historical imagery prior to 2009 was limited. However, subsequent analysis indicates that significant reconstruction has occurred in this area, and other potentially chemical warfare-associated sites are present. These include the Sunchon Pharmaceutical Factory, Sunchon Chemical Complex, and a new facility constructed to the southeast between November 2019 and June 2022 (Figure 7). The continuing existence of an NCDB Bn in the Sunchon area is therefore feasible.
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Figure 7. Overview of areas of interest for the 14th NCDB Bn, located near the Sunchon Vinalon Complex. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Figure 8. Close up of sites of interest near Sunchon Vinalon Complex. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
With no other collateral information than the name of the Bn, a 10 kilometer diameter imagery search was conducted to identify potential candidate facilities. While there were numerous sites that had characteristics of military facilities, many of these were in urban areas and had the appearance of training, academy or administration sites with little security. These have therefore been discounted. The proximity of Sunchon Military Airfield to the Sunchon Phosphatic Fertilizer Plant (within 4 kilometers) is of particular note. The airfield has an embedded underground complex and would be a natural location for an NCDB Bn. The following were identified as potential sites of interest, based on their layout, location and in some cases the historical presence of military vehicles (Figure 8).
Area of Interest #1 – 39°25′10.54″N 125°53′39.29″E. AOI #1 is a military facility located approximately 500 meters northeast of Sunchon Military Airfield, to which it is connected by well-maintained metalled roads. It comprises a large probable sports field, around which are located several support buildings, including a possible gymnasium and probable accommodation blocks. To the west of this primary area are two other compounds, one of which has the appearance of a vehicle maintenance depot and behind this a separately secured compound with a vehicle parking area and a U-shaped support building.
This compound was reconstructed between late 2017 and early 2018. Prior to that, military vehicles of various sizes were regularly observed in this compound (e.g see Figure 10), although the quality of available imagery precluded a positive identification of vehicle types.
The layout of the main area of the facility indicates this is either a military training establishment or barracks, potentially for military personnel serving the airfield. Two significant new buildings were constructed between September and December 2024 (Figure 11), likely to be sports centers/gymnasiums.
While there is nothing on imagery to positively identify this as the location for an NCDB Bn, the discrete, separately secured compound highlighted on Figure 10 would be the most likely location for one if it were there. However, the relatively high profile of the site, further evidenced by the formal avenue of trees on the approach road, indicates this as an unlikely location for an NCDB Bn.
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Figure 9. AOI #1, located northeast of Sunchon Military Airfield, has a probable sports field, several support and accommodation buildings, and two other compounds, likely for vehicles. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Figure 10. Imagery from 2010 shows military vehicles at one of the compounds within AOI #1. It was reconstructed between late 2017 and early 2018. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Figure 11. New buildings and a sports pitch were constructed at the main area of the vicinity in late 2024. Satellite image ©2026 Vantor.
Area of Interest #2 – 39°25′56.89″N 125°54′09.85″E. AOI 2 is a smaller compound off the same access road as AOI #1. It comprises of a central open area that has historically been used as a football pitch, and several support buildings, including probable barracks and vehicle maintenance sheds. On imagery from September 19, 2022, eight military vehicles are parked on the central open area. Image quality precludes a positive identification of these vehicles, and there may be more than one type, however all are approximately 5 meters-long. There is a probable open body truck parked separately in the compound. Notably, this is the only available image in which vehicles have been identified at this location.
This site is in close proximity to an underground hangar that is almost certainly used to store military aircraft. It has two separate entrances that allow the aircraft to transit in and out of the tunnel without having to turn round. While the expanse of the facility is unknown, the number of aircraft that have been seen parked outside, on, for example, imagery from April 16, 2018 (Figure 13), indicates a substantial underground area.
There is no evidence on imagery or other collateral to indicate a link to a NCDB Bn, and it would be unlikely that chemical or nuclear weapons would be stored in the same buried location as operational aircraft, although this cannot be entirely ruled out. The lack of regular military vehicle activity or additional security makes it far more likely that this site is a general support area for the underground facility.
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Figure 12. Off the same access road as AOI #1 and adjacent to AOI #3, AOI #2 is composed of possible barracks and vehicle maintenance sheds. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Figure 13. AOI #2 is in close proximity to an underground hangar, most likely used to store military aircraft. Imagery from 2018 shows aircraft parked outside the underground area. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Area of Interest #3 – 39°24′59.54″N 125°54′19.52″E. Immediately behind AOI #2 is a third military compound. This compound comprises a vehicle parking lot and probable maintenance areas, possible workshops and an HQ/Admin building. Several features distinguish this site from AOIs #1 and #2. While it is the same general vicinity, it is accessed by a single-track road and contains two artificial water reservoirs. Vehicle activity is also more consistent over a longer period, with a greater range of vehicles frequently observed (Figure 15), although quality of available imagery in unable to confirm vehicle types.
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Figure 14. AOI #3 is differentiated from AOIS #1 and #2 as it is accessed via a single-track road and contains two artificial water reservoirs. Vehicle activity has been more consistent at this location. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Figure 15. Imagery from August 2009 shows vehicles parked at possible location for 14th NCDB Bn AOI #3. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Of note are a series of semi-bermed probable storage buildings on the access road and along a connected track to the east (see Figure16).
Figure 16. Along the access road near AOIs #2 and #3, a series of semi-bermed probable storage buildings sits near a possible logistics/storage compound. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Historical imagery from December 2002 (Figure 17) also indicates potential tunnel entrances and other possible hidden entrances that have since been covered by vegetation and trees.
Figure 17. Imagery from December 2002 indicates potential tunnel entrances that have since been covered by vegetation. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
While there is no indication of a link between these buildings and either AOIs #2 or #3, the proximity and access make a link possible. The proximity to Sunchon Military Airfield makes it just as likely that these structures are associated with operations there. There is also an adjacent substantial probable logistics/storage compound that could be linked to these buildings. This compound has gradually expanded since 2017 and is likely to be linked to the observed airfield refurbishment.
Area of Interest #4 – 39°24′49.43″N 125°54′39.68″E. This site is connected to a much larger probable military barracks via a single-track road. It is located approximately 1.2 kilometers from the airfield and 2.5 kilometers from the Sunchon Phosphatic Fertilizer Plant. Of note, it has no direct access to the airfield so is likely not linked.
Figure 18. AOI #4 is connected to a large probable military barracks via a one-way road. It does not have direct access to Sunchon Military Airfield and is likely not linked. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Although an innocuous looking facility, it is characterized by very high physical security, including a high wall surrounding the entire compound, two guard towers and a probable guard room. Various military vehicles and trucks have been observed in the central compound since at least 2006. While the compound has been in existence since the first available imagery of 2002, it was only wall secured in 2006. Two unidentified circular buildings were present immediately outside the facility until their removal in 2011 (Figure 19) but it is unclear as to both their role and whether they are linked to the facility.
Figure 19. AOI #4 is also highly physically secure, with a surrounding wall, two guard towers, and a probable guard room. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
15th NCDB Bn
Given the lack of a location for the 15th NCDB Bn, and the complete lack of any collateral information, it has been impossible to determine whether this Bn exists.
16th NCDB Bn – Namhung Youth Chemical Complex
The 16th NCDB (Reserve) Bn is reportedly located at the Namhung (Anju Namheung) Chemical Factory, which is located just north of the Chongchon River, in North Pyongan Province (39°39′05.72″N 125°41′17.55″E – see figure 20). This is a large chemical complex, built in the 1970s, that has been a central part of North Korea’s chemical industry and is a major producer of a range of chemicals for agriculture and other civil industries.
Figure 20. Overview of possible locations for the 16th NCDB Bn, near the Namhung Youth Chemical Complex. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Located near the city of Anju, the complex is sometimes also referred to as the Anju Youth Chemical Complex or the Namhung Chemical Factory. Since the 1970s, the complex has been an active site with regular expansion and modernisation that still takes place today and it has been linked with elements of a CW programme. This makes it a logical location for an NCDB Bn. However, being a reserve Bn, there may be little to see on imagery and there may just be a headquarters element that could be accommodated in one of the several administrative buildings on the complex. For consistency, a 10 kilometer diameter area search, centred on the middle of the complex, was conducted to look for potential sites. The following sites of interest were noted.
Area of Interest One – 39°37′18.20″N 125°41′23.52″E. AOI #1 is a walled discrete military compound, located in a residential area approximately 2.5 kilometers to the south of the Namhung Youth Chemical Complex, to which it is connected by road. The facility comprises an HQ/Admin building, vehicle storage and maintenance sheds. A variety of military vehicles have been observed on imagery within the compound on a regular basis since the first available image from 2006.
Figure 21. The first AOI for the 16th NCDB Bn is a walled military compound in a residential area. It is located south of the Namhung Youth Chemical Complex. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Area of Interest Two – 39°40′39.20″N 125°41′39.67″E. AOI #2 is another walled military compound, located approx. 2.5 kilometers north of the Namhung Youth Chemical Complex. It includes a central courtyard, with likely vehicle storage/maintenance and workshops around the perimeter. Numerous military vehicles have been observed on imagery since the first available image in 2006, although the quality of imagery precludes their identification.
Figure 22. AOI #2, also a walled military compound, is located north of the Namhung Youth Chemical Complex. Military vehicles have been observed on imagery since 2006. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Area of Interest #3 – 39°34′28.84″N 125°39′45.89″E. AOI #3 is a walled compound within a much broader sensitive complex spread out over a valley within a mountainous area approximately 8 kilometers south of the Namhung Youth Chemical Complex. The facility is accessed via a single road with a controlled access point and is fence secured over a large area.
Figure 23. AOI #3 is spread out across a valley. It has several individual components that make up the site’s sensitive complex. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Within the complex, there are numerous remotely-located bermed buildings, indicating the storage of volatile or explosive material. There are also substantial areas of disturbed earth and individual buildings nested into the mountainside, indicating the potential presence of underground structures.
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Figure 24. Close up of one component area of AOI #3 on imagery from October 2022. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Figure 25. Overview of area on imagery from November 2006. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
This facility is fairly non-descript, comprising a small, separately secured compound, with a central courtyard, admin/support buildings, vehicle storage sheds and a probable inspection ramp. Of note, there is a bermed building in a compound immediately adjacent to the AOI, with a probable guard tower at the entrance. This is connected by a track to two further, unidentified buildings. Another small bermed building was removed sometime between 2014 and 2016 (Figure 26).
Figure 26. A bermed building next to a probable guard tour was observed at AOI #3 until its removal some time between 2014 and 2016. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Area of Interest #4 – 39°42′13.38″N 125°39′04.06″E. AOI #4 is located in a heavily militarized mountainous region, approximately 5.5 kilometers north of the Namhung Youth Chemical Complex. It comprises a discrete compound on the periphery of a larger military facility, at the end of a 2 kilometers tree-lined avenue. This compound consists of a central courtyard surrounded by buildings probably associated with vehicle storage, maintenance and administrative support. Military vehicles are regularly seen within the compound, although not in significant numbers.
Adjacent to the compound is another separately-secured site that has a single building surrounded by a berm. The site has the look of a training base or academy and is in the vicinity of at least two helicopter operating and dispersal facilities. It could therefore be related to flying training and the bermed compound a possible armory, although that is purely conjecture.
Figure 27. The 16th NCDB Bn possible location AOI #4 is within a heavily militarized region north of the Namhung Youth Chemical Complex. It contains a compound and a separately-secured building surrounded by a berm, which has similar signatures to a training base or academy. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
There are numerous other military establishments within the search area, most of which are barracks, headquarters and support buildings and with central courtyards, some of which have sports pitches marked out on them. There is nothing compelling from imagery that can positively identify the presence or identity of an NCDB Bn. However, based on location, layout, associated facilities and activity, the four AOIs described above are the most likely candidates for a 16th NCDB Bn, should one exist in this area.
17th NCDB Bn – Onjong-Ri
Reporting on the possible location of 17th NCDB Bn is historical and contradictory, and, despite claims that this is one of two active Bns, there has been no confirmation to date that this battalion exists. A key challenge in identifying a location for this NCDB Bn has been to refine the appropriate image search areas, given the plethora of reported place names with different translated spellings, similar place names in different regions and probable circular reporting. Examples are as follows: ‘The 17th battalion was located at a hot-spring spa in the mountains of Ojong-Ri.’ The only location for Onjong-Ri on Google Earth and other reference material is in South Hamgyong Province (39°31′49.58″N 127°21′56.63″E) which is in the east of the country. The same reference places Onjong-Ri in Songchon County, South Pyongan Province (in the central west of the country). Other references are variations on the theme that may be due to translation or nomenclature variations, for example, ‘17th NCDB is location at Pyeongan Namdo Songchon gun Onjori.’
The existence of the 17th Bn has been questioned, but an NCDB General Training Center at Onjong-Ri has also been reported[4]. Ri Chung Guk, lists the 17th NCDB as Onjong-ri, in Songchun County, South Pyongan Province (reference not available). According to Daily NK, the 17th NCDB is in the same ‘gun’ as the headquarters of the KPA Strategic Forces Command, at Pyungannam-do, Songchon-gun in Paekwon-ri, North Hamgyong Province.
Given the conflicting reporting but taking into consideration the weight of existing evidence, the search was centred around Onjong-ri (village), Songchon-gun (county), South Pyongan Province (39°31′29.60″N 127°21′45.96″E). The sites of interest described below were noted (Figure 28). There are several other possible military facilities within the search area, but none of them fit the likely profile expected of an NCDB Bn.
Figure 28. Overview of possible locations for the 17th NCDB Bn. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Area of Interest #1 – 39°31′37.99″N 127°21′52.08″E. AOI #1 is a small military compound on the northern outskirts of Onjong-ri. The facility comprises a central square, surrounded by vehicle sheds and support buildings, apart from a single access gate. Immediately outside of the gate is a possible vehicle inspection shed/garage, and there is a small water reservoir immediately to the southeast. Vehicles are routinely seen within the compound on available imagery. For example, imagery from November 14, 2019, shows three vehicles, each approximately 3.2 meters long. Although the quality of imagery was too poor to identify these vehicles, at least one of them appears to be military.
Figure 29. AOI #1 for the 17th NCDB Bn has a central square, vehicle sheds, and support buildings. Vehicles have been observed on imagery periodically throughout the complex. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
This is the only military related site in the immediate vicinity of Onjong-ri, and probable military vehicles are present on all available imagery since the first available image in 2007. There are several other compounds of similar format in the vicinity, however these do not have the same degree of security and are clearly associated with agriculture.
Areaite of Interest #2 – 39°33′16.75″N 127°24′30.94″E. AOI #2 is a military complex just under 4.5 kilometers northeast of Onjong-ri, nested in the conjunction of two valleys just 2 kilometers southwest of Kumsa-ri. The complex comprises a central parade square/sports field, a headquarters/barracks building on the north side, a possible gymnasium and an unidentified support building. East of the parade square is another sports field and support building, behind which is an enclosed courtyard and a vehicle compound, which routinely contains a variety of military vehicles. Image resolution prevents identification of these vehicles, but they include flatbed trucks, box bodied vehicles and other unidentified vehicle types. Next to this compound is a probable prison.There is also a water storage facility associated with the site. It is uncertain as to whether this vehicle compound relates to the prison or to the military facility, or indeed whether the colocation of the military facility and prison signifies a link between the two.
Figure 30. A parade square/sports field, headquarters/barracks building, a possible gymnasium, and a several support buildings are all observed at AOI #2. A probable prison is nearby. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Area of Interest #3 – 39°32′11.94″N 127°23′50.36″E. AOI #3 is at the head of a dammed reservoir, approximately 3 kilometers east-northeast of Onjong-ri. It comprises two sites, approximately 500 meters apart. The western site, constructed between 2003 and 2007, comprises a large parade square/sports pitch, headquarters/barracks, workshop, and large warehouse.
The workshop and warehouse were constructed over a long period from early 2013 to completion by mid-2016.
The eastern site comprises a series of unidentified support buildings and possible accommodation blocks, and two vehicle storage courtyards in which are located the occasional unidentified vehicle. This element of the facility was in existence at least since the first available image of 2003.
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Figure 31. Two sites make up AOI #2. The first was built between 2003 and 2007. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Figure 32. Between early 2013 and mid-2016, a workshop and warehouse were constructed at one of the sites. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Figure 33. The secondary site part of AOI #2 has unidentified support buildings, possible accommodation blocks, and two vehicle storage courtyards. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
There are several other possible accommodation and storage buildings located in the immediate vicinity of this SOI.
The timings of construction, and lack of military vehicles make it unlikely to be a location for an NCDB Bn, although the western site cannot be discounted as a potential candidate.
Area of Interest #4 – 39°33′40.24″N 127°21′37.85″E. AOI 4 is a remote military facility spread along a valley 3.5 kilometers north of Onjong-ri. The site comprises six discrete areas, laid out in a similar configuration, and a seventh that probably includes an administrative support area. By mid-2025, buildings in four of the discrete areas had been removed. This site has all the hallmarks of a military training base, possibly for special forces, with assault courses, probable water training courses, and small arms ranges, and is therefore unlikely to be an NCDB Bn location.
Figure 34. The 17th NCDB Bn AOI #4 is a remote military facility with six separate areas with a similar layout and a seventh that also includes an administrative support area. Buildings in four of the areas had been removed by mid-2025. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
18th NCDB Bn – Sogam-Ri
The 18th NCDB Bn is the second of the reportedly ‘active’ Bns, allegedly located at Sogam-Ri, Pyongwon-Gun, Pyongannam-Do. Although no corresponding name could be identified on collateral, there is a Sogam Station located in Pyongwon County. Unusually, limited collateral exists that has been invaluable in locating this Bn.[5],[6] Ri Chung Guk offered the following regarding the 18th Bn, supported by a sketch illustration (FIGURE 35). He recalled reaching the unit by going some distance from Sogam Station, on the rail line from Sinuiju Station, bound for Kaesong. He and his guide left the road and went into the mountains. Ri spotted the unit by looking down from halfway up a slope. Leaving his vehicle at that point, Ri and his guide walked 20 minutes to reach the unit. It should be noted that there is no independent verification of this report, however the diagram and description have been used to help identify the likely location for the 18th NCDB Bn.
Figure 35. Defector diagram of the 18th NCDB Bn with area identification overlays.
Illustration Key
(1) Sogam-ri Reservoir (outside compound, far left)
(2) Road with arrow pointing up in the direction of Pyongwon
(3) Mobile repair/service station area: repairs KPA chemical equipment, radiation detection equipment.
(4) Factory 279, which produces decontaminants.
(5) 1st, 4th, 5th Companies
(6) Fuel storage
(7) Tunnel
(8) Chemical storehouse
(9) 3rd, 6th, 2nd Companies; 6th Company also has training room(s)
(10) Vehicle repair
(11) Mess hall
(12) Guidance unit
(13) Communications unit
(14) Military clinic
(15) Provisions storehouse
(16) Exercise area
(17) Guardhouse
(18) Institute 398, a decontaminant research center
(19) Tree windbreak
(20) Sogam-ri, Pyongwon County, South Pyongan Province
(21) Road with arrow pointing in the direction of Sunan
(22) Chemical complex
(23) Sogam-ri training facility for new soldiers. Ri notes that the NCDB 18th Battalion, along with 17th Battalion, trains new soldiers for NCDB units.
A 10 kilometer radius area search centred on Sogam Station was conducted to identify all potentially military related facilities within the selected area to identify likely looking sites. These were then cross-referenced against the Ri defector report. The area is characterised by a mixture of farmland and mountainous outcrops and is highly militarised. There are a substantive number of air Defense missile sites, military training and academic areas, barracks, underground and buried facilities and tunnel entrances, as well as the Sunan joint military/civilian airfield. This made positive identification of an individual unit such as the 18th Bn a particularly challenging task. An initial list of approximately 25 sites was refined to 13 of particular interest (Table 2).
Table 2. Sites of particular interest related to 18th NCDB Bn.
Of these, the facility that most closely matched the layout and directions given in the defectors report was No. 11. A detailed comparative analysis of the site on historical and current imagery with the defector map, description and labelling makes this a high confidence assessment that the site described by the defector is that identified on imagery. However, without further collateral, this does not confirm that this facility is or was the location of the 18th NCDB Bn.
An overview of the facility is given on Figure 36, indicating its relative location and associated facilities according to the defector report.
Figure 36. Possible locations for 18th NCDB Bn on imagery from October 2020. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Figure 37 compares a historical image from 2003 (the earliest available) with the defector report, demonstrating a strong correlation between the two. There have been several changes since this time, most notably the reconstruction of 1st, 4th and 5th Companies and the replacement of the three buildings corresponding to 3rd, 6th and 2nd Companies with two longer buildings.
Figure 37. Comparison of possible locations for 18th NCDB Bn on imagery from 2003 with defector report. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Figure 38. Possible location for 18th NCDB Bn on imagery from 2019, in contrast from 2003 imagery and defector report. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Additionally, there has been a significant expansion of Factory 274, which occurred sometime between March 2020 and August 2022. Military vehicles have been a regular feature of this area on all available imagery since 2003 and imagery from July 10, 2025 shows four towed artillery units (possibly D-30) and three other unidentified military vehicles (Figure 39).
Figure 39. New construction completed between March 2020 and August 2022. Satellite image ©2026 Vantor.
The only discrepancy between the defector reporting and the imagery analysis is the lack of an observed chemical complex or recruit training center on imagery at the location he indicated. It is possible that these facilities had been demolished between the time of his visit and the earliest available image, however there is a possible chemical complex approximately 2 kilometers south down the main road towards Sogam Station, and three possible locations of a potential training facility in the vicinity of the 18th NCDB Bn have been identified (Figure 40).
Figure 40. Possible locations for recruit training center and chemical complex in Sogam-ri on imagery from 2019. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
27th NCDB Bn – Wonsan, Kangwon-do (Kangwon)
Also known as the 37th NCDB Bn, this bn is assumed to be collocated or associated with the Wonsan Chemical Complex. Wonsan is North Korea’s fifth largest city, located on the east coast. As a natural harbour, it has a substantial port facility and naval base. Since 2015, the city has seen significant redevelopment with the aim of transforming it into a tourist destination. A review of available imagery from 2002 has been unable to definitively identify a functional chemical complex, however there are two likely areas that may have been linked to the chemical industry at one point. Several facilities have nonetheless been identified with a profile that could potentially comprise an NCDB Bn, although there is nothing on imagery to confirm this and the existence of the 27th NCDB Bn in the Wonsan area is assessed as low confidence. There are numerous other military facilities within a 10 kilometers radius of the city centre, however most of these have the appearance of standard military training/academic or barrack facilities.
Figure 41. Overview of AOIs for 27th NCDB Bn assumed to be associated with the Wonsan Chemical Complex. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Areas of interest have been identified as follows:
Area of Interest One – 39°09′03.08″N 127°27’23.72″E. This site is within a kilometer of one of the potential legacy locations of the Wonsan Chemical Complex. It comprises two primary secured areas, the eastern one of which includes several vehicle storage and maintenance sheds and a large courtyard area. Military and civilian vehicles are frequently seen in this area, primarily box bodied vehicles and white coaches, which are frequently used for moving troops throughout North Korea. The western area, to which there is separate access, has the appearance of a support area, with probable barracks, administrative and other support buildings. There is nothing in imagery to indicate this site as a NCDB Bn and the site is just as likely to be a military vehicle depot. Other than the air defence sites located on hill tops in the surrounding area, it is, however, the only identified non-naval military site in the immediate vicinity of the potential chemical complex locations.
Figure 42. One of the potential legacy locations of Wonsan Chemical Complex, AOI #1 has two primary secured areas that include vehicle storage and maintenance and support areas. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Area of Interest #2 – 39°09′06.09″N 127°25’53.45″E. AOI #2 is a substantial military facility approximately 2 kilometers from the potential legacy locations of the Wonsan Chemical Complex. The site is dominated by a large parade square and likely substantial barracks accommodation. Unusually, there are two air defense sites in the immediate vicinity of the site, which could indicate a sensitive facility, however this could be coincidental due to the elevated terrain surrounding the facility, or the base could be a training facility, which could potentially include air defence training. There is nothing on imagery to indicate the presence of an NCDB Bn.
Figure 43. AOI #2, a substantial military facility, has two air defense sites in the immediate vicinity. This may indicate the site’s sensitivity, but could be coincidental given the terrain. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Area of Interest #3 – 39°08′34.68″N °26’06.86″E. AOI #3 is a discrete, secure site of significant interest. Although not configured as a standard military facility, it is unusually well-secured, with an external perimeter wall, internal walls, and a single gated entrance with an associated guardroom. The main feature within the complex is a tiered, multi-story building that has the appearance of a possible research and development building, although this cannot be confirmed on imagery. Occasional military vehicles are observed in the compound. Of note are two tunnel entrances nearby, linked to the site by a road. Therefore, while there is no indication of a NCDB Bn from imagery and it does not have military barracks or a parade square, it is clearly a sensitive site.
Figure 44. The 27th NCDB Bn AOI #3 is a sensitive sight of significant interest given its security measures, its exact nature is unclear. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
36th NCDB Bn – Sariwon Potash Fertilizer Complex
The 36th NCDB Bn has been linked with the Sariwon Potash Fertilizer Complex. Although unconfirmed, there are two probable potential locations for this facility, both approximately 6 kilometers east of the city of Sariwon, which is the capital of North Hwanghae Province
Figure 45. Overview of AOIs for 36th NCDB Bn, linked with the Sariwon Potash Fertilizer Complex.Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
A wide area (10 kilometers in diameter) search of the area revealed a significant number of probable military facilities, although many of these were generic.
Those with some or all the features that may be expected of a possible NCDB Bn were analysed in more detail (labelled AOIs #1 – 6) and described below. However, with no collateral information, it was not possible to confirm a location for 36th NCDB Bn.
Area of Interest #1 – 38°32′01.76″N 125°48’03.41″E. AOI #1 is a military barracks in the foothills of the mountains approximately 3 kilometers northeast of Sariwon City. There are several other military facilities in the vicinity, however this one stands out for several reasons. It is the only one that appears to have a dedicated vehicle parking area and military vehicles are routinely present. There is also a buried building, and a semi-buried remote building, and two possible tunnel entrances along a track leading directly from the facility.
There are also two further tunnel entrances in the hillside approx. 300 meters away (Figure 47). Therefore, while there is nothing on imagery to confirm this as an NCDB Bn location, it is a site of significant interest.
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Figure 46. AOI #1 for the 36th NCDB Bn is a military barracks located roughly three kilometers northeast of Sariwon City. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Figure 47. Two tunnel entrances are observed approximately 300 meters north of AOI #1. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Figure 48. AOI #2 is located nearby one potential location for the Sariwon Potash Fertilizer complex. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Area of Interest Two – 38°28′37.79″N 125°51’00.84″E. AOI #2 comprises two military facilities only 500 meters from one of the potential locations for the Sariwon Potash Fertilizer Complex. However, they are both of broadly standard layout and their direct connectivity to two operational air defense sites indicates that they are probably support facilities for this capability.
Figure 48. AOI #2 is located nearby one potential location for the Sariwon Potash Fertilizer complex. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Area of Interest Three – 38°26′51.32″N 125°43’32.69″E. AOI #3 is a walled military compound approximately 9 kilometers east-southeast of one of the potential locations for the Sariwon Potash Fertilizer Complex. It comprises a vehicle parking and maintenance area and single multi-story probable barracks. A variety of military vehicles are routinely observed in the compound and many of these are approximately 3.6 meters in length. They could therefore be UAZ-469, although imagery quality precludes positive identification. Flatbed trailers and cabs are also regularly observed. There is nothing to indicate an NCDB Bn link and the distance from Sariwon makes this an outlier, however it is an active, self-contained facility, so this cannot be ruled out.
Figure 49. A variety of military vehicles are regularly observed in the compound of AOI #3. Its distance 9 kilometers from one of the potential Sariwon Potash Fertilizer Complex makes this an outlier from other 36th NCDB Bn AOIs. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Area of Interest Four – 38°28′58.49″N 125°50’57.67″E. AOI #4 is a small possibly joint civil/military walled compound less than one kilometer from one of the potential locations of the Sariwon Potash Fertilizer Complex. It includes vehicle sheds, administrative and other support buildings, as well as a two two-tiered multi-story building that could be related to academics or research. There are also four probable concrete cylinders in the facility, three of which are covered and one uncovered. It is likely that they were used for storage at some point, however all now appear to be derelict. Civilian and military flatbed trucks are routinely seen in the compound.
Figure 50. The fourth AOI, located less than a kilometer from one of the Sariwon Potash Fertilizer Complex potential locations, includes vehicle sheds, administrative buildings, and a possible academic- or research-related building. It is a possible joint civil and military facility. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
The function of this facility is unidentified, however its location to the fertilizer complex, likely joint civilian and military function and additional infrastructure (multi-story buildings) not normally expected of a military facility, make it a site of interest.
Area of Interest Five – 38°29′17.49″N 125°49’52.55″E. This military base is located approximately 1.5 kilometers northwest of potential locations for the chemical complex and comprises three connected compounds. The main compound includes a large central open area, surrounded by probable barracks buildings. Military trucks are regularly seen in this area, although normally in small numbers. There is a separate substantial vehicle parking and maintenance area to the north of this compound. A second, separately secured, smaller compound may have been a technical support area for the main facility at one point, however, now appears to have largely been turned into an agricultural area.
The third compound is probably a headquarters, administrative and logistical support hub. The layout and size of the facility, coupled with observable probable training and small arms ranges, indicate that this is likely to be a military training base and there is no evidence of an NCDB Bn presence. However, this cannot be ruled out.
Figure 51. AOI #5, a military base, has three connected compounds. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Area of Interest Six – 38°29′28.27″N 125°49’02.56″E. AOI #6 has a similar layout to AOI #5 and is located only approximately one kilometer away. It also has an open central courtyard surrounded by probable barracks buildings although is configured slightly differently in that it has a probable HQ/admin building facing this main compound. There are also a sizeable military vehicle parking and storage area and a separate vehicle compound attached, with its own entrance and support area. There is a probable large vehicle inspection ramp in the compound, which may indicate this as a deeper vehicle maintenance yard.
Figure 52. The last AOI for the 36th NCDB Bn may have a deeper vehicle maintenance yard. It is similar in configuration to AOI #5. Image: Google Earth, annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected].
Conclusion
The aim of this study was to determine the extent to which military sites of interest (in this case NCDB Bns) could be identified as being potentially linked to a North Korean CW program through the analysis of publicly available imagery. Given the paucity of recent open-source reporting, search areas were wide and the analysis necessarily superficial and illustrative. However, the sites detailed above indicate the most likely identified candidates for the location of NCDB Bns. Respective locations in the vicinity of industrial chemical facilities known or suspected to be linked to a CW programme, the presence of military equipment, tunnels and bermed buildings and associated facilities were used to narrow down options, however, in the absence of more detailed collateral, only one of these potential sites (18th NCDB Bn) has been positively identified, if defector reporting is accurate. There is nothing on imagery to confirm that this base, or any of the other potential sites still accommodate an NCDB Bn, if they once existed. Sites are all individual and there is no apparent single template or layout that marks them as having the same function, including when compared to the 18th Bn.
A more detailed, longer-term analysis of each of these bases, supported by up-to-date collateral information would be needed to provide a higher confidence assessment about the existence, role and locations of NCDB Bns. Although outside the scope of this project, an analysis of equipment and personnel present during official parades, may confirm the existence of dedicated NBC vehicles, equipment and formations, and the identification and monitoring of discrete artillery and rocket launch training ranges may provide further indications of their existence.
