By Isha Qarsoon

Somalia’s government frames its dispute with the United Arab Emirates as a foreign policy disagreement. It is better understood as a failure of governance. The dispute did not fracture the federal system; it exposed the absence of an authority capable of exercising sovereignty on behalf of the state as a whole. It revealed that Somalia does not have a functioning federal government. Somalia’s federal history is consistent with this reality.

In 2018, the relationship between Somalia and the United Arab Emirates deteriorated following the UAE’s port agreement with Somaliland and its expanding engagement with Somali regions outside Mogadishu. President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (Farmaajo) framed these actions as violations of Somalia’s sovereignty. The federal government treated the episode as a serious breach but did not expel the UAE or sever diplomatic relations. Instead, the UAE’s federal military training program ended after Somali authorities seized funds from a UAE aircraft in Mogadishu and the UAE announced the termination of that program.

The federal response is better explained by exclusion than by principle. Mogadishu was not a party to the Somaliland agreement and had no role in its negotiation, oversight, or financial returns. Somaliland had long operated outside federal authority, but this arrangement also left the federal government without leverage or visibility. Engagement with the UAE did not end however. Instead, security and political interaction continued in narrower and less transparent forms. The evolution of the relationship, rather than a complete rupture, shows that the dispute escalated because a relationship that bypassed the federal government was treated as unacceptable.

What followed matters even more. The 2018 dispute did not end UAE–Somalia military engagement. It ended a specific form of it. Prior to April 2018, the UAE maintained a formal and overt security partnership with the federal government, including training Somali National Army units, providing logistical support, and financing soldier stipends. That arrangement collapsed after Somali authorities seized UAE funds at Mogadishu airport, which the federal government framed as a sovereignty violation, and the UAE terminated its official training mission.          

Yet disengagement was partial. In the years that followed, federal–UAE relations shifted into narrower and less transparent forms of security cooperation, including continued financial and logistical support to Somali security units operating in and around Mogadishu. That residual engagement explains why Emirati military equipment remained in Somalia and was only recently withdrawn. At no point did the federal government articulate or enforce a comprehensive framework to govern this relationship, nor did it apply consistent rules across the federation. The result was not a sustained assertion of sovereignty, but a pattern in which formal cooperation ended while practical engagement continued and objections were applied selectively.

In Puntland, which had established security and political relationships with the UAE well before 2018, cooperation continued openly and with little disruption. Puntland did not contest Somalia’s sovereignty or pursue separation. It remained within the federal system and participated in federal institutions, while simultaneously maintaining external relationships that predated the 2018 dispute. The federal government neither prohibited these engagements nor enforced regulatory constraints against them. Whatever objections were raised elsewhere, they were not operationalized in Puntland’s case.

Jubaland’s posture was similar in effect, if less formally articulated. Its leadership maintained external relationships in a context of limited federal reach, relying on regional partners for security and political support. While UAE engagement with Jubaland was less institutionalized than in Puntland prior to 2018, it was not newly created in response to the dispute that centred in Somaliland, nor was it meaningfully curtailed afterward. Federal response took the form of political objection rather than institutional control.

At the same time, Mogadishu itself did not maintain a consistent position of exclusion. After the 2018 dispute, formal military cooperation ceased, but relations were not severed. Diplomatic channels were later restored, and practical engagement resumed in uneven and largely opaque ways across finance, facilitation, and political interaction. No comprehensive foreign-relations framework was adopted, and no enforcement followed earlier objections. The federal government neither treated the UAE as a permanently excluded partner nor imposed binding rules to prevent engagement by federal member states. Against this background, the recent trigger demands explanation. The events preceding it do not account for a sudden rupture, but instead reveal a longer pattern in which cooperation was tolerated, objections were selectively asserted, and regulation remained absent.

The explanation lies largely outside Somalia. The Yemeni figure was not significant because of Somali law or domestic Somali politics. The issue was regional. Saudi Arabia treats the Yemen conflict as a core national security concern, and activity involving Yemeni political figures linked—directly or indirectly—to the UAE had become increasingly sensitive in that context. Somalia’s territory and airspace mattered because they intersected with that regional conflict, not because Somalia’s own governance principles had materially changed.

That context helps explain the abruptness of the response. A relationship that had been tolerated for years across Mogadishu, Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland was suddenly reframed as a sovereignty violation once the regional stakes shifted. The trigger was external rather than institutional. The federal government reacted to changing regional dynamics rather than applying a pre-existing rule or enforcing a standing foreign-relations framework.

That shift exposed an underlying weakness. Authority depends on consistency. If UAE engagement violated sovereignty, the objection should have been raised earlier and applied evenly. It was not. The federal government tolerated the relationship when it aligned with political, security, or financial interests. Objection emerged only after the regional context changed. That history weakened the federal claim and shaped the response of the regions.

From the perspective of Puntland and Jubaland, this was not the enforcement of an existing rule. It was a new position announced without institutions to support it. The regions were being asked to absorb the consequences of a shift they did not initiate. Compliance offered no clear protection. Defiance carried limited risk.

The response followed accordingly. Puntland and Jubaland rejected the federal position. Somaliland reinforced its separate stance. No enforcement mechanism followed. The confrontation dissipated without resolution.

The recent UAE–Somalia dispute reflects a broader condition. Federal authority does not operate across Somalia. The federal government does not command regional forces or enforce law without consent. Its authority outside Mogadishu is limited and conditional.

Earlier disputes between the center and the regions concerned internal political and constitutional matters and remained within a Somali framework. The UAE dispute is different. It involved external relationships that existed for years with federal acquiescence. Once entrenched, reversing them required capacity the federal government does not have. Puntland and Jubaland rely on external support and depend little on Mogadishu. When challenged, they maintained those relationships. No penalty followed.

That outcome exposes underlying structural problems under federalism. The federal government lacks enforcement capacity. Regions remain within the federation without binding limits or accountability under federal law, allowing them to engage foreign actors without consequence. Somalia exists as a recognized state, with a parliament and a capital, but authority does not extend beyond Mogadishu. Federal directives are contested and compliance is optional. This is why the UAE dispute matters. It shows that Federal Member States can disregard federal authority in foreign relations with impunity. This is not about Somaliland, Puntland, or Jubaland. It is about Somalia. Even in Somalia without Somaliland, the federation exists in name only.

Isha Qarsoon
Email:  Ishaqarsoon1@gmail.com