In recent weeks, key stakeholder countries on the Korean Peninsula have omitted the term “denuclearization” from their official national security documents, raising questions about the future of the North Korean nuclear issue.

• The latest US National Security Strategy, released on December 4, 2025, does not mention “North Korea” or “denuclearization”—a stark departure from previous versions in 2017 and 2022.
• The South Korean president on December 2 unveiled a new three-point North Korea policy calling for a “nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.” According to South Korean officials, this formulation was intended to maintain the policy goal of denuclearization while avoiding a term anathema to Pyongyang. Earlier, in September, the president announced the “END Initiative,” with END standing for “exchange, normalization and denuclearization.”
• China’s white paper Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era, issued on November 27, briefly addresses the Korean Peninsula but omits any mention of the nuclear issue or “denuclearization.” Instead, it reiterates that Beijing “adopts an impartial stance and adheres to the right approach of always working for the peace, stability and prosperity of the peninsula and the resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue through political means,” calling on relevant parties to resume dialogue. This omission tracks with China’s practice of dropping “denuclearization” from its official statements and documents after July 2023.

Russia appears to have already given North Korea tacit recognition of its nuclear status in private settings. In reporting on the October meeting between the North Korean and Russian foreign ministers, North Korean state media said Russia expressed “full support” for Pyongyang’s efforts to defend “the state’s present position”—an apparent reference to North Korea’s claim to nuclear status. Previously, both Putin and Lavrov have made comments that seemed to signal de facto recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status.

The meaning of these omissions from official statements and documents by key stakeholder countries remains unclear, as do their implications for North Korea’s position on future nuclear negotiations. Importantly, both the US and South Korean governments continue to emphasize that denuclearization remains their policy goal toward North Korea, despite the language in their latest policy documents.

North Korea has yet to react to the latest US, Chinese, and South Korean documents. It is possible, given the upcoming Party events, that official responses are being withheld for now. At the very least, the Ninth Party Congress, scheduled for 2026, is likely to shed light on Pyongyang’s foreign policy direction for the next five years.