By Abdijaliil Osman
A Looming Constitutional Crisis in Mogadishu
Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is entering the final stretch of his four-year term with barely six months remaining. Yet instead of preparing for a smooth transfer of power, he appears to be laying groundwork to extend his rule. Elected on May 15, 2022, President Mohamud has enjoyed most of his term relatively unchallenged – buoyed early on by a “total war” campaign against Al-Shabaab that rallied public support. But that campaign’s momentum has long since stalled, and the nation now faces a cascade of crises: a faltering offensive against insurgents, a brewing constitutional showdown, and scandals over land grabs and corruption. The big question dominating political circles in Mogadishu today is whether anyone can halt President Mohamud’s apparent plan to cling to power at all costs.
Whispers from Villa Somalia suggest discreet meetings are exploring a possible two-year extension of Mohamud’s mandate. Such rumors come despite the president’s public insistence that he will not seek extra time in office. In September, Mohamud told the BBC that only the electoral commission could delay the vote and that “no individual politician has veto power” over the timetable. Opposition leaders remain unconvinced. They note that his administration has delayed regional elections, rushed contentious constitutional amendments, and pushed an unrealistic timeline for a one-person-one-vote election – all moves they say are calculated to justify prolonging his tenure. Somalia’s provisional constitution mandates a presidential election by May 2026, and any attempt to bypass that deadline risks igniting a political firestorm. The memory of 2021 looms large: when former President Mohamed “Farmaajo” tried to ram through a two-year term extension, it triggered armed clashes in the capital and international censure. Mohamud himself was among the chorus of critics then. Ironically, he now stands accused of deploying the very playbook he once decried.
Loyalists in High Places: Mohamud’s Inner Circle
To execute his plan, President Mohamud has carefully surrounded himself with loyalists holding the levers of security and administration. These figures – some controversial in their own right – form an inner circle intent on keeping him in power. Take the recent appointment of Hassan “Muungaab” as Mayor of Mogadishu and governor of Banadir region. Muungaab governed the capital in 2014–15 and gained notoriety for pervasive graft; every public project under his watch seemingly required a personal kickback. His reinstallation in May 2025 was billed by Villa Somalia as tapping an experienced hand, but many Somalis saw it for what it was: entrenching a crony known for land deals and strong-arm tactics. “This isn’t about reform… it’s about putting a loyalist with a known appetite for public land back in a position to serve both himself and the presidency,” one Somali analyst observed bleakly. Indeed, Muungaab’s name became synonymous with the sale of public lands in Mogadishu during his prior tenure, now, critics fear a return to impunity as he protects Mohamud’s interests in the capital.
Mahad Salat, Muungaab and Fiqi
Over at the Ministry of Defense, a similar pattern prevails. Defense Minister Ahmed Moalim Fiqi has emerged as the President’s attack dog against domestic rivals. Fiqi, a former security czar with a checkered past, has made no secret that his priority is crushing political dissent. “Absolutely no one can walk around Mogadishu with a gun,” he proclaimed recently – a thinly veiled threat aimed at opposition figures considering mass protests or forming militias. “If anyone attempts to take up arms in Mogadishu, they will regret it,” Fiqi warned, pointingly reminding Somalis of the violent crackdowns during the 2021 crisis.
Rather than focus on Al-Shabaab, the defense minister spends his energy publicly deriding “so-called opposition voices” as “noisemakers” and vowing to meet them with force. Such rhetoric has sent a chill through the capital. To Mohamud’s opponents, Fiqi’s appointment was never about bolstering the fight against terrorists, it was about installing a loyal enforcer to intimidate any challenge to the President’s rule.
Perhaps the most telling move was Mohamud’s decision in mid-2025 to reappoint Mahad Mohamed Salad as head of NISA, Somalia’s intelligence agency. Mahad Salad had been Mohamud’s close ally in the ruling party, but was ousted from the spy chief post earlier amid factional intrigue. By June 2025, however, Villa Somalia brought him back, just as the election dispute was heating up. Analysts read the reinstatement as a strategic bid to tighten control over the security apparatus ahead of a contentious electoral season. Mahad Salad is a savvy operator with deep political links (he even maintains ties with Egypt’s government) and a history of partisan loyalty. His return to NISA came only days after opposition leaders openly accused Mohamud of plotting a term extension. The timing was no coincidence. It signaled that the President wants trusted eyes and ears at the helm of intelligence, not only to counter Al-Shabaab threats, but to monitor and preempt any moves by his rivals. In effect, Mohamud has placed key security posts in the hands of loyalists who owe their power to him, ensuring the regime’s stability as the clock runs down on his term. This well-calculated consolidation of influential figures – from city hall to defense to intelligence – gives the President a formidable domestic firewall against efforts to unseat him.
Foreign Policy Misfires and Isolation
While President Mohamud fortifies his position at home, his standing abroad is marked by isolation and inconsistency. Unlike his predecessor, he has struggled to cultivate robust international backing. In fact, over the past two years Somalia’s foreign policy has often appeared adrift – oscillating between regional partners and leaving all sides uneasy. A telling episode came in late 2024. In October of that year, President Mohamud entered a tripartite security pact with Eritrea and Egypt, aligning with those countries amid Horn of Africa tensions. But barely two months later, his government struck a surprise deal with Ethiopia that would grant Addis Ababa access to a Somali Red Sea port. Asmara and Cairo were reportedly blindsided by Somalia’s sudden shift toward Ethiopia, feeling betrayed after the earlier alliance. Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki was so incensed that he threatened to sever ties, and Mohamud hastily flew to Asmara on an emergency visit to mollify him. At the same time, Mohamud dispatched his foreign minister to Cairo to soothe Egyptian fears. The damage, however, was done.
These flip-flops reinforced a growing perception that Somalia’s president lacks a coherent foreign policy and is willing to abandon partners for short-term gain. As one Eritrean diplomat put it, the Somali-Ethiopia naval base accord was “rushed and ambiguous” – and utterly “unanticipated” by Somalia’s erstwhile allies.
The upshot is that Mohamud today finds himself with fewer enthusiastic friends on the world stage than perhaps any Somali leader in recent memory. Western donors have voiced quiet alarm that his combative political tactics are undermining Somalia’s fragile progress. Washington, for instance, has privately signaled frustration that Mohamud’s unilateral approach – sidelining federal states and opposition is stalling critical reforms and even slowing the fight against Al-Shabaab. Meanwhile, traditional allies in the region offer only lukewarm support. President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh of Djibouti remains one of Mohamud’s closest confidants – the two share a long friendship, and Djibouti’s influence was instrumental in Somalia’s 2000 peace conference that birthed the current federal system. Guelleh can be expected to advocate for Mohamud in regional forums, if only to preserve stability. Similarly, Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni, as a major troop contributor to the African Union mission in Somalia, has often favored continuity in Mogadishu; Museveni’s government has shown little appetite for rocking the boat over Somali internal politics. Mohamud appears to be counting on such regional allies to acquiesce to an extension or disputed election, preferring an incumbent they know over the uncertainty of a succession crisis.
Perhaps most significantly, the African Union itself has shown signs of endorsing Mohamud’s administration even as Somalia’s political turmoil deepens. In mid-2025, the newly elected AU Commission Chairperson, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf – formerly Djibouti’s foreign minister – made Mogadishu his first official visit. Villa Somalia touted the visit as a diplomatic victory, a symbol of pan-African solidarity with Mohamud’s government. The optics indeed suggested that the AU’s leadership “stands with” Somalia’s president at this critical juncture. Official communiqués spoke of support for Somalia’s security and governance efforts. Behind the scenes, of course, the AU is anxious to avoid a repeat of 2021’s chaos. African Union envoys and regional IGAD diplomats have quietly urged Mohamud’s rivals to keep talking and avoid any action that could splinter the Somali state. Publicly, African and Arab partners continue to pose for photos with Mohamud, congratulating his initiatives and pledging support. But this outward calm may simply be papering over Somalia’s growing storm. Despite all the foreign trips and summit handshakes, Mohamud has secured no binding guarantees that would legitimize a term extension. At best, some neighbors might turn a blind eye to a flawed electoral process; at worst, his government could lose what external legitimacy it has left. In sum, President Mohamud’s foreign policy maneuvers have yielded more skepticism than solidarity. His international standing rests on a shaky foundation – one built on short-term alliances and personal rapport, rather than the consistent, principle-based partnerships Somalia so desperately needs.
Rising Opposition and Talk of a Parallel State
Facing what they view as an impending autocratic power grab, Somalia’s opposition leaders are mobilizing with unprecedented unity and determination. In recent months, nearly all major opposition factions – including influential former presidents and prime ministers – have coalesced into a coalition variously known as the Somali Salvation Forum or “Madasha Mustaqbal Soomaaliya” (Future of Somalia Forum). These figures accuse Mohamud of steering the country toward authoritarian rule and have vowed to stop him from rewriting the rules to stay in office. Notably, two federal member states, Puntland and Jubaland, whose leaders have long been at odds with Villa Somalia, have joined forces with this opposition bloc. In early October 2025, Jubaland’s President Ahmed Madobe hosted a high-profile gathering in Nairobi with Puntland’s Said Deni and a slate of opposition heavyweights. The outcome was the formation of a “Somalia Future Council,” an opposition platform that aims to “unify national efforts” and chart an alternative roadmap for the 2026 transition. This development has fundamentally altered Somalia’s political chessboard. For the first time in over a decade, a sitting Somali president faces a coordinated front of federal states and opposition parties that no longer recognize his mandate as legitimate.
The stakes of this confrontation could not be higher. Opposition leaders warn that if Mohamud attempts to engineer an extension or a sham election, they may take the drastic step of establishing a parallel government. Already, whispers abound of a contingency plan to convene an alternative “national consultative” process in a place like Garowe (Puntland’s capital) or Kismayo (Jubaland’s capital), effectively creating a rival authority to challenge Mohamud’s claim to the presidency. Such a scenario – two dueling governments each claiming legitimacy – has not been seen in Somalia since the chaotic 1990s.
It would be an extreme outcome, but as one former Somali official observed, “if things continue on this trajectory, by May 2026 we could wake up to find we have two presidents – one in Villa Somalia and one in a regional capital.” The mere hint of this speaks to how far the situation has deteriorated. Indeed, the Jubaland-Puntland alliance’s recent moves have already strained relations with Mogadishu to the breaking point. Diplomats fear that if dialogue collapses entirely, opposition-held regions might refuse to participate in any vote organized by Villa Somalia, deepening the fissure.
On the ground, the opposition’s grievances are resonating with many Somalis tired of broken promises. The Salvation Forum’s lawsuit filed in September accuses Mohamud’s administration of gross abuses: unconstitutional power grabs, selling off public lands, forced evictions of poor families, and failure to stem corruption and insecurity. They point to the forcible clearance of communities in Mogadishu to benefit politically connected developers as evidence that the regime is enriching itself while ordinary Somalis suffer. Moreover, critics say Mohamud’s relentless focus on cementing his own position has come at the expense of the fight against Al-Shabaab – a war that is now backfiring dangerously.
In fact, after initial gains in 2022, the Islamist insurgents have rebounded. Earlier this year, Al-Shabaab launched its largest offensive in years, recapturing swathes of territory in central and southern Somalia and even creeping closer to Mogadishu. Opposition figures argue that this resurgence is no coincidence: they contend that leadership failures and political infighting in Villa Somalia have distracted from the counter-insurgency campaign. Instead of uniting the country against a common enemy, they say, Mohamud has been consumed by silencing dissent and bending laws to extend his tenure. It is a damning indictment – that personal ambition at the top is undermining Somalia’s security and state-building efforts. And it bolsters the opposition’s appeal to Somalis and international partners alike: if Mohamud will not play by the rules, he must be stopped for the good of the nation.
Somalia at a Crossroads: The Perils of Power and Greed
Somalia today stands on the edge of a political precipice. Less than a year ago, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was touting a vision of completing a new constitution and ushering in universal elections to deepen Somalia’s democracy. Now, that lofty reform agenda has devolved into a bitter struggle over whether Somalia will have an election at all – or a new autocrat in the making. The coming months will be pivotal. The choices made by Somalia’s leaders, lawmakers, and international backers will determine whether the country navigates a fragile transition in 2026 or collapses into an unprecedented crisis of legitimacy.
For Somalia’s international partners – from the African Union and United Nations to the donor countries funding Somalia’s recovery – the message from Mogadishu should serve as an early warning. Propping up a leader bent on defying his term limit could push Somalia into turmoil it can ill afford. The last time a Somali president attempted extra-constitutional rule, in 2021, it nearly unraveled the federal state and led to street battles. This time could be worse: the insurgency remains potent, clan tensions are inflamed, and the economy is dire. A showdown over Mohamud’s mandate could splinter the country along regional and clan lines, undoing decades of fragile progress. Somalia’s partners should think twice about offering unconditional support or blind eyes to undemocratic maneuvers. Stability achieved by undermining democracy is a false bargain – it risks fueling the very instability it seeks to prevent.
And to President Mohamud himself, the situation demands statesmanship, not stubbornness. At 70, he is old enough to remember Somalia’s painful history and the consequences of leaders who clung to power. He came to office promising a break from the past, a chance to heal divisions and rebuild a nation shattered by decades of conflict. That legacy is now in danger of being overshadowed by a personal quest to remain in the Villa. Mohamud would do well to reflect on where Somalia has come from – the sacrifices made since the Arta conference 25 years ago – and ask whether his actions honor those sacrifices or threaten to destroy them. Somalia cannot afford a return to the politics of “winner takes all.” It is already divided enough. True leadership now would mean ensuring a credible election or consensual transition, even if that means Mohamud stepping aside for the sake of national unity.
In the end, Somalia’s nascent democracy will only survive if respect for the rule of law outweighs the temptations of power. The coming weeks and months will test that principle. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s legacy and Somalia’s future hang in the balance. Will he be remembered as the statesman who shepherded his country through a delicate transition, or as yet another ruler whose greed and hubris drove Somalia to the brink? The world is watching – and so are the Somali people, hungry for accountable leadership. It is not too late for Mohamud to change course and pull back from the abyss. But the window is closing. Somalia stands at a crossroads between a hopeful democratic future and a fragmented, fragile “third republic” born of political greed. The choices made now will echo for generations. The hope is that wisdom prevails over ambition, and that Somalia’s leaders spare their nation a disastrous descent into crisis. History, and the Somali public, will judge them accordingly.
Abdijaliil Osman
Email: abdijalilosman@gmail.com
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Abdijaliil is a Video Journalist and Podcaster, best known as the host of “Abdijaliil Show” on YouTube — one of the most influential Somali-language digital platforms. Through in-depth interviews, documentaries, and thought-provoking discussions.
