Marrakech – The fabricated narrative of a separate “Sahrawi people” stands today as one of the most calculated political manipulations of the post-colonial era. The recent UN Security Council Resolution 2797, adopted October 31, exposes this decades-long charade by endorsing Morocco’s autonomy plan as the sole framework for resolving the Western Sahara dispute. The resolution marks the final collapse of an obsolete separatist ideology crafted in the crucible of Cold War geopolitics.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro, known by its Spanish acronym “Polisario,” was established on May 10, 1973, by Sahrawi-origin youth studying at Mohammed V University in Morocco’s capital, Rabat.

Rooted in strong Arab socialist and leftist ideas, the group launched a few limited attacks against Spanish colonial forces in the Spanish Sahara during 1973.

Its key founders included El-Ouali Mustapha Sayed, Mohamed Abdelaziz, and Ould Sheikh Beidallah, all of whom embraced leftist socialist ideology inspired by revolutionary movements of the era – an era of radical decolonial, anti-imperialist, Sandista-inspired ideology.

The historical record exposes a stark truth: before Mauritanian diplomat Ahmed Baba Miske defected to the Polisario, the movement’s founder, El-Ouali Mustapha Sayed, spoke exclusively of the “Arab people” of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro.

Sayed himself was a Moroccan national who attended primary school in Tan-Tan in 1962, then continued his studies at the Islamic Institute of Taroudant in 1966 with outstanding results, earning scholarships to attend Mohammed V University in 1970.

There, he studied law and political science, becoming the first student in the history of Moroccan universities to score 19 out of 20 in Constitutional Law.

Born in 1948 in a nomadic encampment on the hammada desert plains, El-Ouali’s parents were poor, and his father was disabled. Severe drought and the aftermath of the Ifni War forced his family to abandon their Bedouin lifestyle and settle near Tan-Tan in southern Morocco in the late 1950s.

His early years, education, and socialization were therefore shaped entirely within the Moroccan cultural and institutional framework – a fact that underscores the artificial nature of the later separatist narrative and his claim to Sahrawi identity.

Another prominent founder, Mohamed Abdelaziz Rgubi, was born on August 17, 1948, in Kasba Tadla, Morocco. He pursued secondary studies in Marrakech and later university studies in Rabat until 1973. He was the son of Khalili Ben Mohamed Al-Bachir Rgubi, a veteran of the Moroccan Liberation Army who later served in the Royal Moroccan Army.

Abdelaziz’s father lived in Morocco with part of his family and served as a member of the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs. He was also granted two transport licenses for the Rabat-Casablanca-Essaouira route, one by King Hassan II in 1983 and another by King Mohammed VI in 2002.

Abdelaziz would later become the president of the self-proclaimed “SADR” (so-called Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic) from 1982 until his death in 2016, after which the leadership passed to Brahim Ghali.

The engineered identity: A systematic fabrication

It was Miske who systematically invented and codified the concept of a distinct “Sahrawi people” through his ideological treatise “Polisario: Soul of a Nation.”

Miske was not the only Mauritanian within Polisario – the organization harbored numerous Mauritanians, Algerians, Malians, and others who had no historical connection to the territory.

In its formative phase, the Polisario positioned itself as a radical leftist movement rooted in an artificial identity construction that emerged from a rigid revolutionary framework aimed at fighting Spanish colonialism and fomenting revolution across Maghreb nations.

The founding document of Polisario, issued on May 20, 1973, declared that the front was formed as “a single mass expression” aiming to liberate the Sahrawi people from Spanish colonialism using revolutionary violence and armed action.

Crucially, this founding statement made no mention of fighting against Morocco, as most of its founders were sons of the Liberation Army who had fought for Morocco in battles like Sidi Ifni.

The transformation of Polisario into an anti-Moroccan movement came later, engineered by Libya under Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, who harbored a pathological hatred for monarchies and sought to destroy them. Algeria was another orchestrator still smarting from its defeat in the Sand War against Morocco and desperate to save face and impose its Maghreb hegemony.

The movement received unlimited support from Gaddafi’s regime in Libya and was embraced by Algeria, which allowed for the establishment of Polisario camps in Tindouf Province in the south. Military training camps for Sahrawis proliferated across both countries throughout the 1970s, revealing the external powers’ manipulation of the conflict from its inception.

The early Polisario actively suppressed authentic Hassani cultural symbols, like the traditional daraa garment, to avoid appearing as a genuine local movement with distinct cultural roots. This deliberate cultural erasure reveals the fundamentally ideological – rather than indigenous – nature of the separatist project.

The native inhabitants identified themselves primarily by tribal affiliation, under the comprehensive Beidane designation, or even embraced the term “Moros” used by Spanish colonizers – a direct reference to their Moroccan heritage.

In fact, one of the Polisario’s underlying ambitions was to establish a Beidane state stretching across southern Morocco, southern Algeria, northern Mali, and northern Mauritania – a trans-Saharan entity uniting tribes under a single ethno-cultural banner.

The movement’s origins were deeply intertwined with Morocco, yet as the Mauritanian state emerged with an overwhelmingly Beidane identity, the Polisario’s vision evolved into a Beidane-centric project of its own. This explains why individuals from multiple countries came to believe in and rally behind the idea, seeing in it a pan-tribal cause that transcended modern borders.

This identity engineering was not spontaneous but carefully crafted. As Moroccan scholar Karim Serraj reveals, the very notion of a “Sahrawi people” was born under Franco’s colonial regime in the 1960s. Spanish anthropologists, instructed to counter Morocco’s territorial rights, fabricated a homogeneous “Sahrawi ethnicity,” erasing tribal divisions to create the illusion of a nation distinct from Morocco, and therefore carve out borders more easily for their benefit.

The project was later amplified by Mexican universities such as UNAM, which, during the 1970s, spread Polisario’s propaganda under Third Worldist and anti-imperialist rhetoric. Their writings turned a colonial invention into an international academic narrative, eventually audaciously embraced by Western intellectual circles that had never set foot in the Sahara.

Even declassified 1977 CIA reports noted that Algeria’s true objective was not self-determination but domination – to establish a puppet microstate subservient to Algiers, granting it access to the Atlantic and weakening Morocco’s regional standing. This strategic manipulation masqueraded as liberation, concealing a geopolitical design to fragment the Maghreb.

In fact, most residents of the Tindouf camps are either Moroccans abducted during the conflict or individuals brought from Mali, Mauritania, and Algeria. This is precisely why Algeria persistently rejects every United Nations (UN) call for a census, fearing exposure of this demographic manipulation.

The nomadic lifestyle of the region’s tribes further discredits the notion of a territorially-defined “Sahrawi people.” Tribal extensions spread across what is now Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria, with seasonal migrations that paid no heed to colonial borders.

This fluid tribal geography presents an insurmountable challenge to the separatist narrative, exposing its fundamental flaw: how can self-determination apply to a territory when the supposed “people” extend far beyond its artificial boundaries? The question dismantles the myth at the very heart of the Polisario’s creation.

The ideological contradiction

Polisario’s ideological architects deliberately avoided defining who qualified as “Sahrawi,” creating a vague, intractable problem during identity verification for the proposed referendum that Hassan II agreed to in the late 1990s. Their convoluted solution – defining Sahrawis by reference to a Spanish census – exposed the fundamental contradiction of their position.

This definition, even in its falsity, would have allowed Mauritanian members of Polisario’s political bureau to vote, including Ahmed Baba Miske himself. Even more absurdly, the wife of former Polisario leader Mohamed Abdelaziz – an Algerian Reguibi from Tindouf who had never set foot in Western Sahara – would have been granted voting rights. Her father had been the first Algerian mayor of Tindouf after Algeria’s independence.

The irony, of course, lies in the fact that Tindouf itself was historically Moroccan – part of the Eastern Sahara, whose inhabitants paid allegiance, “bay‘a”, for centuries to the Sultans of Morocco. The region was carved out of Morocco by colonial France and attached to Algeria, which Paris believed would remain permanently under French administration.

During the struggle for Algerian independence, France even used Tindouf as leverage to pressure Morocco not to support the National Liberation Front (FLN), a diplomatic card meant to fragment Maghrebi unity. Yet Morocco, guided by pan-Maghreb solidarity, chose to believe that the territorial issue would be resolved amicably “between brothers” once Algeria gained independence – until Algeria turned against Morocco, leading to the tragic Sand War.

The region’s last Moroccan caïd, Hadj Abdallah Ould Sidi Ould Senhouri, was appointed by Sultan Mohammed V in 1953. After leaving Tindouf in protest against the new colonial reality – affirming his lifelong loyalty to Morocco, as his ancestors had always done – he was later honored by King Hassan II in 1967 as honorary caïd of Tan-Tan.

The logical inconsistency becomes even more apparent when considering tribal distributions: why should an Algerian Reguibi have no right to self-determination while his cousin in Smara does? Why would a Mauritanian Tekna or Delimi be excluded from deciding their destiny in northern Mauritania? If they are all “Sahrawi people,” as claimed, these arbitrary distinctions become untenable.

The absurdity reached its apex with the late Polisario leader Mohamed Abdelaziz, who, in a notorious interview, admitted that while he was considered “Sahrawi,” his own father, living in Tadla, Morocco, was not. This arbitrary classification reveals the fundamentally implausible nature of the separatist project.

Moreover, the vast majority of the Tekna tribe, with members residing in Assa, Tantan, Guelmim, and Smara, were rejected during the identification process. This raises another impossible question: if they participated in a referendum and voted for independence, would they relocate to the so-called “Western Sahara,” or would Morocco surrender the cities of Guelmim, Assa, and Zag to the “Sahrawi Republic”? Would Mauritania hand over Zouerat and Atar, or Algeria relinquish Tindouf?

Polisario leadership understands that creating a definitive list of eligible voters is impossible and fundamentally absurd. Spanish census records cannot answer the essential question: who is Sahrawi?

King Mohammed VI demonstrated remarkable courage when he declared an end to this impractical referendum approach and opened the door to an alternative solution to this futile conflict. He could have easily maintained the status quo preferred by Algeria and Polisario: a referendum that would never happen and a perpetual conflict.

The legal meaning of self-determination

Based on official UN documents, MINURSO reports, and even diplomatic cables from within Morocco’s foreign service, it becomes clear that few international missions are as misunderstood – or as deliberately misrepresented – as the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

The purpose here is to outline the mission’s actual mandate and the true meaning of self-determination under international law, in order to pre-empt the predictable Algerian propaganda that seeks to downplay Morocco’s latest diplomatic triumph: the entrenchment of autonomy as the only viable framework for any future negotiation.

Contrary to the illusion still perpetuated by certain actors, MINURSO’s mandate no longer includes organizing a referendum on self-determination. Over time, its tasks have been narrowed to three operational pillars: monitoring the ceasefire between the parties, overseeing demining operations and supporting confidence-building measures in coordination with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and facilitating the political process under the guidance of the UN Secretary-General and his personal envoy.

Its mission, therefore, is not to determine sovereignty or administer a vote of independence, but rather to create the conditions for a negotiated, mutually acceptable political solution – a framework that the Security Council has consistently reaffirmed.

Practically, MINURSO is the only UN peacekeeping mission in the world without a human-rights monitoring mechanism, a reality that reflects the kingdom’s sovereign prerogatives. Its vehicles carry Moroccan license plates; its headquarters and surrounding compounds fly the Moroccan flag; and its personnel have their passports stamped by Moroccan authorities upon entry.

Each of these is a symbolic and administrative affirmation of Moroccan sovereignty – non-negotiable red lines that Rabat has defended firmly. When former UN Envoy Christopher Ross and then-Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon sought to modify the mission’s scope in 2016, Morocco expelled part of the MINURSO contingent, signaling unmistakably that Rabat will never accept any erosion of its sovereign control.

In UN doctrine, self-determination does not automatically mean independence – nor does it require a referendum. The UN Charter itself does not prescribe any specific mechanism for exercising this right, nor does it define independence as its necessary outcome.

Foundational resolutions such as 1514 (1960), 1541 (1960), and 2625 (1970) identify several legitimate modalities: independence, free association, integration, or “any other political status freely determined by a people.” Nowhere do these texts designate the referendum as the obligatory  – or even the preferred – method.

In fact, out of 64 cases examined by the UN since its creation, only five referenda were ever conducted – most of which yielded complex or contested results, underscoring that the referendum model is the exception, not the rule.

In the Western Sahara, the referendum approach collapsed under the weight of its own impracticality. The tribal, nomadic, and trans-border nature of Saharan society made it impossible to define an electorate linked to a fixed territory.

The identification process dragged on for more than a decade, before the UN itself concluded that an operational referendum was unworkable – a conclusion confirmed in UN report S/2000/131 and reiterated by Personal Envoy James Baker’s successor, Alvaro de Soto Van Walsum.

By 2004, the Security Council had effectively abandoned any reference to a referendum in its annual resolutions. Instead, it called for “a political, practical, and mutually acceptable solution,” signaling the institutional recognition that the only sustainable path forward lay in negotiated autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.

The definitive pivot came with Morocco’s Autonomy Initiative, presented on April 11, 2007, which redefined the contours of self-determination itself. The initiative offered an advanced form of regional self-government, combining local self-rule with national sovereignty – a model lauded internationally as realistic, credible, and consistent with the UN Charter.

Subsequent Security Council resolutions have explicitly tied the principle of self-determination to this Moroccan proposal. The most recent resolution, adopted on October 31, not only extended MINURSO’s mandate for another year, but also requested the Secretary-General to conduct a six-month strategic review of the mission’s future, aligning it with ongoing negotiations and political realities on the ground.

This language represents an unmistakable endorsement of the autonomy paradigm as the only workable, enduring framework capable of ensuring stability and regional cooperation.

The recalibration of the UN’s position on Western Sahara marks a profound doctrinal shift – from the theoretical ambiguity of “self-determination” to the tangible practicality of autonomy. It reflects a decades-long diplomatic victory for Morocco, grounded in patience, institutional maturity, and credibility.

The mission that once envisioned a referendum has evolved into one that consolidates peace, supports development, and implicitly recognizes Moroccan sovereignty. This evolution also explains the fierce Algerian resistance to the most recent Security Council resolution. Having exhausted its procedural and diplomatic arsenal, Algeria’s delegation ultimately refused to participate in the vote, signaling both strategic frustration and diplomatic isolation.

The trajectory of MINURSO and the reinterpretation of self-determination converge on a single, undeniable truth: the Moroccan Autonomy Initiative is not merely a proposal – it is the cornerstone of international consensus and the only credible pathway toward a lasting settlement.

It preserves the rights of Saharan inhabitants, aligns with global legal precedents, and enjoys broad diplomatic support. Far from being a setback to any party, this paradigm embodies the triumph of realism over rhetoric, diplomacy over dogma, and sovereignty over separatism – a reality that no amount of propaganda can obscure.

The collapse of a failed narrative

The fractured ideology that once propelled the separatist movement now stands utterly discredited. The FOSATIN forum reported dramatic scenes in Tindouf camps following the UN resolution, with spontaneous celebrations by autonomy supporters quickly suppressed by Polisario security forces. The forum described “stolen moments of joy that did not last long as Polisario repression forces intervened to prevent them, disperse crowds, and impose a curfew.”

This repressive response reveals the deep fissures within the camps, where a growing number recognize the autonomy solution as the only path forward. FOSATIN further documented a dangerous security breakdown with “armed attacks and looting operations amid the complete absence of Polisario militias,” who were preoccupied with preventing celebrations of the UN resolution.

A particularly troubling incident occurred in the Tichla district of the so-called Auserd camp, where “a large group of masked men riding a four-wheel drive vehicle and carrying firearms attacked food storage warehouses.”

The attackers fired shots to intimidate people, with women screaming and one bystander desperately pleading: “Leave us some flour.” The armed group later raided the tent of a relatively affluent Sahrawi family, stealing valuables and money at gunpoint.

The Sahrawi Peace Movement (MSP), a breakaway faction from the Polisario Front, was founded in 2021 by Hach Ahmed Bericalla, a former senior Polisario official who defected to promote a pragmatic and peaceful resolution to the conflict.

Reflecting the natural evolution of Sahrawi society, MSP embraced Resolution 2797 as establishing the autonomy proposal as “a valid basis for reaching a realistic, consensual solution, and above all ‘without losers or winners’ as the King of Morocco solemnly proclaimed on Friday, October 31.”

The MSP said that “the Security Council, by prioritizing this approach, redefines the parameters of international legality, moving the problem from the rigid framework of decolonization to a political logic based on negotiating a compromise formula.”

The Canary Saharan Forum stressed that the resolution represents “the strongest endorsement by the international community of the autonomy proposal presented by the Kingdom of Morocco in 2007.”

The Forum has consistently maintained since its founding that “the Moroccan autonomy proposal represents the only realistic way to end half a century of conflict and reunify terribly fractured Sahrawi families.”

The legitimacy of Morocco’s position has been consolidated with unprecedented international support. The United States recognized Moroccan sovereignty in 2020, followed by Spain in 2022, France in 2024, and the United Kingdom in June 2025.

More than 20 European Union member states have expressed support for the Moroccan plan, with almost 30 countries opening consulates in Laayoune and Dakhla as unequivocal testimony to the recognition of Moroccan sovereignty.

The resolution received 11 votes in favor, three abstentions, no votes against, and notably, Algeria’s absence from the vote altogether. According to Elliott Abrams, who became involved in the dispute in 2002 as Senior Director for the Near East and North Africa in the George W. Bush administration, “Slowly but surely it has become clear to countries around the globe that this is the right solution: autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, not the creation of a new failed state under the non-democratic rule of the Polisario backed by Algeria.”

The authentic voices

Inside Morocco, where the authentic Sahrawi population resides, tribal leaders expressed their unequivocal support for the resolution.

The sheikhs of Sahrawi tribes in Laayoune-Sakia El Hamra released a statement declaring the resolution “enshrines the full and complete legitimacy of Morocco’s sovereignty over its Sahara” and “confirms, once again, the failure of all illusory maneuvers directed against the kingdom’s position.”

Sidi Hamdi Ould Errachid, president of the Laayoune-Sakia El Hamra region, affirmed that the resolution “illustrates the extent of international support for the Moroccan autonomy plan and consolidates the kingdom’s territorial integrity,” emphasizing that “our brothers in the Tindouf camps are fully considered as Moroccan citizens.”

The tribal sheikhs issued a powerful appeal “to their brothers and cousins in the Tindouf camps to return to the motherland and contribute to the development of the southern provinces and the building of a united, strong and prosperous Morocco.”

Fifty years since the Green March, the international community has decisively rejected the outdated ideological constructs of a bygone era, embracing instead the pragmatic reality of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.

In response to the resolution, Polisario announced its formal withdrawal from negotiations and any UN political process, a move that FOSATIN described as “cementing its isolation and refusal to submit to international legitimacy.”

This reactionary stance only confirms what has been increasingly evident: the separatist movement represents a Cold War relic desperately clinging to an obsolete ideology while the international community moves forward with a pragmatic, humanitarian solution.