Trump and Kim signing joint statement at Singapore summit in 2018.

Resolving the North Korean nuclear issue remains as elusive as ever, despite more than three decades of diplomatic efforts by key stakeholders to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula and pursue the normalization of US-North Korea relations through denuclearization. The first and second US-DPRK summits in Singapore (2018) and Hanoi (2019) appeared to offer a potential breakthrough, yet ultimately failed to yield progress. Since the collapse of the Hanoi summit, North Korea has significantly advanced its weapons of mass destruction programs. Meanwhile, the shifting geopolitical landscape has gifted Kim Jong Un with a new heyday in North Korea’s relations with Russia. In sum, North Korea has been empowered, reinforcing the prevailing view that the Korean Peninsula’s security situation may be now at its most precarious since the Korean War.

President Trump has not given up on engagement and has expressed a willingness to meet with the North Korean leader during his current trip to Asia. Given Kim’s refusal to discuss denuclearization, the US will need to find other avenues of approach to the DPRK leader.

Against this backdrop, 38 North spoke with General (Ret.) Dan “Fig” Leaf to gain his perspective on the current situation on and around the Korean Peninsula, his proposal to formally end the Korean War, and the opportunities and challenges that such an initiative entails. General Leaf is former deputy commander and acting commander of US Pacific Command and former director of the Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS).

38 North: You have been a strong advocate of a US “peacemaker” role on the Korean Peninsula and ending the Korean War. Could you elaborate on your thinking behind this proposal?

Dan Leaf: There are three premises to my concept. First, decades of well-intentioned US policy have failed to deter North Korean provocations, prevent nuclear development, and improve human rights in the DPRK. It is time to try something different.

Secondly, the risk of potential nuclear conflict with the DPRK is real, and that should make finding a new, more effective approach to this US national security problem and urgent priority.

Lastly, the nation that leads the United Nations Command (UNC) and that signed the Armistice Agreement in that capacity must take a leading role in establishing a permanent peace arrangement on the Korean Peninsula. Given the difficulties of reconciling competing interests at the outset illustrated by failure of the Six Party Talks, the new effort should begin with a unilateral US effort that takes a principled approach to preparation for any opportunity to replace the Armistice with a peace treaty.

There is real work to be done prior to embarking on formal treaty negotiations. In a discovery phase, the US government should seriously study past failures and successes in peacemaking. There are no perfect parallels to the 73-year standoff since the Armistice was signed, but we can learn from US-Vietnam reconciliation and our participation in Northern Ireland conflict resolution. Negotiators must be prepared to address Korean War Armistice compliance and violations by both sides. Understanding situations where the agreement has succeeded or failed will inform effective negotiation and guide development of a sustainable treaty.

US negotiators must enter the room with vetted national positions on key issues likely to arise in the peace process such as which nations deserve a seat at the table and with what role. They need to have a plan for the process and substance normalized post-Armistice land and sea boundaries. The transition of Armistice-related organizations like the United Nations Command and Military Armistice Commission and their responsibilities will be complicated and must be accomplished in a way that does not create a security vacuum. Without a plan for a formal Truth and Reconciliation process, peace will not be possible—nor will it if the United States is unprepared to guide and participate in that endeavor. These preliminary stances cannot be set in stone; they will necessarily evolve through negotiations with both Koreas.

38 North: What would a process for ending the Korean War look like? What role would the United States, South Korea, and each China play?

DL: The first and most necessary step is for the United States to reimagine its role regarding the Koreas. For decades, the preeminent focus has been war prevention. No doubt we must continue to deter North Korean aggression with our South Korean allies. At the same time, while maintaining peace through strength, we should also make peacemaking our primary objective.

Prioritizing peace is consistent with the Trump administration’s policies. Secretary of War Hegseth has emphasized warfighting readiness, citing a decline in focus within the military. I agree—readiness is the foundation of credible deterrence. President Trump has touted his considerable peacemaking successes, some of which would not have been possible without compelling combat capability. In Africa, Europe, Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia, US street cred was built on the big stick of American military might.

The initial US only initiative will naturally transition to a multilateral solution. Our interagency preparation should not be intended to supplant the ROK role, rather to enable success. Once adequately prepared for substantive negotiation of a peace treaty to finally, formally end the war, South and North Korea must be drawn into the discussion, and the United States role may or may not shift from principal to interlocutor.

China will understandably insist on participation. Beyond Chinese participation in the Korean War, the have valid strategic considerations in the future of the Peninsula. Those are complex—from reducing nuclear risk, to trade with South Korea, to a desire to counter US influence. In some cases, their goals will be contrary to ours, but they still must be dealt with directly.

38 North: You have written extensively about the need for a lasting peace, and have spoken publicly about it many times. You have shared with 38 North that you also pursue behind-the-scenes engagement with US officials and other interested parties. For example, you recently returned from a trip to China. I understand you met with some of the scholars there who study North Korea. Based on your latest exchange with them and your own reading of open-source reporting, what is your assessment of North Korean stability and the security situation on and around the Korean Peninsula?

DL: My travel to China leverages relationships built on active military duty and as the Director at Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS). It is important to note that I visit at their invitation, and as a private citizen, not as a US official or employee of the government. That allows me to speak freely on a variety of issues of concern to both countries, and I think my hosts appreciate that. I work to stay informed on American policy and perspectives. I support United State policies, and the discussions are frank but collegial.

On Korea matters, I try to emphasize areas where US and Chinese interests can be served by the pursuit of a permanent peace. Writ large both countries will be well-served by the kind of paradigm shift a formal end to the Korean War would bring. The devilish details must be addressed, but for US attempts at progress to succeed, China must at least not impede our initiatives and better still, could play a constructive role.

I will not attempt to speak for the Chinese, but I did gain valuable perspectives in my most recent trip by sitting down with policy influencers and academics, some who have recently traveled to the DPRK. This is what I concluded from the discussions:

• There is significant development activity in North Korea as part of Kim Jong Un’s 20×10 project.
• That development is likely enabled by Russia’s compensation for North Korean armaments and troops to assist the war against Ukraine.
• Positive relations with Russia and North Korea are important to PRC.
• That said, I sense that Beijing is uneasy about the expanded Russia-North Korea ties and sees them as a potentially destabilizing factor in the Northeast Asia security environment.
• Therefore, China may be inclined to tolerate and perhaps assist US efforts and engagement with Kim Jong Un.

38 North: Let’s talk about the role of the UN. What more could and should the UN be doing to try to settle the war? Who at the UN should be leading this initiative? From a UN perspective, where does the nuclear issue fit into war settlement efforts?

DL: The United Nations and its member states will have a role, but at the outset, I expect it to be ancillary. The Security Council has imposed numerous sanctions on the DPRK that will be key considerations on the path to a treaty. However, the competing interests and priorities of the antagonists and other interested parties, particularly Russia, make it unlikely that the UN can play a central role in negotiations.

38 North: As you know, Kim Jong Un announced a two Koreas policy at the end of 2023, defining South Korea as a permanent hostile state and altogether ruling out peaceful unification. Kim also indicated that North Korea would be defining its “territory” in the constitution. How might North Korea’s changed policy on South Korea and unification, and possibly its future territorial claims, affect any effort to end the Korean War?

DL: Two issues have served the primary barriers to peace. The first, denuclearization, must remain a US imperative, but needs to be deferred in favor of establishing an environment where it will eventually be achievable. The second Gordian knot is reunification of the two Koreas.

Kim’s declaration that unification is not possible provides an opening. It will be far easier to transition from his designation of North and South as distinct enemy states to separate friendly states. Korean reunification may or may not be an eventual outcome of a permanent peace, but proceeding from a state of war to peaceful reunification has proven to be the ultimate bridge too far.

Even though South Koreans’ support of reunification is lower than ever according to a recent government poll, this is still an emotionally charged issue for a vocal minority in those who advocate and lobby regarding US policy on North Korea. A conservative cabal argues that a free and unified Korea is the only acceptable end state. “Free” in this context presumes the demise of North Korea, and it is difficult to imagine this would be a winning talking point with Kim Jong Un.

Reunification advocates see return to a single Korea as an imperative, necessary to right the historical wrong of division by external powers. The Soviet Union and the United States agreed to partition the Peninsula into two occupations zones, adding lasting injury to the insult of 35 years of brutal occupation by Imperial Japan. Morally sound as that rationale is, a practical path from the precarious situation today to a utopian end state does not exist.

38 North: Now, let us turn to the challenges and limitations of your proposal. A number of scholars and practitioners have warned against replacing the Korean Armistice with a peace agreement, fearing that a premature settlement could destabilize the region further. What is your response to this perspective? What do you see as the key challenges and limitations of your proposal?

DL: Opponents of a peace agreement generally emphasize possible second-order consequences. They worry that a treaty will lead to a precipitous withdrawal, abandonment of denuclearization, and possible North Korean attack on South Korea. None of these need to be foregone conclusions, and US preparation for peace must address risk-mitigation. The American government should also study the failures of the 1954 Geneva Conference, the Agreed Framework, Six Party Talks, and policy of Strategic Patience. The tragic aftermath of the Paris Peace Accords merit special consideration. By learning and applying these lessons, the US can significantly decrease the potential for post-Treaty disaster.

I worry more about the consequences of a failure to make peace—the potential for an intentional or accidental nuclear exchange, and the perpetuation of our ineffectiveness at addressing human rights within the North. Is there risk to negotiating the end of the Korean War? Of course. But the risk of sustaining the dangerous status quo is much greater.

There will be nothing easy about the US-only preparation for crafting a peace treaty to the actual arbitration of an agreement. Nor is success guaranteed. But inaction—failure to do this hard work—will doom the Koreas and the rest of the world to an unacceptably dangerous future.

Lt. Gen. Dan “Fig” Leaf is a retired three-star Air Force general and combat fighter pilot who last served on active duty as Deputy Commander of the US Pacific Command. He later returned to public service as the Director of the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies under the Department of Defense. Leaf is the Managing Director of Phase Minus 1, a conflict resolution and security consulting company.